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Abstract
The attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI) has changed con-
siderably over the last two decades as many governments around the globe
have liberalized their FDI regulations since the early 1980s and are now
actively providing generous investment incentives to attract inward FDI
(UNCTAD, 2003). The rationale for these policies often stems from the
expectation of FDI spillovers (Caves 1974, Cantwell 1991a, Dunning, 1992),
which embodies the fact that foreign rms own technological advantages 
such as technological know-how, marketing and managerial skills, interna-
tional experience, and reputation which can be transmitted to domestic
host countryrms, raising their productivity level (Blomström and Kokko,
1998).
Generally, spillovers are said to take place when the entry and pres-
ence of MNCs a¢ liates leads to productivity or e¢ ciency benets in the
domestic rms and the multinational corporations (MNCs) are not able to
internalize the full value of these benets (Blomström and Kokko, 1998).
Such spillovers may occur either in the foreign a¢ liatesown industry or in
other industries among the a¢ liates suppliers or customers. Intra-industry
spillovers may materialize through three main channels. First, there are
"demonstration-related spillovers", when the foreign rms after entering the
market demonstrate their advanced technologies to domestic rms which
may afterwards adapt and imitate them. Second, there are "competition-
related spillovers", when the increase in competition that occurs as a result
of foreign entry forces domestic rms to introduce new technology and/or
work harder. And third, there are "worker mobility-related spillovers", when
domestic workers trained by or working in MNCsa¢ liates may decide to
leave and join an existing or open up a new domestic rm, taking with them
some or all of the rms specic knowledge.
A large amount of literature has developed over the last two decades on
the concept of intra-industry spillover e¤ects. Too often, existing studies
have merely o¤ered a partial description of these e¤ects, since each of them
was concerned with analyzing only one means of the e¤ects. Moreover,
they have treated the mechanism by which the technology is transferred
as a black box. Our study o¤ers a more complete picture of FDI intra-
industry spillovers by distinguishing these e¤ects according to their diverse
channels. It hypothesizes that the size and the extent of spillovers depend
largely upon the mechanisms by which they occur, since the amount and
the nature of the technology di¤used di¤er to a great extent according to
the way it is transmitted. In addition, domestic technological characteristics
such as domestic absorptive capacity and regional proximity are also taken
xix
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into account in our study along with spillover channels, so as to allow for
more detailed analysis of spillover e¤ects.
The aim of this thesis is thus to focus in detail on the role of FDI channels
as well as domestic absorptive capacity and regional dimension in determin-
ing the magnitude and the extent of possible intra-industry spillover benets
from FDI. Unlike existing studies, it calls upon a detailed analysis of these
e¤ects according to the mechanisms by which they occur. It argues that the
size and the extent of spillover benets depend largely upon the interaction
between the mechanisms by which they occur and the technological levels
of domestic rms. In addition, geographical proximity between foreign and
domestic rms is an important element in determining the size and the ex-
tent of spillover e¤ects; spillovers are more likely to occur between neighbors
than other more distant rms.
On the basis of these hypotheses, this thesis proposes some components
for a research agenda on FDI spillover e¤ects, on both the theoretical and
the empirical levels. Relatedly, we develop an evolutionary model of intra-
industry spillovers embodying the above hypotheses and we test our theoret-
ical nding against empirical evidence for Switzerland using both qualitative
and quantitative analyses to the best of our knowledge, this study is the
rst to explore the Swiss case. For the qualitative analysis, we held inter-
views with managers of foreign and domestic rms of diverse industries from
manufacturing and services/construction, operating in Switzerland; while
for the quantitative analysis, we made di¤erent regression estimations to
assess the size and the extent of intra-industry spillovers. Our regression
analysis makes use of a thorough measure of domestic absorptive capacity
in which the learning and investment e¤orts of domestic rms come with
their existing technological capacities; argument disregarded by most exist-
ing empirical studies.
Our simulation and empirical results seem to conrm our hypotheses,
in which high and mid technology rms benet a lot from, respectively,
competition and demonstration e¤ects, while low technology rms unable
to benet from foreign a¢ liates via demonstration e¤ects alone, manage to
reap this benet via the recruitment of MNCshuman capital, in that this
channel provides some assistance which can help them to imitate successfully
the foreign knowledge. Our results also demonstrate that the geographical
dimension matters for intra-industry spillovers. Furthermore, the regression
results show that only domestic rms which largely invest in the absorp-
tive capacity benet from spillovers, resulting mostly from the technology
transfer.
xx
Introduction
The multinational corporation (MNC) is an important agent in host
countries, in so far as it is able to substantially e¤ect their economic devel-
opment, since it is largely assumed to be the provider of knowledge, capital,
capabilities and markets, the creator of jobs, the supplier of foreign currency,
the competition stimulator, etc. (Dunning, 1992, 1993). Most host countries
have liberalized their foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations and have
been encouraging the inow of FDI by, for example, providing generous in-
vestment and/or tax incentives, enforcing the patent regime, etc.1 The main
motivation for these policies is the assumption of spillover benets to the host
country resulting in productivity growth. The most expected potential ben-
et is the prospect of acquiring new technology which may spill over to the
host country and allow domestic rms to improve their performance (Buck-
ley et al., 2003). This stems from the fact that MNCs are assumed to possess
a countervailing advantage over the host countrys (domestic) rms (Hymer,
1960, 1968). They use advanced technology (production technology, mar-
keting and management technique, etc.) which makes them more e¢ cient
than domestic counterparts (Dunning and Rugman, 1985). Knowledge can
be transferred either voluntary through technology transfer agreements or
involuntary through spillovers.
Generally, spillovers are said to take place when the entry and the pres-
ence of MNCs a¢ liates lead to e¢ ciency benets in the host countrys do-
mestic rms and the MNCs are not able to internalize the full value of these
benets (Blomström and Kokko,2 1998). Intra-industry spillover e¤ects3 
the focus of this study are assumed to occur through three channels. First,
there are demonstration e¤ects, when the foreign rms after entering the
market demonstrate their advanced technologies; they may afterwards adapt
and imitate them. Second, there are competition e¤ects,when the increase
in competition that occurs as a result of foreign entry forces domestic rms
to introduce new technology and/or work harder. Third, there are "worker
mobility e¤ects", when domestic workers trained by or working in MNCs
1The attitude towards foreign direct investment has considerably changed in the last
two decades as many governments around the globe have liberalized their FDI regulations
since the early 1980s and are now actively providing generous investment incentives to
attract inward FDI (UNCTAD, 2003).
2Blomström and Kokko (1998) add that these e¤ects may take place either in the
foreign a¢ liates own industry or in other industries, among the a¢ liates suppliers or
customers.
3The reasons for studying intra-industry spillovers are detailed in section 3 of the
following chapter.
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a¢ liates may decide to leave and join an existing or open up a new domestic
rm, taking with them some or all of the MNC-specic knowledge.
1. Intra-industry spillover assessment as a very di¢ cult task
A large literature has developed over the last two decades around the
concept of intra-industry spillovers. Despite the policy relevance, spillover
e¤ects of FDI on host economies are not well understood. So far, results
have been mixed for country studies and evidence on spillovers has not yet
been conclusive (chapter 3).
Too often, existing theoretical studies merely o¤ered a partial description
of FDI spillovers, since each of them was concerned with analyzing only one
means of those e¤ects. For example, in Findlay (1978) and Das (1987)
spillovers are determined by the degree of foreign presence alone (contagion-
type spillovers). In Wang and Blomström (1992) and Perez (1998) spillovers
are rather endogenously generated by the technological competition between
foreign a¢ liates and domestic rms (competition-related spillovers), while
in Kaufmann (1997) and Fosfuri et al. (2001) spillovers are the outcome
of worker mobility e¤ects. Just as spillovers have not been analyzed at the
theoretical level for a complete picture with respect to their diverse channels,
so empirical studies have only given partial analyses of these e¤ects. In fact,
spillover e¤ects are by and large measured by the share of foreign presence
in the corresponding industry. This variable seems to be inappropriate to
capture much of the competition and worker mobility-related spillovers; it
can only hold the information about demonstration e¤ects. This is one of
the reasons why there are contrasts in the scant empirical evidence available.
Thus, the assessment of the existence and the extent of spillover benets
for given rms (industries or countries) calls upon a detailed analysis of
these e¤ects according to the ways they occur. As a result, disentangling
the e¤ect of demonstration and worker mobility from that of competition by
employing technology and competition control variables is required. Such
modeling strategy is likely to describe more correctly the process of spilling-
over and then identify with accuracy the nature and the size of the resultant
e¤ects.
Other possible reasons for the apparently contradictory ndings from the
country studies are that local characteristics and regional proximity may in-
uence the incidence of spillovers. That is, rstly, it is argued that relatively
high technology rms are likely to benet from spillovers through demon-
stration and/or competition e¤ects, while small technology rms which are
not in a position to compete with foreign rms, may reap benets from other
forms of spillovers such as worker mobility, since this channel provides some
personal assistance which can help domestic rms to better understand and
implement foreign technology (Mody, 1989). Thereby, only rms with very
low technological competence, to a point that they are not capable of reaping
prots via any of the spillover channels, enter into a process of cumulative
decline and eventually leave the market. Secondly, spillover benets tend
to occur and be more pronounced in locations where domestic rms are
2
2. The approach in this thesis
close to their foreign counterparts, so that as geographic distance increases,
spillovers decrease (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
2. The approach in this thesis
This study di¤ers from previous ones with respect to three main points:
rst, it o¤ers a more comprehensive picture of FDI intra-industry spillovers
by distinguishing these e¤ects according to their diverse channels. Second, it
hypothesizes that the size and the extent of such spillovers depend upon the
interaction between the mechanisms by which they occur and the technology
levels of domestic rms. And third, it assumes that spillovers are more likely
to occur in neighborhood rms than other more distant ones.
This thesis proposes some components for a research agenda on FDI
spillover e¤ects, at both theoretical and empirical levels.
With regards to our theoretical contribution, we develop an evolution-
ary model of intra-industry spillovers in which we embed the question of
spillovers examined in Perez (1998), wherein he explained the process of FDI
spillovers by means of a dynamic interaction between foreign and domestic
rms at the technological level, into a larger one by allowing for di¤erent
mechanisms by which domestic rms benet from FDI. In fact, to protect
its market share, a domestic rm may choose to innovate or imitate foreign
technologies according to its technological competence. Domestic rms may
choose to acquire the best foreign practice technology via either the demon-
stration mechanism or the recruitment of MNCslabor.4 Then, successful
learning drives domestic rms to improve their competitive power relative
to their foreign counterparts. Such improvement is likely to be higher when
foreign and domestic rms are neighbors. Given the complexity of the dy-
namics dened by the equations of the model, we use simulation techniques
to explore its outcome. The simulation results reported in detail in the
chapters that follow seem to conrm our hypotheses.
Regarding our empirical contribution, thesis hypotheses are tested against
the empirical evidence for the Swiss economy using both qualitative and
quantitative analyses of data. To the best of our knowledge, this study
is the rst to explore the Swiss case. Switzerland is a particularly inter-
esting example for this study given that it experiences increasing ows of
inward FDI over time. Switzerland is one of the small European countries
which, like Austria and Norway, recorded sharp increases in inward FDI
over the last years, mainly in 2003, which even surpassed those of outward
investment. It is regarded to have achieved competitive technological levels
in many industries such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and watches. The
Swiss government is more and more active in attracting foreign MNCs.5 In
addition, as argued by Robinson and Schweizer (2006), existing clusters,
4MNCslabor denote the domestic workers who have trained by or worked in MNCs
a¢ liates.
5Favourable tax treatments are provided for many forms of foreign investment (Ser-
met, 2003).
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such as in Biotechnology, nancial services, trading, and pharmaceuticals
also help dene Switzerland as a driving place to do business.
For our qualitative analysis, we interviewed managers of foreign and do-
mestic rms of diverse industries from manufacturing and services/construction,
operating in Switzerland. Such rms and industries have been selected ac-
cording to the industrys and rms technological capacities, so as to have
a heterogeneous rm sample with diverse technology levels. The industrys
and rms technology gaps are used to measure the industrys and rms
technological capacities, derived from innovation activity surveys of manu-
facturing and services/construction rms, conducted at the Swiss institute
for business cycle research "KOF".
While our attention in quantitative analysis focuses on testing the size
and the extent of intra-industry spillovers according to the mechanisms by
which they occur, the levels of technological capacity of domestic rms 
expressed in terms of technology gaps, and the levels of their learning and
investment e¤orts undertaken to absorb foreign knowledge measured by the
level of investment expenditures in new equipment and training activities
for product/process innovation.6 The share of total sales in the industry ac-
counted for by foreign rms is used to capture the demonstration-imitation
productivity e¤ects and other control variables are used to assess competi-
tion and worker mobility-related spillovers. The data for econometric analy-
sis is derived from KOF innovation activity surveys (2002 and 2005) of man-
ufacturing and services/construction rms.7
Empirical analyses conducted in the last part of the thesis conrm to a
great extent the simulation results; so we conclude that empirical evidence
for Switzerland seems to support our hypotheses.
3. The organization of this thesis
Following this introduction, three parts are developed:
Part I: This part consists of three chapters devoted to reviewing and
discussing the existing literature of MNCs and spillover e¤ects. In chapter
1, we review the various strands of theoretical thought which explain the ex-
istence and growth of MNCs and the main kinds of foreign production they
own and control. Then we discuss the resultant e¤ects of MNCs foreign
activities on the competitiveness of the nations receiving them, consider-
ing both the direct and the indirect (spillover) e¤ects. Chapters 2 and 3
present, respectively, a survey of existing theoretical and empirical studies
of spillovers in the relevant literature and highlight the main shortcomings
of existing analyses. The theoretical literature on spillovers, discussed in
chapter 2, distinguishes three strands of studies according to the way they
occur: spillover benets that are simply determined by the degree of foreign
6Learning and investment e¤orts of domestic rms are important to come with their
existing technological capacities, so as to provide in the approved manner a thorough
measure of the domestic absorptive capacity.
7We try to bridge the gap by testing spillovers for service/construction industry since
there is scarce evidence on this aspect.
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presence in the industry  in this way, knowledge is di¤used when foreign
a¢ liates come into contact with existing domestic users by way of demon-
stration. Spillovers are rather endogenously generated by the technological
competition between foreign a¢ liates and domestic rms. And the most
recent strand wherein spillovers are assumed to occur mainly from worker
mobility. Chapter 3, devoted to analyzing existing empirical studies, takes
into consideration the possible explanations of the negative or insignicant
results when assessing spillovers. There exist studies dealing with the impor-
tance of local and foreign characteristics in determining spillovers. Others
explore the question of measurement and linearity of spillover variable, and
discuss the role of the regional dimension on spillovers.
Part II: In part 2 our focus shifts to the formulation of an alternative
model wherein the precise process of spilling-over is correctly described and
then the impact of this process is exactly identied. We develop our theoret-
ical model of spillovers within an evolutionary perspective. Thereby, chapter
4 gives some insights about the basics of evolutionary theory by presenting
its main outcomes in the eld of economic dynamics, and analyzing the
explanatory power of its models and its applicability in the framework of
FDI spillover analyses. Chapter 5 discusses in detail the thesis hypotheses
and arguments treated in this introduction and presents the equations of our
evolutionary model formulated with respect to these hypotheses. To explore
the outcome of this model, simulation technique is used in chapter 6 which
examines the results obtained by way of computer implementation. It rstly
comments on the relationship between spillover e¤ects and the interaction
between spillover channels and technology gaps, and then makes explicit the
relation between regional proximity and spillovers.
Part III: The third part analyzes the empirical evidence of the model
presented in part 2, using data from Switzerland. Thus both qualitative and
quantitative analyses are conducted to examine spillover e¤ects in Switzer-
land. Chapter 7 analyzes data and descriptive statistics about FDI in
Switzerland and the performance of domestic rms vis-à-vis their foreign
counterparts. It also examines the distribution of those ows both in Switzer-
land and in the world, the performance of domestic rms vis-à-vis their for-
eign counterparts, and the contribution of foreign rms to the development
of human capital in Switzerland. Chapter 8 summarizes the results from a
number of interviews conducted with Swiss and foreign rms. We summa-
rize the methodology adopted for making interviews, and then report the
interview results. Finally, the last chapter presents the econometric model
embodying the properties of the thesis and discusses the estimation results.
At the end of the parts, we sum up our theoretical and empirical nd-
ings and the implications that follow. Thereafter we point out some of the
limitations to this thesis and some areas for future research.
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Part 1
Multinational Corporations and
Spillovers in the Relevant Existing
Literature: A Survey
As previously noted, the topics discussed in this study form part of large
debate on the e¤ects of the FDI by MNCs, which give particular emphasis
to spillover e¤ects in the host countries. FDI is increasingly considered to
be the main conduit of new technologies between countries the creation,
di¤usion, and commercialization of technological innovations is one of the
main characteristics of MNCs (Dunning and Gugler, 1994). It is argued that
inward FDI is the principle source of positive spillovers for host (developed
and developing) economies (Dunning 1992 and Buckley et al. 2003). Many
governments around the globe have liberalized their FDI regulations since
the early 1980s and are now actively providing generous investment incen-
tives to attract inward FDI (UNCTAD, 2003). While the expected potential
benets include among others, employment creation, capital formation, ex-
port promotion, etc., the main motivation for these policies often stems from
the expectation of FDI spillovers resulting in productivity enhancement of
domestic rms. In fact, MNCs are assumed to possess a countervailing
advantage over the domestic rms in host countries (Hymer, 1960) since
they use advanced technology in production, marketing, management, etc.
which makes them more e¢ cient than domestic rms (Dunning and Rug-
man, 1985). Such advanced technology may spill over to domestic rms
allowing them to improve their performance. Compared to international
trade, the spillover e¤ects derived from FDI to host countries are larger and
the importance of the trade channel is much reduced once FDI is controlled
(Safarian and Hegazi, 1999).8
The earliest discussions of the e¤ects of FDI on the technological devel-
opment of domestic rms in the literature date back to the early 1960s and
emanate from the theory of international production this theory serves to
reveal a better understanding of MNCsactivities. As Cantwell (1989, page
119) said, the theory of international production (as set out, for example,
in Dunning, 1981, or Caves, 1982) has typically addressed a related set of
issues. It has, on the one hand, attempted to answer questions about the
geographical location of production by MNCs, the export versus local produc-
tion decision, and its e¤ect on the industrial structure of national economies
(see, for example, Hirsch, 1976; Caves, 1980; and Dunning, ed., 1985) . . .
Indeed, the attention of the theory of international production has pri-
marily focused on studying the reasons for investing abroad. Diverse thoughts
emerged over time and have been concerned with analyzing the determinants
of MNCsbehavior. Scholars of international production theory have also
discussed the motives for foreign production and the role of MNCsactivities
in the economic development of host and home countries both the direct
and the indirect or the spillover e¤ects.
A large literature has developed over the last two decades on the spillover
e¤ects of FDI for host countries with a major concern with intra-industry
spillovers at both the theoretical and the empirical levels. Both the de-
terminants of and the motives for MNCsforeign production appear to be
8Safarian and Hegazi (1999) study spillovers at country level. They do not distinguish
between the diverse types of FDI spillovers.
important factors in determining the potential spillover benets "Identify-
ing the variation and dynamics in behavior among rms and across sectors
is crucial in understanding how FDI a¤ects the host country" (Chung et
al. 2003, page 215). The literature suggests that spillover e¤ects do not
occur automatically but depend largely upon existing characteristics of the
investing rms, viz. existing domestic technological strengths, the degree
of foreign technology complexity, the motivations for investing abroad, the
geographic distance between foreign and domestic rms, etc. Nonetheless,
spillover e¤ects of FDI on host economies, as we will see in chapters 2 and
3, are not well understood; results have been mixed for country studies and
evidence on spillovers has not been conclusive yet. It is our opinion that a
more satisfactory model of spillover e¤ects providing a deeper understand-
ing of the process involved and the channels of knowledge transfer is still
required so that the impact of this process can be exactly identied. In this
context, our study, as we shall see in parts 2 and 3, o¤ers a more compre-
hensive picture of FDI intra-industry spillovers at both the theoretical and
the empirical levels by distinguishing these e¤ects according to their diverse
channels. It hypothesizes that the size and the extent of such spillovers de-
pend largely upon the interaction between the mechanisms by which they
occur and the existing technological levels of domestic rms. It also argues
that geographical proximity is an important element in determining the size
and the extent of spillovers.
The following chapters in this part will concentrate on discussing the
existing literature on MNCs as an important agent for spillover benets
for host countries. We shall try to o¤er a critical account of this litera-
ture, attempting to identify its main weaknesses and thereby single out our
approach developed in parts 2 and 3. Chapter 1 studies the behaviors of
the MNCs by discussing the determinants of their foreign activities, their
motives, and their contributions to international technology transfer and
the competitiveness of receiving host countries  in line with Chung et al.
(2003) we will highlight the importance of MNCs behavior in addressing the
question of host country e¤ects, especially spillovers. Chapter 2 discusses in
detail the existing theoretical models of intra-industry spillovers and chapter
3 presents the main results of the existing empirical studies on the topic.
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CHAPTER 1
Multinational corporations and international
production
An MNC is an entity that engages in international production (FDI) by
means of its a¢ liates located in more than one country. It is composed of
a mother company located in the home country and a number of foreign
a¢ liates located in several other countries called host countries. By way of
international investment, an MNC looks for a diversication of its products.
Economic theory recognizes three main forms of diversication and the same
MNC may exhibit more than one form. A rm may be horizontally diver-
sied if it produces the same product in several di¤erent locations; it may
be vertically diversied if it produces intermediate products corresponding
to di¤erent stages of its same productive sequence; and it is conglomerately
diversied if it produces through di¤erent productive sequences.
The mother company exercises direct control over the policies of its
a¢ liates and own at least 10% of their assets. The degree of MNCs own-
ership over its foreign a¢ liates di¤ers according to the types of FDI or the
entry strategy of the MNCs1: greeneld investments creating fully-owned
a¢ liates, joint ventures between foreign and host countrys rms undertak-
ing economic activity together, and mergers and acquisitions consisting in
transfers of existing assets from host countrys rms to foreign a¢ liates. The
speed of transferring new technologies from mother company to foreign af-
liates is faster for fully-owned a¢ liates than joint ventures, and in turn the
transfer is more rapid when the fully-owned a¢ liates are located in developed
host countries than in developing ones (Manseld and Romeo, 1980). Also
the nature and the amount of technology transferred from mother company
to its a¢ liates di¤er in terms of ownership structures, in that fully-owned
foreign a¢ liates use newer or more sophisticated technologies than jointly
owned investment projects (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2003). MNCs are ret-
icent to transfer their state-of-the art technology to the a¢ liates that do not
1The strength of competition from domestic rivals is emphasized as a determinant
of entry strategy for MNCs (Casson and Buckley, 1998). Tsangs (2005) analysis of the
determinants of foreign market entry mode choice in the context of Vietnam indicates that
also advertising intensity, country risk of Vietnam, project investment amount, project
duration, cultural distance, and location of investment have signicant impacts on entry
mode choice. Calderón et al. (2002) found that MNCs entry mode choice (between
greeneld FDI and mergers and acquisitions) depends on whether the rm invests in
developed or in developing countries. Moreover, Yeheskel et al. (2004) show that the
e¤ectiveness of both international joint ventures (IJVs) and international acquisitions
(IAs) is consequently related to di¤erentiating successfully between the pre- and post-
incorporation stages of these two business forms. A meta-analysis of the determinants of
the MNC entry mode choice can be found in Zhao et al. (2004).
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have full control over their production, so as to prevent their leakage into
the host country (Ethier and Markusen, 1996). Also, the entry of MNCs
through greeneld investment increases domestic capacity and intensies
competition (Casson and Buckley, 1998). This is the reason why greeneld
investment is viewed as the rst target of a host countrys promotional ef-
forts since it leads to transferring the newest technologies. Javorick and
Spatareanu nd that compared to joint venture, only the fully-owned for-
eign investments seem to be associated with positive productivity spillovers
within a sector.2 Thereby, it is clear that the di¤erent types of FDI lead to
di¤erent amounts and natures of spillover benets for host countries; this
argument will be detailed in chapter 3.
Two distinctive features of an MNC emerge from the denition above:
rstly, an MNC organizes and coordinates multiple value-adding activi-
ties (production, marketing, R&D, nancing, and sta¢ ng) beyond national
boundaries and secondly, it internalizes the cross-border markets for the in-
termediate product arising from those activities.3 Such activities lead to sub-
stantial improvement in host countrys productivity in terms of spillovers,
although in some case studies such as Todo and Miyamoto (2006), intra-
industry spillovers for host countrys rms in Indonesia are found to be
generated by R&D activities of foreign a¢ liates, but not by their produc-
tion activities.4 This nding can not conclude that the production activities
of foreign a¢ liates have no positive spillovers for host countries. In fact, as
we shall see in what follows, such spillovers are not automatic but depend
on many conditions relative to the foreign and domestic rms (markets and
countries).
Although our focus in this thesis is on the spillovers within a sector
for host countries, we can not neglect that MNCsoperations abroad also
have positive spillover e¤ects on home countries. In line with Blomström
and Kokko, (1998), we believe that MNCs that focus on investing in, for
example, R&D in foreign industry with leading technologies are very likely to
result in the transferring of valuable foreign technology to the home country.
The spillover e¤ects from MNCsactivities in R&D stem from the fact that
MNCs are increasingly decentralizing their units of R&D by investing abroad
(Pearce 1989, Pearce and Papanastassiou, 1999). This helps foreign a¢ liates
gain access to the knowledge of the host country and learn from innovation
made by local rms; this knowledge will be transferred back to the investing
MNCsunits in the home country, raising their innovation performance and
productivity (Lipsey 2002, Gri¢ th et al. 2004, Falzoni and Grasseni 2005,
Ambos et al. 2006, and Piscitello and Rabbiosi 2006). Consequently, some of
2Policies encouraging foreign MNCs to set up in form of joint ventures may not raise
the benets for the host economy (Meyer et al. 2007).
3Dunning (1992) notes that no other institution engages in both cross-border produc-
tion and transactions.
4Many other studies among others (Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
1996, Feinberg and Majumdar 2001, Van Beers and Sadowski 2003, Gri¢ th et al. 2004,
and Todo et al. 2006) also found that the R&D activities of foreign a¢ liates contribute
to the improvement of the innovative capacities of host countrys rms and then lead to
spillover benets.
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the potential benets for domestic rms in the home country resulting from
their interaction with the investing MNCs may be interpreted as spillovers.5
Besides the types of FDI and the diverse MNCsactivities undertaken
abroad, spillovers within a sector from MNCs to host countries are also
inuenced by other characteristics, mainly those of the receiving countries
 details of those determinants are given in chapters 2 and 3 when out-
line the main existing theoretical and empirical ndings of intra-industry
spillovers for host countries. Before introducing those chapters, we will take
the time to explain in this chapter why MNCs conduct FDI. The following
two sections discuss the determinants and strategic objectives of investing
in international production, which in turn a¤ect the nature and the size of
spillover e¤ects. Section 3 analyzes the diverse spillover e¤ects beneting
host countries, introduces the kind of spillovers we focus on in this the-
sis, and reviews in brief the main di¢ culties encountered in assessing such
e¤ects.6 Finally, the discussion will point to a conclusion.
1. The determinants of multinational corporationsforeign
activities
This section analyzes the main key determinants of MNCsforeign ac-
tivities the rst concern of the theory of international production7 and
highlights their importance in addressing the question of how inward FDI
a¤ects the host economy,8 particularly in terms of spillovers.9 We start with
the seminal work of Hymer who advanced the market power approach to
analyze the determinants of MNCs activities. He explains the behavior of
MNCs by means of market imperfections which still underlie much of the
thinking on the determinants of the MNCsbehavior. Moreover, Hymers
approach underlines the importance of MNCs ownership advantage (the
best foreign practice technology) that the rm must possess over the domes-
tic rms in the host market to make its international investment viable.10
5Spillovers for the home country is detailed in studies as Globerman et al. (2000),
Popovici (2005), and Bitzer and Görg (2005).
6Details of those di¢ culties as well as proposed solutions are presented in chapters 2
and 3.
7It is worth noting that the most explanations of this theory "are concerned with
explaining what rms actually do rather than what they should do" (Dunning 1992, page
56).
8The theory of international production has been extended to embrace the impact
of the value adding activities of MNCs on the economic welfare of host country. In this
respect, as we demonstrate in chapters 2 and 3 , MNCs intra-industry spillover e¤ects on
host countries are not an automatic consequence of foreign entry and presence, but rather
they are much often closely related to the domestic and foreign characteristics (such as,
the type of FDI, the technological level of foreign rms vis-à-vis their domestic rivals, the
technological capacity of domestic rms, etc.). Such e¤ects then vary between countries,
sectors, and rms and also over time.
9We have to note that the term spillovers in this section and the next one embodies
the di¤erent kinds of e¤ects, among others the intra-industry spillovers.
10This being so, foreign-owned a¢ liates are generally assumed to be more e¢ cient
than domestic rms (Harris, 2002).
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Foreign knowledge may thereafter be transferred to domestic rms resulting
in spillover benets.
The theory of MNCs singles out four other streams of thought explain-
ing the existence and growth of MNCs and the foreign activities they own
and control.11 First, we identify the macroeconomic development approach
which seeks to explain the location of the MNCsactivities using the theory
of international resource allocation based on the spatial distribution of factor
endowments and capabilities  it stresses the importance of the countries
comparative advantages in determining the MNCslocation choice and the
level of embeddedness of the MNCsa¢ liates;12 this is the primary deter-
minant of the quality of the FDI (Kojima, 1978, 1982 and Dunning, 1988c).
The embeddedness of MNCs, as suggested by Marin and Bell (2006), is im-
portant in generating spillovers e¤ects to host countries. Narula (2003, page
39) adds that "it is to be noted that rms build on location advantages that
already exist in the host economy (Ritchie 2002), and increases in embedded-
ness are generally in response to improvements in the domestic technological
and absorptive capacity".
Second, the internalization approach is concerned with the ways in which
the cross-border transactions of intermediate products are managed and or-
ganized the costs of organizing cross-border markets in intermediate prod-
ucts is thus considered the main determinant of the existence and growth
of MNCs (Buckley and Casson, 1976). Such costs are determined in close
connection to the extent of the a¢ liates autonomy in shaping their own
technological behavior within the structure and strategy of the MNC 
the heterogeneity in MNCs a¢ liates technological activities (knowledge-
creating or accumulating activities) is regarded as an important source of
di¤erences in spillovers (Marin and Bell, 2006). Third, the eclectic paradigm
of Dunning (OLI) provides an analytical framework for explaining both the
location of the MNCs activities, and the ownership and organization of
these activities. Dunning, along the evolution of his OLI thinking, has also
incorporated an evolutionary aspect to this paradigm to be able to consider
the dynamics of the MNCsactivities in which MNCs both generate and
respond to technological change  identifying the variation and dynamics
in behavior among rms and across sectors is crucial to understanding how
FDI a¤ects the host economy (Chung et al. 2003). Fourth, the technologi-
cal accumulation approach considers the existence and growth of MNCs as
an evolutionary process subject to, among other things, the e¤ects of their
foreign production on both the development of home and host economies
and on the embeddedness level of MNCs.
1.1. Market imperfections and ownership advantages. The rst
contribution to the modern theory of international production was that of
Stephen Hymer (1960, 1968), followed by Kindleberger (1973), who in his
11Detailed analysis of the theory of MNCs can be found in Cantwell (1991b) and
Dunning (1992).
12The embeddedness of MNCs is a matter of how long they have been present in host
country.
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seminal thesis on foreign direct investment and MNCs expresses his dis-
satisfaction with the theory of market perfections of neoclassical economies
to explain the foreign value-added activities of rms. He asserts that in a
world of pure competition, where all the products existing in the market are
homogeneous and there is the perfect mobility of factors and knowledge of
information, direct investment could not exist.13 Drawing upon the theory
of industrial organization (which deals with market imperfections), Hymers
school of thought recognizes that the existence of foreign direct investment
is mainly explained by the following: rstly, MNCs must possess a coun-
tervailing advantage over the local rms to make such investment viable;
secondly, the market of the sale of this advantage (intermediate or/and nal
product markets) must be imperfect and the outcome of business uncertain
(e.g., market structure imperfections, market failure imperfections, market
disequilibrium, and government-imposed distortions as trade barriers).
Among the reasons for Hymers analysis of the determinants of MNCs
activities are that domestic rms have better information on the economic
environment in their country than do their foreign a¢ liates. So MNCs must
possess some special ownership advantage viz. technological know-how,
marketing and managerial skills, international experience or reputation 
over potential domestic competitors in order to ensure the survival of their
a¢ liates vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts in an imperfect market. Such
ownership advantage, as we previously noted, makes the MNCs more e¢ -
cient than their domestic counterparts. Ownership advantage is more often
considered an essential prerequisite for the initial act of foreign production
(Kogut, 1983) it serves, of course, to primarily benet the competitiveness
of the MNC itself, and also, in our view to benet the host countrys rms
that expect to learn from it in order to get the necessary strength to face
the foreign competition. In addition Hymer states that FDI is an equilibrat-
ing force among segmented markets which eventually comes to an end when
equilibrium is reestablished across countries; it may be attracted, however,
towards areas where the average rates of prots are higher (i.e. when the
capital markets are in disequilibrium).
Hymer concludes that direct investments are capital movements asso-
ciated with the international operations of MNCs. Their goal is to keep
control over foreign production, which allows them either to suppress com-
petition or appropriate rents derived from advantages such as cheap raw
materials and unskilled labor and/or get access to capital markets, skilled
labor, and/ or technology. Hymer asserts that international production has
substantially negative e¤ects on the host economies since it raises market
13MNCs emerged in the late of the 19th century and continued to grow in the inter-
war years and after World War II. The increase of direct investment ows was a key factor
of the dynamism of Western economies, in particular those from the USA to Western
Europe up to around 1960. It is this that justies the close attention paid by economists
to explain those ows and then the birth of the modern theory of international production,
advanced by Hymer, as the traditional explanation for this surge were inadequate.
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barriers, increases concentration, restricts the ability of governments to con-
trol national economy, and may put at risk national productive and inno-
vative systems because MNCs tend to impose their innovative products on
the world demand.14
Following Hymers thesis, Kindleberger embeds the question of owner-
ship advantages into a larger one by allowing for the diverse kinds of market
imperfections. He investigates the MNCsbehavior according to three im-
perfections: the nal product market imperfections, the intermediate prod-
uct market imperfections, and the economies of scale and scope.
1.2. Location advantages. While the market power approach relies
on the ownership advantages as the main determinant of the MNCs ac-
tivities, the macroeconomic development approach, emanating mainly from
scholars (such as Vernon, 1966 and Kojima, 1978, 1982), is more concerned
with the operation of locational inuences on the value adding activities
of MNCs. This is not to say that Hymers theory disregards location ad-
vantages but rather that he treats them as exogenous factors related to the
MNCsbehavior. It is our opinion that, taken together these two approaches,
the international transfer of the technology of the MNC plays an important
role in increasing its competitiveness by exploiting the locational advantages
o¤ered by diverse production sites. Cantwell and Piscitello (2004, page 6)
assert that "the technological activities of MNCs may tend to agglomerate
partly due to a random and cumulative process essentially related to certain
natural advantages, but more especially due to the spillovers they can enjoy
in the foreign location".15
The macroeconomic development approach draws extensively on the
neoclassical theory of the spatial distribution of factor endowments and ex-
tends it to embrace intermediate products. It further acknowledges that
strategic factors, arising from an oligopolistic market structure wherein
MNCs compete ercely, inuence the response of rms to factor endow-
ments. Vernon developed a product cycle model (PCM) serving to explain
the technological dynamism associated with the growth of US foreign direct
investment in Europe after World War II  in the 1950s and 1960s.16 He
suggests that the determinants of locational strategy of MNCs vary accord-
ing to the stage of the product cycle the rms are in. The propensity of
MNCs to engage in foreign production changes as the product they produce
moves from its innovatory to its mature and standard forms. At the initial
innovatory phase of product, American rms produced within their national
14In this context, as we shall see later, scholars such as Caves (1974), Findlay (1978),
and Cantwell (1989) have instead underlined the pro-competitive consequences of MNCs
activities on host economies.
15Cantwell and Piscitello (2004) adds that geographic proximity and face-to-face con-
tacts are highly important considerations when developing new technologies since tech-
nological development is recognized as a complex, cumulative, tacit, and highly context-
specic activity that requires socially organized learning processes.
16Vernons analysis has extended to take account of the potential positive externalities
that can emerge from international trade and FDI. It calls upon a debate about policies
selection for the economic development of countries.
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boundaries and exploited abroad through exports, since the American mar-
ket o¤ered, among other things, highly skilled labor, abundant capital, high
quality infrastructure, and a large demand for innovative products. How-
ever, when products became mature they lost their technological advantages
and their production was moved abroad, to Europe, where the production
factors were cheaper, the transport costs were lower, and the barriers for
entry into marketing and distribution were higher. Such process entails the
presence of centers of research and development abroad to adapt the mature
product to the needs of the domestic market. In this context, Mudambi and
Navarra (2004, page 386) add that "the bargaining power of a subsidiary
to maintain and increase its share of the rents generated by the operations
of the MNC as a whole is crucially dependent on the nature and pattern
of its knowledge ows". This being so, as we shall see in chapter 3, di¤er-
ent technological characteristics of foreign-owned knowledge lead to di¤erent
amounts and natures of spillover benets for host economies.
Kojima views the MNC as an instrument by which the comparative
trading advantage of nations may be better advanced. In his analysis, he
clearly distinguishes between import-substituting investment (trade displac-
ing) and exports (trade-creating) and states that a home country should
invest abroad in sectors requiring intermediate (but internationally mobile)
products that t the supply comparatively well, but that need to be com-
bined with nontransferable inputs in which the host country is relatively
well endowed.
Before concluding this section, it is important to note that Dunning
(1979) also worked out the macroeconomic development theory when he
developed the investment development path which mainly deals with the
question of FDI growth from the perspective of countries.17 The basic hy-
pothesis of this path is that a countrys propensity to engage in outward or
inward investment depends upon 1) its stage of economic development, 2) the
structure of its factor endowments and markets, 3) its political and economic
systems, and 4) the nature and extent of market failure in the transaction
of intermediate products across national boundaries. This investment devel-
opment path suggests that as a countrys economic development proceeds,
its foreign investment position will pass through a number of stages.18
1.3. Internalization advantages. The third school of thought deals
with the internalization approach developed by Casson and Buckely (1976),
and draws upon the theory of the rm to explain the existence and growth
of MNCs. They suggest that MNCs activity is related to the costs of or-
ganizing cross-border markets in intermediate products the asymmetry of
information in the market is identied as the basis of transaction costs. This
approach comes from the work of Coase (1937), who recognized transaction
cost as a main determinant of the existence and growth of productive orga-
nizations. When applied to international production, Casson and Buckely
17The investment development path of Dunning was thereafter extended in Dunning
(1986) and modied by Tolentino (1987).
18A detailed analysis of the investment development path is in Dunning (1988c).
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essentially focus on explaining why the cross-border transactions of inter-
mediate products are organized by hierarchies rather than determined by
market forces.19 In this respect, Dunning (2003, page 110) answers of this
question by saying that "the answer was because the transaction costs of
the market exceeded those of handling the same transaction within a single
entity". As Meyer (2004) claims, Buckley and Cassons seminal work has
mainly stimulated research on how to run business better in terms of prots.
In fact, Buckley and Casson address the question of why rms conduct FDI
and by doing so, Chung et al. (2003) state that "they raised critical issues for
policymakers. Notably, what stance should host country governments take
towards FDI, as FDI causes social and environmental externalities? Buck-
ley and Casson suggested that entering foreign rms might train labor, cause
greater worker migration, and exhaust critical inputs. They asked whether
the net welfare outcome for the host country is positive". Thus, we see that
Casson and Buckley also raised the question of how MNCs activities a¤ect
the host economy.
As explained by Cason and Buckely, the starting point of their theory
is that the modern business sector carries out many activities apart from
the routine production of goods and services. These activities, including
marketing, R&D and training labor, are interdependent and related by ows
of intermediate products mostly in the form of knowledge and expertise.
However, intermediate product markets are di¢ cult to organize due to their
imperfections; this represents an incentive to bypass them. Four main groups
of imperfection factors are found relevant to the internalization decision:
rm, industry, region, and nation-specic factors; but Casson and Buckely
put the main emphasis on industry specic factors. Then, it results in the
creation of internal markets that bring the MNCsactivities under common
ownership and control them. Rugman (1980) asserts that MNCs arise due
to the internalization of the failure of the market for information. In this
context, Casson and Buckley (2003) a¢ rm that it is the internalization of
the imperfect market for technology that creates the link between MNCs
innovation and multinational production. Of course, the type of technology
transferred within the MNC has major implications for its transaction costs
and thus its internalization. In that, MNCs strategic objectives to exploit
its ownership advantage or to gain access to foreign resources have di¤erent
implications for its internalization.20
Thus, the MNC according to Casson and Buckely is dened as a rm
which owns and controls activities in di¤erent countries. Their thesis is based
on three hypotheses: First, MNCs maximize prot in a world of imperfect
markets. Second, when markets in intermediate products are imperfect,
there is an incentive to bypass them by creating internal markets; this brings
19Transaction costs were not analyzed for the rst time in the framework of inter-
national production by Buckely and Casson. Hymer had already mentioned them in his
dissertation, but they were implicitly investigated Dunning and Rugman (1985) said in
their article, written in honor of Stephen H. Hymer, that Hymer misses the distinction
between structural and transaction-cost (cognitive) market imperfections.
20We shall see in the next section and in chapter 3 that MNC strategic objectives
also a¤ect the size and the signs of FDI spillover e¤ects on host countries.
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the di¤erent activities of the rm under common ownership and controls
them. Third, internalization of markets across national boundaries generates
MNCs.
Internalization theory may be considered as a general theory in so far
as it is able to predict the situations in which rms choose to internalize
foreign markets. However, as argued by Dunning (1992), it is not in itself
su¢ cient to explain the level and structure of the foreign production of
rms. The study of MNCsactivities calls for ownership advantages and
location-specic variables to be integrated with internalization variables;
this provides a unied theory of MNCs in which the eclectic paradigm of
Dunning, as we shall see in the following section, ts nicely.
1.4. OLI paradigm. As Dunning (1992, page 68) said, "it is di¢ cult
to perceive an all-embracing theory of the determinants of the MNEs ac-
tivities in the sense of encompassing, within a single explanatory equation,
a set of variables that can fully explain each at the same time as there are
four types of value-added activities undertaken by MNEs and they may be
di¤erently motivated. The most the economist or business analyst can rea-
sonably do is to formulate paradigms to provide an analytical framework for
explaining the various kinds of MNE activity or theories designed to explain
particular kinds of FDI ".
Dunning states that the theory of the determinants of MNCs activity
must then seek to explain the location of value-adding activities and the
ownership and organization of these activities. As such, it needs to draw
upon and integrate the three strands of thought discussed above: the theory
of international resource allocation based upon the spatial distribution of
factor endowments and capabilities, chiey addresses itself to the location
of production; the theory of economic organization is essentially concerned
with the ownership of this production; and the internalization theory is
related to the costs of organizing and managing cross-border markets in
intermediate products of this production. Thus Dunning identies the own-
ership, location, and internalization advantages as preconditions for a rm
to engage in foreign production.
Drawing upon those assumptions, Dunning (1977, 1981, 1988a,b) devel-
ops his eclectic paradigm (OLI paradigm), which seems su¢ cient to explain
the level and structure of the production of a countrys own rms outside
their national boundaries. This paradigm seeks to o¤er a general framework
for determining the extent and the pattern of MNCs activity and assumes
that the level and structure of foreign value adding activities will depend
upon:
(i) The extent to which an MNC possesses sustainable ownership spe-
cic advantages deriving either from their own specic technolo-
gies, their technical and/or managerial skills, or preferential access
to particular markets,
(ii) assuming the condition (i) is satised, MNCs activities depend on
the extent to which it internalizes its cross-border markets,
19
Chapter 1. Multinational corporations and international
production
(iii) And given conditions (i) and (ii), an MNC tends to choose the
foreign territory according to the location advantages of host coun-
tries.
Appendix 1 summarizes the di¤erent components of the OLI paradigm.
Since we know that the presence of MNCs abroad generates benets
for the economic performance of host countries, Dunnings OLI paradigm
has been extended to incorporate some additional components called the
strategy initiating variables in order that OLI becomes, to some extent, ap-
propriate to explain the dynamics of MNCsactivities and their e¤ects on
host economies. To this end, Dunning (1992) enlarged his eclectic paradigm
to o¤er a schema for analyzing the interaction between the consequences of
FDI (inward and outward) and the behavior of MNCs, which might apply
to all kinds of FDI and embrace all kinds of impacts ("the OLI paradigm
revised"). He suggests that the impact of MNCs activity varies accord-
ing to, rstly, the nature and extent of its ownership advantages, secondly,
its propensity to internalize cross-border markets for intermediate products,
and thirdly, the location specic characteristics of the host country. He also
suggests that OLI characteristics are likely to vary according to the countries
and sectors of activity in which foreign rms are located and also according
to the characteristics of investing rms. To construct the "OLI paradigm
revised", the OLI paradigm is amplied by four supplementary paradigms,
viz. the environmental/systems/policy (ESP) paradigm,21 the Porters dia-
mond of competitive advantages,22 the asset accumulation and restructur-
ing paradigm rst introduced by Pavitt(1987) and Cantwell (1989), and the
stage growth paradigm.23 Doing so, Dunning examines the dynamics of the
MNCsactivities and explains them as follows24 : inbound MNE activity
will, over time, a¤ect the L-specic assets of the recipient country. It will do
this initially via its impact on the structure and components of its diamond of
the competitive advantage and on the actions of the host government. Next,
depending on the sectors and countries in which the investment is made and
the presence, or absence, of e¤ective competition and supply capabilities, the
cumulative assets of the country may be benecially or adversely a¤ected.
This, in turn, will change both the conguration of the ESP of the host
country and the OLI conguration facing both foreign and domestic rms
(Dunning 1992, pages 266-267).
1.5. Technological accumulation. This strand is the more recent
one. It deals with some dynamics of MNCs activity and tends to explain the
extent to which the internationalization of production is related to the ability
of rms to accumulate, integrate, and control ownership advantages across
21The ESP paradigm was formulated by Koopman and Montias (1971).
22More details of diamond for competitive advantages are in Porter (1990).
23This paradigm was advanced by Rostow (1959).
24A detailed representation of the Dynamic interplay between MNC activity and the
economies in which they operate is given in Exihibit 10.1 of Dunning (1992).
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national boundaries. This theory, based on competitive international indus-
try approaches,25 is called the technological accumulation approach and was
rst put forward by Pavitt (1987) and mainly developed by Cantwell in his
1989 book, wherein the conditions for technological creation and its e¤ective
and e¢ cient use in production are considered as the key factors to deter-
mining the MNCsactivities. Respectively, the expansion of MNC is largely
linked to a process of technological accumulation within the rm (Pavitt,
1987). Freeman (1980, page3) claims that "Cantwells book is a landmark
in the study of multinational corporations, both for its critique of some es-
tablished theories, such as a common version of the product-cycle theory,
and even more for its own novel interpretation". The term technological
accumulation as stated by Cantwell (1989, page 7) "encapsulates the idea
that the development of technology within a rm is a cumulative process".
Innovation and the growth of international production in Cantwells view
are mutually supportive.
In contrast to the market power approach in which MNCs activities
have anticompetitive e¤ects  they lower the extent of competition and
increase collusion among rms, the competitive international industry ap-
proaches share the view that the growth of cross-border production tends
to be associated with competition strengthening. Cantwell, for example,
shares Grahams (1985) view in which the increase of internationalization
helps to maintain the competition between MNCs. This interaction between
internationalization and competition is explained by the fact that, rstly,
MNCs gain access to new and complementary technological developments
by locating production abroad and tend to integrate them into their exist-
ing technological lines. Competition between MNCs is then enhanced as
the overlap between the technological development of rms increases. Also
the number of cooperative agreements grows as the number of technological
spillovers between rms increases. According to Cantwell (1989, page 13),
spillovers " occur where technologies are created by a rm which lie outside
its own major lines of development but which may be of great use within
the main traditions of another rm". Secondly, and partly because of the
rst element, a growing number of connections emerge between technologies
which consequently leads to competition between rms, especially MNCs.
When analyzing the dynamic path of foreign MNCsactivities, in the
vein of Dunning, Cantwell discusses the e¤ects of these activities on the
development of host economies and afterwards on the embeddedness level
of MNCs. In fact, the technological accumulation approach is based on
the fact that MNCs are increasingly seen as global organizers of economic
systems, including systems relating technological developments in di¤erent
parts of the world.26 The involvement of MNCs in research in centers of
25Competitive international industry approaches also include, among others, the later
versions of the product cycle model and the consideration of oligopolistic interaction theory
(Vernon, 1974 and Graham, 1975), wherein the reason for relocating abroad when the
product maturated is no longer a matter of a simple rms prot maximization but shifted
towards risk-minimizing strategies.
26At one time MNCs were viewed as simply the providers of technology.
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innovation has a direct e¤ect on broadening the scope of domestic techno-
logical capability, and also an indirect e¤ect (the spillover e¤ect) through
its competitive stimulus which encourages other rms to extend their local
research programmes. MNCs in a competitive international industry are all
attracted to certain centers of innovation in order to maintain their overall
strength; as a result research and production tends to agglomerate in these
locations. Cantwell asserts that spillover e¤ects are subject to the absorp-
tive capacity of domestic rms spillover benets occur only for domestic
rms with higher absorptive capacities.27
2. The objectives of multinational corporationsforeign activities
In the previous section we examined the key determinants of MNCs
foreign value-added activities in the relevant existing literature wherein the
question of how MNCs activities a¤ect the host economy is highlighted. In
this respect, economic analysis distinguishes two controversial views con-
cerning the e¤ects of the existence and growth of MNCsforeign activities:
the pro-competitive e¤ects pointing out various kinds of spillover benets
for the domestic economy (e.g. Cantwell 1989 and Dunning 1992) and the
possible anti-competitive e¤ects lowering the domestic market power (e.g.
Hymer 1970).28 In this section, the discussion will be extended to explain
the behavior of MNCs in terms of strategic objectives of (or motives for)
doing international production. We recognize, as we shall see later, four
main kinds of the MNCsmotivations which inuence in di¤erent ways the
type and the amount of the technology transferred to host countries and
thus the amount and the nature of potential spillover benets.29
MNCs do not pop up randomly in foreign countries. They constantly
attempt to increase their prots over time and choose to undertake foreign
production in locations where their long-term protability is expected to
be improved. Diverse factors mediate the choice of a foreign location and
motivate an MNC to invest: The resource-seeking and market-seeking in-
vestment approaches, which were the rst motives for foreign investment,
and the e¢ ciency-seeking and strategic asset or capability-seeking invest-
ment, which came out in 1960.30 As noted in Narula (2003), the rst three
kinds of investment can represent motives which are primarily asset exploit-
ing in nature, while the strategic asset-seeking investment represents an asset
augmenting activity whereby rms choose to acquire additional assets over
27A detailed description of the Cantwells (1989) analysis of spillovers for host coun-
tries is given in chapter 3.
28Recently, economic debate has rised, rather than a univocal relationship between
FDI and domestic economic development, both virtuous and vicious circles of domestic
development resulting from, respectively, positive and negative FDI e¤ects (Cantwell and
Dunning 1991 and Perez 1998) more details on this recent thinking are given in chapter
3.
29Case studies analyzing the e¤ects of FDI motives on spillovers for host countries
are detailed in chapter 3.
30Relating to Vernons theory explained above, we could say that the PCM tends to
explain market seeking production by rms of a particular nationality and ownership it
does not explain resource based, e¢ ciency seeking or strategic assets acquiring investment.
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their existing created ones to protect their long-term competitive power. It
is argued, as we shall see in chapter 3, that MNCs foreign activities, as a
mean of exploiting its existing knowledge abroad, actively contribute to the
transfer of new technologies to the host country and then to the expansion of
domestic spillover benets, while MNCs activities as a means of acquiring
a host countrys knowledge benets from absorbing technological spillovers
from domestic rms.
As identied in the taxonomy used by Behrman (1972) and extended
by Dunning (1992), the motives for foreign production are of four types:
rstly, a rm is called a resources seeker when it invests abroad to acquire
specic resources at a lower real cost than what could be found in their home
country. Relatedly, three kinds of resources seekers come out: First, MNCs
seek to reduce the cost of their physical resources and acquire minerals, raw
materials, agricultural products, constructions, and machines at minimum
prices. Second, as labor costs tend to di¤er between nations, MNCs can
hold down costs by locating part of all their productive facilities abroad
and getting access to the cheaper labor force there. Third, MNCs tend
to locate abroad, particularly in developed countries, when they need to
acquire technological capability, qualied labor, management or marketing
expertise, and organizational skills. Dunning (1992, page 57) mentions that
"the needs of the rst and second kinds have decreased in the mid 1980s but
the third type is more important than it used to be". It also appears that
most of the output of a¢ liates of natural resources seekers is exported.
Secondly, there exist rms that seek to maintain or protect existing
markets or to exploit or promote new ones. In most cases, this kind of
rms previously exported to these markets but because of tari¤s or other
cost-raising barriers imposed by host countries, these markets are no longer
best supplied by exports. This kind of foreign investment may be a result of
attracting policies adopted by many of the host countries. It could also be
a part of the global production and marketing strategy of MNCs in order to
be present in the leading markets supplied by their competitors. MNCs may
choose to be present in the domestic market to supply goods and services
than if they were outside the domestic country, because the production and
transaction costs are less expensive and also MNCs need to be close to their
suppliers or customers to retain their business.
Thirdly, some MNCs seek the e¢ ciency or the rationality which results
from the common ownership of their diversied overseas activities so as to
be able to maintain and continuously improve their position and competitive
power vis-à-vis their rivals in the international markets. E¤eciency-seekers
take advantage essentially of the economies of scale and scope and from the
risk diversication, when they make investments in countries with broadly
similar economic structures and income levels. Moreover, given that technol-
ogy and information intensive value-added activities tend to be concentrated
in developed countries and labor and natural resource intensive activities in
developing ones, MNCs may benet from the di¤erences in the availability
and the cost of traditional factor endowments by investing at the same time
in both developed and developing countries. It is also argued that foreign
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a¢ liates of a more e¢ ciency-seeking nature are likely to be better embedded
in the domestic environment (Papanastassiou et al., 2005).
Fourthly, like e¢ ciency seekers, rms which search for strategically re-
lated created assets aim, as described by Dunning, to capitalize on the ben-
ets of the common ownership of diversied activities and capabilities, or of
similar activities and capabilities in diverse economic and potential environ-
ments. The MNCs foreign expansion can be regarded not only as a way to
internally exploit its existing ownership advantage on a host market (Hymer
1960, and Casson and Buckley 1976), but also as a way to absorb domestic
knowledge and then build new rm-specic advantage (Kuemmerle, 1999).
Thus, by investing in knowledge/asset-seeking FDI, the MNCs explicit mo-
tive is to gain access to new technologies (e.g. innovative capacities, man-
agerial and organizational knowledge, intangible resources, a better com-
prehension of the domestic customers) from the host country (Dunning and
Narula 1995), raising its productivity. It emerges then that foreign-owned
rms benet from reverse technology spillovers.31 Kuemmerle (1999, page
18) claims that "rms seek di¤erent types of spillovers from the national and
local environment in which they invest. It would be precipitous, however, to
assume that foreign rms investing in local R&D facilities are free riders.
Foreign rms also create spillovers for the local environment because R&D
sites provide employment and learning opportunities for local researchers".
It is worthwhile to add that the motives for foreign production may also
change over time. Initially, most MNCs invest outside their home countries
to acquire natural resources or gain access to markets. Later, as their degree
of multinationality increases, they change their foreign investment strategy
to seek e¢ ciency or strategic assets so as to improve their global market
position. Government FDI policies of host countries which are interested
in the outcome of the activities of MNCs may also e¤ect the activities of
such rms and the amount and pattern of their foreign investment. For
example, host countries that attempt to attract FDI are mainly motivated
by the expectation of technology transfer or technology spillover e¤ects from
MNCs to domestic rms (Ito 2004 and Lim 2005).
Moreover, Dunning identied three further motives for foreign invest-
ment, viz. escape investments wherein the MNCs invest abroad to escape
restrictive legislation or macro-organizational policies by home governments,
support investments that maintain and support the rest of the MNCsac-
tivities, and passive investments which involve passive management and are
essentially made by large institutional conglomerates that specialize in the
buying and selling of rms and also by small rms and individual investors
in real estate.32
31Detailed analysis of these reverse spillovers can be found in, for example, Dri¢ eld
and Love (2006) and Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2007).
32For a detail of those three additional motives for international investment, see
chapitre 3, section 3.3.5 of Dunning (1992).
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After explaining the reasons for the existence and growth of MNCs ac-
tivities abroad (sections 1 and 2), we would like, in this section, to give some
insights about the diverse e¤ects of those activities on competitiveness, par-
ticularly, of the nations receiving the foreign production. The FDI literature
distinguishes between the direct and indirect e¤ects of MNCs activity on
the economic welfare of the host country. As Dunning (1992, page 263)
states: the direct e¤ects embrace the role of foreign rms as providers and
controllers of resources and capabilities to host countries, and the e¤ects of
these ownership advantages on the way in which resources and capabilities
are allocated both between and within sectors in an economy. Whereas, the
indirect e¤ects are related to the impact of the activities of MNCs and their
a¢ liates on their suppliers, competitors and customers, as well as, more
generally on the host economy of which they are part.
Thus, an MNC is considered an important agent in host countries in
so far as it is able to substantially a¤ect both directly and indirectly 
economic development. On the one hand, it is assumed to be the provider
of knowledge, capital, capabilities and markets, the creator of jobs, the sup-
plier of foreign currency, the competition stimulator, etc. To sum up, these
diverse direct e¤ects of MNCs could be discussed under six main points:
FDI is rstly associated with an increase in the technological knowledge of
the host countries since MNCs when setting up a¢ liates in those countries
transfer part of their technology. Technology " embraces all forms of phys-
ical assets, knowledge and human learning and capabilities that enable the
e¢ cient organization and production of goods and services within a particu-
lar ESP conguration or Diamond of competitive advantage" as dened by
Dunning (1992, page 287). Technology transfer becomes easier if the MNCs
set up innovatory centers overseas. As Dunning and Gugler (1994) asserted,
the transnationalization of research and development is an important phe-
nomenon and some of these international R&D operations are realized via
cooperative agreements, joint ventures and strategic alliances.
Secondly, MNCs are generally larger than domestic rms, produce goods
using state-of-the-art technology with highly qualied employees and then
use more capital. This may raise the local supply and demand expectancies
on the market and reduce prices. Thirdly, MNCs may either break down
monopolies and stimulate competition or create a more monopolistic indus-
try structure, depending on the strength and response level of their domestic
counterparts. The increase in competition would result, as we shall see in
the following section, in spillover e¤ects for domestic rms. These e¤ects
could be negative or positive depending on the competitive power of do-
mestic rms.33 Fourthly, MNCs a¤ect human capital development in the
host country when they are considered job creators and human capability
developers. They demand skilled labor and provide attractive employment
33The e¤ect of competition may be positive or negative as competitive pressure ei-
ther induces domestic rms to be more e¢ cient by assimilating foreign konwledge and
mobilizing existing ressources or leads to lower economies of scale.
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opportunities (Blomström and Kokko, 2002). Also MNCs support the devel-
opment of universities and related institutions in several ways and give some
training courses to domestic employees, mainly international business man-
agers. Gershenberg (1987) found that MNCs are even more active in training
domestic employees than domestic rms. The types of training range from
on-the-job training to seminars and more formal schooling to overseas ed-
ucation, perhaps at the parent company, depending on the skills needed
(Blomström and Kokko, 2002). Fifthly, foreign ownership always carries a
cost, in that MNCs may push for policies that are good for them but not nec-
essarily in the interest of the host country they may erode its sovereignty.
And lastly, the MNCsbehavior may a¤ect the balance of payment of host
countries in which both export-oriented and import-substituting FDI should
improve it.
On the other hand, MNCs are widely considered the main source for
spillover benets reected in productivity and/or market improvements of
the domestic host countrys rms. It is generally argued that the expected
spillover benets from inward foreign direct investment is the main motive
of many governments in host countries, both developed and developing, for
liberalizing their FDI regulations and encouraging the inow of FDI (Dun-
ning 1992 and Buckley et al. 2003). In fact, MNCs are by and large assumed
to possess the advanced technology (production technology, marketing and
management technique, etc.) they tend to exploit in many host countries
and, consequently, other rms, particularly the host countrys, expect to
learn from this technology so as to get the necessary strength to face the
foreign competition. Knowledge can be transferred either voluntary through
technology transfer arrangements or involuntary through spillovers.
The literature recognizes two groups of spillovers. First, productivity
spillovers which take place when the entry and the presence of MNCs af-
liates lead to e¢ ciency benets in the host countrys local rms and the
MNCs are not able to internalize the full value of these benets (Blomström
and Kokko 1998). In this context, spillovers to domestic rms are said to
be positive when the resources required for the adoption of foreign technol-
ogy or the development of the existing one is small relative to the economic
value of the underlying technology (Blomström et al., 1999). Whether for-
eign investors allow positive spillovers depends on the opportunity costs of
sharing the knowledge, and the transaction costs of establishing barriers
to knowledge ows (Meyer 2004). Second, market access spillovers which
materialize when export oriented MNCs provide knowledge about the prod-
uct technology and the foreign market conditions for domestic rms to be
able to benet from access to those markets through direct exports. Similar
kinds of spillovers may occur from domestic to foreign rms as well (called
reverse spillovers), especially when domestic rms are highly competitive
and possess the best practice technology.
Productivity spillovers are grouped into knowledge spillovers and com-
petitive disciplinary e¤ects. The competitive e¤ects, or rather the incentives
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for competition, operate through either a more e¢ cient use of existing tech-
nology and resources or an assimilation of foreign technologies.34 While,
knowledge transfer e¤ects may result from the introduction of new know-
how, by among other things, demonstrating new technologies and training
workers who later work for local rms. The main examples of knowledge
spillovers are: (i) new technology transferred to domestic producers who
learn new techniques from foreign rms by demonstration e¤ects (also called
contagion or imitation e¤ects); (ii) learning by doing among domestic rms,
combined with investments in formal education and on-the-job training of
domestic employees who move from foreign to domestic rms; (iii) cost sav-
ings due to technology passed to downstream users of new products or up-
stream buyers or suppliers.
In this thesis, we focus on studying in detail the productivity spillover
e¤ects from MNCs a¢ liates to domestic rms in the same industry (i.e.
the intra-industry spillovers); we do not take into account the other kinds of
spillover e¤ects, although they are also of a great importance and worthy to
be explored and is sometimes hard not to take them into consideration. Our
motivation emanates from the fact that (i) the literature has been largely
concerned with analysis of intra-industry spillovers and despite the huge
amount of existing theoretical and empirical studies, and the relevant policy
which encourages the inows of FDI, intra-industry spillover e¤ects on host
countries are still not well understood. So far, results have been mixed for
country studies and evidence on this kind of spillover has not been conclusive
yet. Therefore, we think that additional studies and further investigations
are still required to explain these controversial results and nd solutions in
order to make clear the positive e¤ects of intra-industry spillovers. And (ii)
we believe that each kind of spillover, although they are somehow jointly
related, requires a highly context-specic, in-depth exploration. For exam-
ple, assessing productivity spillovers calls upon a detailed analysis of diverse
factors which are not necessary the same as those of market access spillovers.
Although, the term spillovers in the previous two sections of this chapter
does not distinguish between the di¤erent kinds of spillovers for the host
country, in what follows, this term will consistently reect the intra-industry
e¤ects, otherwise it will be specied.
As we have said, lots of case studies have shown that locals learn from
MNCs.35 Most of them demonstrate that spillovers are not automatic con-
sequences of FDI, in that e¤ects are determined by the local environment,
e.g., technological capability and labor skills, level of competition, motives
for foreign production, trade policy, and regional proximity.36 However, as
we shall see in the following two chapters, too often these studies overlook
the fact that the e¤ects of spillovers are not the same according to the di-
verse channels by which they occur. In fact, (i) they do not consider that
34Noting that in short run the competition e¤ects could be of a negative sign (market
stealing e¤ects).
35Meta-analysis of spillover studies can be found in Blomström and Kokko (1998),
Görg and strobel (2001), and Meyer and Sinani (2005).
36We analyze and discuss in the next two chapters the main outcome of existing
theoretical and empirical literature related to intra-industry spillover e¤ects
27
Chapter 1. Multinational corporations and international
production
the amount and the nature of the technologies transferred from foreign to
domestic rms are highly likely to depend upon the mechanism by which
they are transmitted. Thereby, spillovers via worker mobility for example
are likely to be higher than through demonstration e¤ects, since worker mo-
bility can lead to substantial improvements in productivity throughout the
local economy by transferring not only public technology, but also tacit el-
ements (rm-specic knowledge). Also (ii) they use by and large the share
of foreign presence in the corresponding industry to measure intra-industry
spillovers. However, this variable seems to be inappropriate to capture much
of the competition (Kokko, 1996) and worker mobility-related spillovers (Ben
Hamida, 2006a) ; it can only hold information about demonstration e¤ects.
Our present study o¤ers a more comprehensive picture of FDI intra-
industry spillovers by distinguishing these e¤ects according to their diverse
channels. It also highlights the fact the relationship between spillovers and
domestic technological characteristics is not unidirectional, rather the size
and the extent of such spillovers depend upon the interaction between the
mechanisms by which they occur and the technological levels of domes-
tic rms. It also assumes that spillovers are more likely to occur between
neighboring rms than between more distant ones. This thesis proposes
some components for a research agenda on FDI intra-industry spillover ef-
fects, at both the theoretical and the empirical levels.37
4. Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented what MNCs are, why they conduct
FDI, and how they e¤ect the investing and the receiving FDI countries. We
distinguish diverse key determinants explaining the existence and growth
of the MNCsforeign production: the ownership advantages, the internal-
ization, the location advantages, the OLI paradigm, and the technological
accumulation. Moreover, we identify four main motives for foreign pro-
duction resource-seeking, market-seeking, e¢ ciency-seeking and strategic
asset-seeking investment approaches. All of these determinants and motiva-
tions are found to be highly important when attention is drawn to the im-
pact of MNCsforeign production. In particular, to engage in international
investment, a rm must possess a countervailing technological advantage
over domestic rms, so as to make such investment viable. By exploit-
ing this advantage abroad, some of the foreign knowledge is expected to
spread throughout foreign locations and then be di¤used to domestic rms.
Knowledge can be transferred either voluntarily through technology transfer
arrangements or involuntarily through spillovers. The transfer of technol-
ogy is primarily assumed to benet the competitiveness of the MNC itself
by exploiting the locational advantages o¤ered by diverse production sites.
However, this benet is not only felt internally by MNCs. Rather, both
the nations of origin and those receiving the MNCsbenet. Such improve-
ments, especially those related to the host economy are of great importance
in determining the embeddedness level of foreign MNCs.
37See parts 2 and 3, respectively.
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4. Conclusions
As we shall see in chapters 2 and 3, a large body of literature has ana-
lyzed the intra-industry spillovers from foreign to domestic rms within the
industry  the focus of this study  but too often they pay no attention
to the fact that these spillovers tend to vary according to the channels by
which they occur, i.e. demonstration e¤ects, competition e¤ects, and worker
mobility. These studies use by and large the share of total output, employ-
ment, or capital in the industry accounted for by foreign rms as proxy for
spillovers. It emerges then that the most reliable evidence points to no or
negative spillovers.
Unlike existing studies, this thesis calls upon a detailed analysis of these
e¤ects according to how they occur, so as to be able to assess intra-industry
spillovers. It also suggests that the size and the extent of spillovers depend
largely upon the interaction between the mechanisms by which they occur
and the technological levels of domestic rms. Spillover benets are likely to
be more pronounced in locations where domestic rms are close to foreign
rms.
A detailed description of our thinking about the determination of intra-
industry spillover e¤ects is given in parts 2 and 3. But, before proceeding,
we discuss in chapters 2 and 3 the main outcomes of existing theoretical and
empirical literature related to such e¤ects.
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CHAPTER 2
Existing theoretical models of intra-industry
spillovers
The earliest discussions of spillover e¤ects in the theoretical literature on
FDI date back to the early 1960s. McDougall (1960) was the rst author to
systematically include productivity spillovers among the possible e¤ects of
FDI. Other earlier contributions were provided by Corden (1967) and Cave
(1971). The common aim of these studies was to identify the various costs
and benets of FDI, and spillovers (intra- and inter-industrial e¤ects) were
discussed together with several other e¤ects such as balance of payments,
terms of trade, tax policies, etc. The detailed theoretical models analyzing
spillovers did not appear until the late 1970s.
Blomström et al. (1999) have elaborated a theoretical framework for un-
derstanding the underlying supplyand demandforces determining the
scope and magnitude of FDI spillovers to host economies.1 They consider
spillovers (whatever they are) in a traditional technology market supply
and demand context, wherein foreign and domestic investors represent the
supply and demand sides, respectively. Spillovers are then endogenously
determined by the actions of those investors. The identication and (if pos-
sible) quantication of factors on both sides of the market for spillovers
are important to policy-makers in leveraging the potential benets of in-
ward FDI spillovers. Table 2.1 summarizes the main proximate variables
theoretically related to FDI spillovers and their likely e¤ects. Obviously, we
are in agreement that all of these variables2 are important in determining
the scope of FDI spillovers, although some of them are not yet explored in
the literature.3
In the next three sections of this chapter, we present and discuss the
main existing theoretical studies explicitly modeling spillover e¤ects from
FDI.4 We recognize three strands of studies. The earliest ones reported in
the following section represent spillovers as an increasing function of the
1A comparable framework was previously suggested (at least implicitly) by Cantwell
(1991a).
2We have to note that other variables such as the geographic proximity between
foreign and domestic rms should also be considered when determining FDI spillovers.
Recently, Ben Hamida (2006c) has constructed a theoretical model wherein this variable
appears among the determinants of spillovers. Geographical proximity is found to have a
signicant impact on spillovers. These theoretical ndings seem to be conrmed for the
Swiss case.
3It is important to note that empirically, the measurement of some of these variables
is considered di¢ cult.
4A description of theoretical studies on spillovers is given in Fan (2002).
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Determinants Sign
1) Technological complementarities between MNCs and host
country rms (+)
2) Strength of intellectual property protection in host country (-)
3) Competition in host country markets (?)
4) Size and wealth of host country (+)
5) Technical centers of excellence in host country (+)
6) Technical competence of host country rms (+)
7) Government policies (?)
Note:
(+) and (-) indicate, respectively, positive and negative potential e¤ects
of the corresponding determinant on spillovers. (?) indicates that these
e¤ects could be positive or negative.
Table 2.1. Proximate determinants of spillovers. Source:
Blomström et al. (1999), page 7.
presence of foreign capital. Most of those studies consider the superior
technology possessed by foreign rms to be intrinsically a public good
which are transferred without cost to domestic rms. The second strand
of models described in section 2 suggest that spillover benets are costly
and can not be determined by the degree of foreign presence alone. Instead,
spillovers are largely the outcome of the interaction between foreign and
local rms. Section 3 presents the more recent strand of theoretical models in
which spillovers occur through the movement of domestic workers previously
trained or having worked at MNCs a¢ liates to domestic rms, taking with
them some of the foreign knowledge which can improve their e¢ ciency.
1. Spillovers and the degree of foreign presence
To our knowledge, Kopecky and Koizumi (1977) were the rst to ex-
plicitly model the technological spillovers generated by the presence of a¢ l-
iates of foreign MNCs. Particularly, they analyze the role of technological
transfers in an international capital movement model and assume that these
transfers depend on the extent of foreign ownership of a countrys capi-
tal stock. According to them, the transmission of foreign technology from
foreigners to locals is automatic and technology spillovers are therefore
treated as public goods which can be exploited free of charge by domestic
rms. MNCs are unable to internalize the total returns on them.
Since technology transfer among countries is proxied by the countrys
capital stock owned by foreign a¢ liates "Kf", the aggregate production
function of resident rms (i.e. domestic and foreign rms) can be written as
Y = 	

Kf
L

G (Kf +Kd; L) , (1.1)
where Y denotes output by all the rms in the country, L is labor, Kd
the stock of capital owned by domestic rms and 	

Kf
L

the technologi-
cal transfer function. It is assumed that host countries (especially debtors)
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always experience technological improvements from their contacts with for-
eigners so that 	

Kf
L

is greater than one for any

Kf
L

> 0. It is further
assumed that the technological benets received by host countries are pro-
portional to the amount of capital controlled and operated by foreigners, so
that 	
0

Kf
L

> 0.
Kopecky and Koizumis specication above implies that the marginal
products of foreign and domestic capital are di¤erent
@Y
@Kd
= 	Gk, (1.2)
@Y
@Kf
=

@	
@Kf

G+	Gk. (1.3)
The term

@	
@Kf

G represents the spillover e¤ects produced by the trans-
mission and dissemination of foreign technical know-how within the host
country. Because of the "public good" nature of technology, foreigners can-
not capture

@Y
@Kf

G in the form of a direct monetary payment so that
the private marginal products of foreign and domestic capital are the same,
	Gk.
Findlay (1978) constructs a dynamic model to examine the relationship
between FDI from an advanced region and technological change in a back-
ward one. He postulates that the rate of technological progress in the ad-
vanced region increases at a constant rate and that in the backward country
it depends on two factors. First, the rate of technological progress in a back-
ward region is an increasing function of the technology gap between that
region and the advanced one a hypothesis advanced by Gerschenkron
(1962) and Veblen (1915). Therefore, for a given amount of foreign presence,
the larger the technology gap between the foreign and domestic rms, the
larger the spillovers.5 Second, Findlay followed Arrow (1971) in considering
technological di¤usion as analogous to the spread of a contagious disease.
The basis of this analogy is the fact that technological innovations are most
e¢ ciently di¤used when there is personal contact between those having the
knowledge and those who adopt it. Findlay further hypothesizes that the
rate of change of technical e¢ ciency in the backward region is an increasing
function of the degree to which it opens up to FDI (Manseld, 1961, 1968)
this hypothesis ts well with the contagion idea.
In more formal terms, A (t) and B (t) denote respectively the levels of
technical e¢ ciency in terms of the total productivity of the factors in the
advanced and the backward regions. Assuming that A (t) increases at a
constant rate n, one has
A (t) = A0e
nt. (1.4)
5More and more evidence, however, shows that the assumption that technology trans-
fers increase with a larger technology gap is not true (e.g. Cantwell, 1989). This, in our
view, seems more reasonable as domestic rms can not internalize technologies in their
production process unless they have some traditional technological strength.
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Moreover, the Veblen-Gerschenkrons hypothesis can be stated as
_B =
@B
@t
= 

A0e
nt  B (t) , (1.5)
where a dot over a variable indicates its time derivative and  is a positive
constant which indicates the magnitude which depends upon exogenous pa-
rameters such as the quality of management of the relatively more backward
country and the education of the labor force. Equation (1.5) states that the
convergence-type spillover is an increasing function of the technology gap
between backward and advanced countries. The di¤erential equation (1.5)
is readily integrated to yield
B (t) =

(n+ )
A0e
nt +
(n+ )B0   A0
(n+ )
e t, (1.6)
where B0 is the initial level of e¢ ciency in the backward region. As t tends to
innity, equation (1.6) shows that the the ratio B (t) to A (t) will approach
an "equilibrium gap" of (n+) . This equilibrium varies directly with  and
inversely with n.
Using GAP (= B(t)A(t) ) to denote the technology gap between domestic
rms and MNCs, and FP to be the degree of penetration by the former
into the host economy (measured by the the ratio of the capital stock of
foreign-owned rms in the backward economy to the capital stock of the
domestically-owned rms), the advantages of backwardness (convergence)
and contagion hypotheses can be represented as follows
_B
B
= f (GAP;FP ) , with
@f
@GAP
< 0 and
@f
@FP
> 0. (1.7)
The relative rate of growth of technology gap is itself a function of
G _AP
GAP
= g (GAP;FP ) , with
@g
@GAP
> 0 and
@g
@FP
> 0, (1.8)
which shows that the catching-up level by local rms is higher the wider the
technology gap and the greater the foreign presence.
In his paper, Das (1987) utilizes a standard price-leadership model from
oligopoly theory to describe the technology transfer processes, from the par-
ent MNCs rm to its a¢ liates and in turn from the foreign a¢ liate to domes-
tic rms. He assumes that the foreign subsidiary acts as a price leader in the
domestic market and the local rms constitute a competitive fringe around
it. The model explicitly explores the optimal behavior of a multinational
rms subsidiary in a host country when its local rivals succeed in learning
its production techniques. Similarly to Kopecky and Koizumi (1977) and
Findlay (1978), Das assumes that the rate of increase in e¢ ciency of local
rms is positively related to the level of activity of the MNCs subsidiary 
the larger the scale of foreign operation the greater the opportunity of the
local rms to learn from it. The model recognizes that the MNCs a¢ liates
are aware of the technology leakage, and determines the technology transfer
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behavior based on this recognition. Yet, the behavior of the local rm is
still not explicitly taken into consideration in any calculations. Das con-
cludes that it is worthwhile for foreign a¢ liates to import better technology
from its parent company to be able to boost its prot levels and its market
share, although it loses a lot due to the success of local rms in learning. It
emerges then that the greater the amount of technology imported by foreign
a¢ liates from the parent company, the higher the spillovers will be.
Recently, Smeets (2006) states that the relationship between the degree
of foreign presence and spillover e¤ects depends on the type of foreign own-
ership. He builds a partial-equilibrium model wherein he recognizes three
di¤erent types of ownership (minority, equally, and majority) and nds a
non-linear relationship between these types and spillovers. Spillovers are
relatively high for equally shared international joint ventures and lower in
both minority and majority types of FDI. This result is mainly explained
by the fact that the nature and the number of the channels of knowledge
spillovers di¤er per type of FDI ownership6 all of these channels are as-
sumed to function in equally shared types but not in others.
While the models described above explore the direct relationship be-
tween FDI and technology transfer, another strand of models investigate
instead the e¤ect of FDI on growth using growth theory framework. Those
models, particularly based on the endogenous growth theory, indirectly
touch upon the role of FDI in transferring technology. Unlike earlier neo-
classical modeling of the Solow (1956, 1957) type which treats technolog-
ical progress as an exogenous process and suggests that FDI cannot a¤ect
the long-run growth rate  endogenous growth theory models technologi-
cal progress endogenously and emphasizes the role of R&D, human capi-
tal accumulation, and spillovers in determining long-run economic growth
(Grossman and Helpman 1991, Lucas 1988, Romer 1990).
We recognize mainly two models of the new growth theorywith endoge-
nous technological progress that examine the interaction between growth
and FDI. First, Wang (1990) builds a dynamic two-country model to study
the interactions among growth, technological change and international cap-
ital movements. He extends the earlier theoretical models of long-run inter-
national capital movements, such as MacDougalls (1960), Kemps (1961),
and Ru¢ ns (1979) by adding to the Cobb-Douglas production function a
country-specic variable labeled human capital which gives a measure of the
stock of technical knowledge. Human capital is viewed as the motor of tech-
nological change. This model assumes a perfect capital mobility linking the
two countries. Human capital has an important role in determining the e¤ec-
tive rate of return on physical capital and hence inuences the direction and
the magnitude of international capital movement. The analysis incorporates
Findlays hypotheses on the contagion and the advantages of backwardness
in that the rate of technological change in a less developed country (LDC)
6Although Smeetss analysis does not formally model the spillover channels as deter-
minants of spillovers, it recognizes implicity their role through their relationship with the
types of MNC ownership. Smeets does not distinguish between intra- and inter-industrial
spillovers. Also, he examines the spillover e¤ects from and to the MNC.
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increases with the technological disparity between them and the advanced
country (the North) and the amount of foreign capital operating in their ter-
ritory (the South). With capital already moving internationally, the model
predicts that the steady-state income gap is narrowed by an increase in the
growth rate of human capital and /or the technology di¤usion rate in the
LDC. Then, opening for FDI from more advanced countries has benecial
e¤ects on developing economies. Foreign investment facilitates domestic
technological change via technology spillovers, and hence increases the rate
of income growth.
In more formal terms, the per labor output of the home (North "N")
and host (South "S") countries are
YS
LS
= !(hS)f [
KS
LS
+
Z
LN
]  rZ
LN
, (1.9)
YN
LN
= !(hN )f [
KN
LN
  Z
LN
] +
rZ
LN
, (1.10)
where !(hi) = h
1 
i , i = S;N , is the contribution of human capital (hi) to
production which can be interpreted as an index of the technology level of
an economy, K is the stock of physical capital, L the stock of labor, Z the
amount of foreign capital located in the home country, and r the rate of
return of capital in the world.
The accumulation functions of human capital of the South and the North
are expressed as
_hS = S(x; q)hS , with
@
@x
> 0 and
@
@q
> 0, (1.11)
_hN = NhN , with N > S , (1.12)
where S and N denote the growth rates of Southern and Northern human
capitals, respectively, x denotes the degree to which the host country is open
to FDI and is measured by the ratio of foreign investment to domestically
owned capital, and q is the technology gap between host and home countries.
The growth rate S can also be interpreted as the technological di¤usion
rate or technology adaptive e¢ ciency in the South.
The technical knowledge of the host country ( _hS) increases with x and q.
Thus, equations (1.11) and (1.12) show that the catching-up level by local
rms is higher the wider the technology gap and the greater the foreign
presence. The presence of foreign rms then generates positive technology
spillovers to the LDC rms and hence increases the rate of income growth.
Second, Walz (1997) constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model
with endogenous technological change in which MNCs play a critical role
with respect to growth and specialization patterns. He extracts the idea
of trade-related international knowledge spillovers used in Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and applies it to FDI. Production activities of MNCs in
the low-wage countries are assumed to improve the e¢ ciency of potential
innovators in those countries. The knowledge spillovers of the MNCsac-
tivities make innovation in the low-wage countries protable. Allowing for
imitation in the less developed country, the transfer of technology through
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FDI stimulates active research and development (R&D) and growth. There-
fore, Walz predicts that policies promoting FDI will lead to faster economic
growth.
2. Spillovers and competition e¤ects
In the previous section most of the theoretical models were conned to
an ad hoc modeling of spillovers as they assume that technologies trans-
ferred would be fully beneciary to a receiving country (or to a rm in
this country), and that technologies can be transferred without facing any
di¢ culties and adopted by local rms without paying any extra cost of
adjustment.7 Conversely, the models developed in this section recognize, in
line with Wang and Blomström (1992), that transferring technologies within
MNC and learning from foreign rms is a costly process.8 When building
their spillover model, Wang and Blomström explicitly identify two costs: (i)
the cost to the MNC of transferring technology to its a¢ liates this cost is
assumed to be directly proportional to the vintage of the transferred technol-
ogy, argument based on the results obtained by Teece (1977) and (ii) the
cost of learning to domestic rms in determining the amount of technology
spillovers arising from the existence of foreign a¢ liates.
In addition, where in previous models the extent of spillovers is deter-
mined by the degree of foreign presence alone (contagion-type spillovers),
in Wang and Blomströms model spillovers are instead endogenously gener-
ated by the technological competition between foreign a¢ liates and domestic
rms (competition-related spillovers). In fact, Wang and Blomström model
a di¤erential game involving an MNCs a¢ liate and a local rm that are
both able to inuence spillovers, in which each rm solves its individual dy-
namic optimization problems subject to the other rms action. They also
follow Findlays assumption of a positive relationship between the technol-
ogy gap and spillovers, which generates the convergence-type spillovers. It
is further argued that local rms and policies a¤ecting their behavior play
an important role in the technology transfer process. That is that the learn-
ing e¤ort of a host countrys rms plays an important role in increasing the
rate at which MNCs transfer technology. Hence, spillovers e¤ects tend to
encourage technology transfer.
To model technology transfer through FDI, Wang and Blomström as-
sume, on the supply side, the existence of two rms, a foreign a¢ liate and a
domestic rm, which compete against each other by producing di¤erentiated
products for the domestic market. The products provide certain common
Lancasterian characteristics,9 but use di¤erent technologies. On the demand
7This is true, since technology to a certain extent has a public good nature which
can be supplied without cost. However, technology has also a tacit character as well
as a codied character; neither can be codied in blueprints, nor be transferred easily to
recipients (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
8There is no free copying of technologies in the world (Wang and Blomström, 1992).
9Details on Lancasterian characteristics are given in Lancaster (1966).
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side, technology a¤ects demand and represents the consumerspreference by
the following logarithmic utility function
U(Y ) =  lnKd + ln(Yd + k
Yf ), (2.1)
where the subscripts d and f respectively denote the domestic rm and the
foreign subsidiary, K reects the level of technological development of each
rm, Y the quantity produced,  > 0 all products share the same , and
k the technology gap between foreign and domestic rms is expressed by the
ratio KfKd .
Considering that the price of each product is set proportionally to its
marginal utility in equilibrium and setting the marginal utility of money
equal to unity, it follows from equation (2.1) that the demand functions of
the local and foreign rms are as follows
Pd = (Yd + k
Yf )
 1, (2.2)
Pf = k
(Yd + k
Yf )
 1. (2.3)
These equations show that foreign and domestic prices depend on the
quantities and the relative attractiveness of corresponding products. The
prices Pf and Pd are determined by the technology gap between the two
rms. That is, the price of the MNCs a¢ liates products increases with the
technology gap, whereas the price of the local rms products moves in the
opposite direction:
@Pf
@k
> 0 and
@Pd
@k
< 0.
Competition among rms is represented by a Cournot game in which
a rm decides the quantity to produce in order to maximize its prot, R,
given the status quo of both the rms technology levels and its competitors
current output
Ri (k) =MaxfPi(k; Yi; Y j )Yi ciYi j Yi is feasibleg, i 6= j, i; j = f; d, (2.4)
where Pi(:) is given in equations (2.2 and (2.3), ci is the marginal production
cost of rm i, which is assumed to be constant for both rms, and Y j is the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium output of rm j.
The technological progress achieved by the foreign subsidiary is directly
correlated to the resources If devoted to technology importing from the
parent company
_Kf = IfKf , (2.5)
where, for the sake of simplicity, the marginal productivity of the techno-
logical investment is assumed to equal unity.
For the domestic rm, its technological level also increases in response to
its learning investment Id, and the return of the investment diminishes as the
learning e¤ort increases. Yet, in the domestic case, Wang and Blomström
also include Findlays hypothesis in the learning process, wherein the rate
of technological progress of the local rm is an increasing function of the
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technology gap between its own level of technology and that of the foreign
rm
_Kd = (Id)kKd with 
0
> 0, 
00
< 0, (0) = v > 0, (2.6)
where the constant v is the rate of costless technology spillovers.
The di¤erence between equations (2.5) and (2.6) represents the change
over time in the technology gap between local and foreign rms
_k = [If   (Id)k] k. (2.7)
that is, the technology gap between the rms grows as new technology is
imported, but diminishes as a result of the local rms learning e¤orts.
The foreign rm chooses If (t) to maximize the discounted value of its
prot subject to the transfer-absorption process (equation 2.7), given the
learning e¤ort of the domestic rm,
V f =
Z 1
0
e rt [Rf (k)  Cf (If )] dt, (2.8)
where r is the discount rate used by the foreign rm and Cf (If ) is the cost
of technology transfer.
The domestic rm faces the problem of choosing Id subject to equation
(2.7) and the choice of the a¢ liate. This yields the function
V d =
Z 1
0
e t [Rd(k)  Cd(Id)] dt, (2.9)
where  is the discount rate used by the domestic rm, Cd(Id) is the cost of
learning investment, and (> 0) is a parameter denoting the costs-side e¢ -
ciency of the learning process undertaken by the domestic rm. The smaller
the , the more cost e¤ective the domestic rm in its learning activities.
By solving the dynamic optimization problem (equations 2.8 and 2.9),
Wang and Blomström nd that:
(i) Spillovers are determined by the investment decisions of both for-
eign and local rms. Each decision has a direct e¤ect on the tech-
nology gap and consequently on the amount of convergence-type
spillovers. The more responsive the two rms quasi-rent to the
technology gap, the more rapid and modern the technologies trans-
ferred, the more e¢ cient the learning activities are and the more
spillovers there are.
(ii) Given the learning e¤orts of host country rms, an MNCs incen-
tive to transfer technology is negatively related to its perceived
operation risks in the host country (industry).
Pursuing the work of Wang and Blomström, Nakamura (2002) nds,
paradoxically, that there is the possibility that an increased spillover e¤ect
and an improved e¢ ciency of the domestic rms learning activities discour-
age technology transfer. In fact, as described by the following equations
(2.10) and (2.11), an increase in spillover e¤ects and e¢ ciency of learning
e¤orts accelerate technology transfer only if the elasticity of the foreign rms
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marginal quasi-rent with respect to the technology gap is larger than unity
in absolute value and vice versa,
@If
@cd
=
("Rf + 1)R
0
f (k
)
cf (r + 2I

f )
@k
@cd
, with (2.10)
Cf (If ) = (1=2)cfI
2
f , Cd(Id) = (1=2)cdI
2
d
where "Rf (= kR
00
f (k
)=R0f (k
)) is the elasticity of the foreign rms mar-
ginal quasi-rent with respect to the technology gap k, Rf is the foreign
rms quasi-rent function, If is the steady-state rate of foreign investment,
k is the steady-state technology gap, and cd and cf denote the learning
investment cost and the technology transfer cost, respectively. Because "Rf
and @k

@cd
are always negative, equation (2.10) generates the following rela-
tionship
@If
@cd
T iff j "Rf jT 1. (2.11)
Another study that explores competition-related spillovers is by Perez
(1997, 1998) who models this kind of spillover within an evolutionary per-
spective. He extends the dynamic model of Dosi et al. (1992) aimed at
explaining the process of forging ahead and falling behind among countries
by adding equations describing the interaction between foreign MNCs and
domestic rms at the technological level. Thus, as in the Wang and Blom-
ström (1992) model, the decision by foreign rms to import new technology
depends on the existing technology gap (Gap) between foreign and domestic
rms, while the imitation of foreign technology requires specic investment
in learning.
More formally, the model assumes a closed-economy with only two in-
teracting rms (foreign and domestic) existing in the industry. The market
selection process is given by
_fi(t  1; t) =  [RCi(t  1)  1] fi (t  1) , (2.12)
with _fi standing for the growth of the market share of rm i and RCi being
its relative competitiveness vis-à-vis the foreign rm, where
fi (t) =
Yi (t)
Y (t)
, RCi(t) =
Ei (t)
E (t)
, Ei (t) =
1
pi (t)
,
and E (t) =
X
i
fi (t)Ei (t) , (2.13)
with pi as the price charged by rm i, Yi its output, Ei its absolute com-
petitiveness, and Y the total output. Each rm xes prices according to a
simple mark-up rule over labor costs
pi (t) = (1 + )
wi (t)
i (t)
, (2.14)
with wi as the nominal wage, i the real labor productivity, and  the mark-
up.
Given that N IMId and N
IMI
f denote respectively the number of domestic
and foreign rmsworkers engaged in imitation and NSEARCHd the number
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of workers of domestic rms engaged in searching activity, the productivity
changes of domestic (d) and foreign (f) rms, responsible for the increase
of their market shares, are determined as follows10
_d (t  1; t)
d(t  1) = 1 + 0[1  exp( 1N
IMI
d (t  1))]
[Gap(t  1)]
expf1[Gap(t  1)]g
+ 2[1  exp( 2NSEARCHd )],(2.15)
_f (t  1; t)
f (t  1) = 2 + 0[1  exp( 2N
IMI
f (t  1)]
[1=Gap(t  1)]
expf1[1=Gap(t  1)]g
+ 2 exp[ (Gap(t  1)], (2.16)
with Gap as the domestic technology gap vis-à-vis its foreign MNC, proxied
by the ratio of foreign productivity to domestic productivity; and 1, 2,
0, 0, 1, 2, 1, 1, and 2 as parameters.
The simulation of this model gives rise of some interesting results: highly
technologically developed domestic competitors tend to maintain their com-
petitive power by exploiting the learning e¤ects associated with FDI. While
backward domestic rms are instead likely to be almost completely crowded
out by a rapidly growing foreign presence.
3. Spillovers and worker mobility
Theoretical models discussed in sections 1 and 2 assume that spillovers
are either determined by the degree of foreign presence or endogenously
generated by the technological competition between foreign a¢ liates and
domestic rms. Yet, in line with Dosi (1988), we assume that a considerable
part of technology is embedded in human skills and in their tacit capabilities,
and so the movement of labor from foreign to domestic rms constitutes in
some cases a channel of knowledge di¤usion.
Three theoretical papers have recently modeled FDI spillovers through
this channel. First, Kaufmann (1997) extends the Wang and Blomströms
(1992) model by explicitly representing how information from the technolog-
ical leader (the MNC) to the imitator (the domestic rms) could be trans-
mitted. He suggests that one possible mean is the recruitment of MNCs
employees by domestic rms.11 Kaufmann also considers the resources used
by each rm to inuence its technological position. Two key results emerge
from this model. Firstly, spillovers may either be generated or frustrated in
the game between the MNC and the domestic rm depending on whether
the marginal benets of recruitment actions are greater or smaller than the
marginal costs. Marginal benets of recruitment are assumed to depend on
demand parameters and the domestic rms technological capability, while
marginal costs are determined by internal MNCs wages. Clearly, lower
10Derivation of the Pereza model is detailed in chapter 3 of his book (1998).
11Of course, we agree that the recruitment of MNC personnel is important for tech-
nology transmission, but demonstration e¤ects are also a prerequisite for the technology
transfer process and should be controlled for.
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MNCs wages, higher domestic technological capability, and larger demand
shocks increase the potential for spillovers in the domestic economy. Sec-
ondly, MNC transfers less technology and market prices are higher when-
ever spillovers are generated. Hence the e¤ects of spillovers on the host
countrys welfare is generally ambiguous; this contrasts with the results of
other spillover models (such as Wang and Blomströms), where host country
welfare is improved by foreign investment.
Kaufmanns model can be outlined as follows. There are two players, as
in games à la Stackelberg, a subsidiary of MNC (f) which is the leader and
a domestic rm (d) the follower. The linear market demand curve in the
initial period is given by
P = A0   (Qf0 +Qd0), (3.1)
where P is the market price andQ is the rms output and A0 is the intercept
of the demand curve.
Assuming that no R&D funds are expended, or created, by either rm in
the host country, new technologies can be introduced only through MNCs
technology transfers which in turn are induced by a perturbation of de-
mand in the host market, and technology is transferred within MNC at zero
marginal cost. Then, after new technology is transferred (Tf ), subsidiary
production is given by
Qf1 = Qf0 + Tf . (3.2)
Technology transfers will also lead to spillover gains in output if the do-
mestic rm recruits some MNCs personnel. Then, the domestic production
is
Qd1 = Qd0 + TfL
rTC, (3.3)
where Lr 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of the MNCs workforce that is recruited
and TC is the technological capability of the domestic rm which is assumed
to be an exogenous parameter. Equation (3.3) indicates that spillovers are
positively related to the number of MNCs employees who are recruited and
the level of domestic capability.
There are internal markets in the MNC for labor and technology where
prices wf and R, respectively, are set by the parent company and taken as
a parameter by its subsidiary. The latter is allowed to set employee benet
levels (b) based on labor market conditions in the host country, so as to
limit labor turnover induced by local rms. Given that MNCs workers
di¤er in their relative valuation of wages and benets because of personal
characteristics j like age and risk aversity, the utility, in terms of wages, of
each MNCs employee j is
uj = wf + jb. (3.4)
Assuming that the domestic rm attempts to recruit MNCs personnel
by choosing a markup m > 0 over the internal MNCs wage wf , a worker
will migrate to the domestic rm if this latter o¤ers higher wage than the
MNC:
wd = (1 +m)wf > wf + jb. (3.5)
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Similarly, a worker will leave the foreign rm to join the existing domestic
one if
mwf > jb. (3.6)
The recruitment function is then dened as Lr = min[(mwfb ); 1]. Given
that, the solution of the model is obtained from the maximization of the
rmsprots f and d
f = P (Qf1; Qd1)Qf1  RTf   wf (1 + b); (3.7)
d = P (Qf1; Qd1)Qd1   Lrwf (1 +m). (3.8)
The second paper is of Fosfuri et al. (2001) who, on the basis of their
1998 paper, analyze a model wherein MNC can transfer a superior technol-
ogy to its a¢ liate only after having trained local workers.12 Once trained,
these workers can later be hired by a local rm and technology spillovers
might occur. Even if such spillovers do not take place, the host country wel-
fare might be improved because of so-called "pecuniary spillovers" embod-
ied in the wages the MNCs a¢ liate pays to the trained workers to prevent
them from moving to a local rival. Based on game theory, the Fosfuri et
al. analysis focuses on conditions under which technology spillover e¤ects
occur. They nd that these e¤ects are more likely to happen when the local
rm and the MNC do not compete ercely in the product market (or sell
in independent or vertically related markets),13 when on-the-job training is
general (such as organizational, managerial or marketing skills) rather than
in rm-specic technology, and when the absorptive capability of the local
rm is high (an argument similar to Kaufmann). The formal equations of
the model are given in appendix 2.
Finally, Glass and Saggi (2002) construct an oligopoly model in which
the MNC is assumed to have superior technology compared to local rms. If
the MNC does FDI, technology may be transferred to the host rm if it hires
workers who have been, instead of trained, exposed to superior technologies
by working for the MNC. There is no room for training in this model. Recog-
nizing the attractiveness of its workers to the host rm, the MNC weights
the cost of paying higher wages to keep them within its boundaries against
the benet of limiting technology transfer to the host rm (an argument
similar to Kaufmann and Fosfuri et al.). Glass and Saggi stress the fact
that the premiums MNC pays to domestic workers are purely to control
technology di¤usion no premiums are allowed due to training costs. An
interesting point generated by this model is that the wage premiums paid by
MNC may increase its prots by preventing the cost reduction of the host
rm. Those premiums play an important role in controlling the technol-
ogy di¤usion process. Glass and Saggis analysis points to the importance
12We also admit that the domestic employee who worked in MNCs without receiving
any training courses could play an important role in transferring a part or all of the foreign
knowledge.
13Note that recently, Ben Hamida (2006a) nds that worker mobility-spillovers from
foreign a¢ liates palys an important role in enhancing the productivity of domestic rivals
with low existing technological capacity.
43
Chapter 2. Existing theoretical models of intra-industry
spillovers
of FDI promotion e¤orts which results in technology transfer to host rms
increasing their prots or in wage premiums beneting domestic workers.
4. Discussions
In this chapter we have discussed the diverse existing theoretical studies
of spillovers for host countries. We recognized three strands of theoretical
models; each one merely provides a partial description of FDI spillovers
by restraining analysis to one means of these e¤ects  i.e. direct contact-
demonstration e¤ects, competition e¤ects, or worker mobility. In fact, in
the rst strand of studies, spillover benets are simply determined by the
degree of foreign presence in the industry in this way, knowledge is di¤used
when foreign a¢ liates come into contact with existing domestic users by
way of demonstration. While in the second strand, spillovers are rather
endogenously generated by technology competition between foreign a¢ liates
and domestic rms. In the most recent strand, spillovers are assumed to
occur mainly due to the worker mobility.
This being so, none of the existing theoretical studies o¤ers a complete
theoretical description of intra-industry FDI spillover e¤ects in which their
diverse channels are altogether taken into account. In fact, since the amount
and nature of the technologies transferred from foreign to domestic rms
depend largely upon the mechanism by which they are transmitted  for
example, worker mobility could transfer not only public technology but also
tacit elements which are unlikely to be transferred through informal contacts
between rms (Nelson, 1982), we strongly believe that the size and the extent
of potential spillovers di¤er according to their channels. Therefore, it is our
opinion that a more satisfactory model of spillover e¤ects providing a deeper
understanding of the process involved and the channels of knowledge transfer
is still required so that the impact of this process will be exactly identied.
As we shall note in chapter 3, the contradictory ndings of existing empirical
studies could be explained by the fact that a partial analysis of spillovers is
not satisfactory and that a more complete picture of spillovers with respect
to their diverse channels is needed to be able to correctly assess the e¤ect
of spillovers.
In addition, the theoretical literature suggests that spillovers are not
automatic, but depend on the existing level of technology competence of do-
mestic rms or their initial technology gaps. We are in agreement that this
determinant is highly important in assessing spillovers, but as we shall see in
chapter 3, further factors (for example, foreign technological characteristics,
the type of FDI, the motives for foreign production, and the regional prox-
imity between foreign and domestic rms) could also inuence the amount
of spillovers and should then be taken into consideration when modeling
spillovers.
Moreover, most theoretical models on FDI and spillovers lie within the
framework of industrial organization theory. Only Perez (1997) model is
based on the principles of evolutionary theory, although in our view, this the-
ory is more concerned with the analysis of the determinants of the processes
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of catching-up and backwardness wherein learning is considered a basis for
technological change and economic growth. Spillovers emerge as learning
activities succeed in increasing the rms productivity.14
In this context, we develop in part 2 a theoretical model of spillover
e¤ects based on evolutionary theory in which we attempt to o¤er a more
comprehensive picture of spillovers by distinguishing these e¤ects according
to the way they occur. Our model, as developed in chapter 5, hypothe-
sizes that the size and the extent of such spillovers depend largely upon the
interaction between the mechanisms by which they occur and the existing
technological levels of domestic rms. Geographical proximity is important
in determining the size and the extent of spillovers. Our theoretical model
is tested against empirical evidence for Switzerland (part3).
Before introducing our theoretical model, we present in the following
chapter, the existing empirical studies on spillovers.
14We have to add that this theory, as previously noted in chapter 1, has also been used
by other international business scholars as Cantwell and Dunning to explain the dynamic
of MNC activities.
45

CHAPTER 3
Existing empirical studies of intra-industry
spillovers
The empirical literature of intra-industry spillovers was pioneered by
Caves (1974), Globerman (1979), Blomström and Persson (1983) and Blom-
ström (1986) using data for Australia, Canada and Mexico, respectively.
Each of them hypothesizes that spillover e¤ects should stimulate the pro-
ductivity of competitors by increasing competition and/or by transferring
foreign technologies to domestic rms. They postulate that if there is a
positive statistical relationship between the productivity level of domestic
industry and the share of foreign presence in that sector  the share of
domestic industrys employment or value-added accounted for by foreign
a¢ liates  then inward investment could be considered as a productivity
raising force. Moreover, the productivity of foreign and domestic rms tend
to converge over time. Building on empirical models, they use labor produc-
tivity or changes in labor productivity as variables to be explained which
are regressed linearly, using a production function framework, on a number
of explanatory variables, among them the share of foreign presence. Their
set of explanatory variables includes among others capital intensity, labor
quality, degree of concentration in the industry, technical progress, mar-
ket growth, etc. Using manufacturing cross-sector data, all these studies
yielded a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the foreign pres-
ence variable and concluded that spillovers exist at industry level, although
they cannot say anything about the magnitude and scope of these spillovers.
Since then, the number of empirical studies assessing the incidence of
intra-industry spillover e¤ects on the productivity performance of domestic
rms is fast growing (appendix 3) and the above models have been extended
and rened, even though the basic approach is still, by and large, similar.
According to appendix 3, we nd that (i) existing available studies employ
di¤erent datasets cross-sectional and panel data and vary in their level
of analysis as some of them use rm level data, whereas many others use
industry level. And (ii) most existing studies use either a contemporaneous
level of foreign penetration or relatively short lags most commonly a one
year lag, and thus they usually assess the short run spillovers and not the
long run e¤ects.
According to Görg and Strobels (2001) meta-analysis of 19 empirical
studies relating to spillovers, cross sectional studies deliver more positive
estimates of the spillover coe¢ cients than panel data studies, but the latter
is the most appropriate estimating framework as it allows for examining
the development of domestic rmsproductivity over a longer time period,
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rather than relying on one data point, and for the control of time-invariant
di¤erences in productivity across sectors or rms. Meyer and Sinanis (2005)
meta-analysis of 41 empirical studies of intra-industry spillovers a¢ rms that
cross-sectional analyses generate more positive spillovers because they do not
control for possible reverse causality between FDI and productivity; those
positive e¤ects may be caused by MNCs investing in the more productive
sectors in the host economy. Positive spillovers at industry level may be
also the result of FDI inows forcing less productive rms to exit and /or
allowing multinationals increase their share of the host countrys market,
both of which would raise the average productivity in the industry rather
than reect genuine productivity spillovers (Javorcik, 2004).
Taking into consideration these methodological notes and using the same
specication model as above, the evidence on signicant spillovers is much
weaker. Indeed, our appendix 3 (column 8) reports only eight studies em-
ploying panel data at rm level that support positive evidence for spillovers,
viz. Yudayeva et al. (2000)1 for Russia, Castellani and Zanfei (2001) for
Italy, Meyer and Sinani (2002) for Estonia, Haskel et al. (2002) for the UK,
Schoors and Van Der Tol (2002)2 for Hungary, Barrios and Strobl (2002)
for Spania, and Karpaty and Lundberg (2004) for Sweden. Whereas, the
remaining studies report negative or insignicant spillovers, such as Haddad
and Harrison (1993) for Moroccan rms, Aitken and Harrison (1999) for
Venezuelan rms, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for Czech Republic rms,
Narula and Marin (2003) for Argentinean rms, Barrios (2000) for Spanish
industries, and Lenger and Taymaz (2004) for Turkish industries.
We recognize three possible explanations for the negative or insignicant
results of spillovers. First, spillovers do not occur automatically, but rather
depend on local and foreign characteristics. Second, the foreign presence
variable might be inappropriate to capture much of the spillover e¤ects. It
might also be nonlinearly related to domestic productivity. Third, spillovers
are likely to depend on regional proximity between foreign and domestic
rms.
The following three sections are devoted to discussing existing empirical
studies that consider the above explanations in determining spillover e¤ects.
Section 1 deals with the notion of local and foreign characteristics, section 2
studies the question of measurement and linearity of spillover variable, and
section 3 discusses the signicance of the regional dimension.
1. Domestic and foreign characteristics
In this section, we present the various empirical studies that have sug-
gested that a possible reason for the apparently contradictory ndings from
the country studies is that various domestic and foreign characteristics may
inuence the incidence of spillovers and should be taken into consideration
when assessing spillovers.
1Yudayeva et al. also tested for inter-industry spillovers.
2Schoors and Van Der Tol also tested for inter-industry spillovers.
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1.1. Domestic characteristics: The absorptive capacity. The the-
oretical literature suggests that not all rms should be expected to benet
from spillovers from FDI (Das, 1987, Wang and Blomström, 1992 and Perez,
1997). In fact, domestic rms must possess su¢ cient levels of absorptive ca-
pacity to e¢ ciently take advantage of spillovers. In other words, insu¢ cient
absorptive capacity may thwart critical learning processes at the rm which
in turn would not benet from new technologies (Cohen and Levinthal 1989,
1990). Absorptive capacity is the rms ability to recognize valuable new
knowledge, internalize it into its existing technological development, and
modify it to t its own specic applications, processes and routines. Then,
the level of the rms absorptive capacity depends upon its existing level
of technological competence as well as its learning and investment e¤orts
undertaken to be able to productively use new technologies. Respectively,
Wang and Blomström (page 140) claim that although there is generally
some degree of technology spillover between rms, there is no free copying
of technologies in the word. Searching for information, reversed engineer-
ing, personnel training for new production methods, et cetera, make learning
costly and time consuming. Narula and Marin (2003) also suggest that ab-
sorption is not purely about imitation; domestic rms cannot absorb foreign
knowledge unless they invest in their own research and development, because
it can be highly specic to foreign rms since it is tacit in nature.
The theoretical argument discussed above has been broadly accepted by
most later empirical studies so as to be able to assess signicant spillover
e¤ects. Nonetheless, it is important to note that these studies disregard
the signicant role of learning and investment e¤orts in determining the
absorptive capacity of domestic rms and retain in most cases the exist-
ing level of technological capacity or the technology gap between domes-
tic and foreign rms as proxies. Two exceptions are Narula and Marin
(2003) and Ben Hamida and Gugler (2006) who reported that only domes-
tic rms that largely invested in the absorptive capacity received positive
spillovers from FDI. Investment and learning e¤orts are proxied in Narula
and Marins paper by investments in new equipment for product/process
innovation and training activities undertaken by Argentinean rms between
1992 and 1996, while in Ben Hamida and Gugler they are measured by the
level of investment expenditures in new equipment and training activities
for product/process innovation undertaken by Swiss rms within the period
1999-2001. Yet, the distinction of Argentinean rms according to di¤erent
levels of industrial technology gap (high and small) does not provide any
signicant spillovers.
Cantwell (1989) advanced the idea that absorptive capacity of domestic
rms is the key factor to determining the spillover benets from the entry
and the presence of foreign rms. He investigated the response of domestic
rms to the increase in competition caused by the entry of U.S. multination-
als into European markets between 1955 and 1975 and argued that positive
spillovers occur only in industries wherein domestic rms had some tradi-
tional technological strength. Their analysis does not focus on productivity,
but rather on changes in the market shares of foreign and local rms. Ab-
sorptive capacity is then proxied by domestic market share.
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Using cross-section analysis for Mexican manufacturing industries, Kokko
(1994) suggests that spillovers are related to the technology gap between
locally-owned host country rms and MNCs a¢ liates. Technology gap is
dened as the ratio of value-added per employee in foreign a¢ liates to that
in private locally-owned rms. Kokko used the Cavess spillover model dis-
cussed above and furthermore allows for an interaction term between the
share of foreign presence and the technology gap in order to assess the com-
bined e¤ect of this variable on industry labor productivity. He found that a
large technology gap per se does not appear to hinder spillovers on average,
although industries with a large gap and a high degree of foreign presence
experience lower spillover benets than others. However, Blomström and
Wol¤ (1989) explicitly found that Mexican rmsproductivity growth and
the rate of their catching-up are higher in sectors where the existing technol-
ogy gap between local and foreign rms is greater; this result accords well
with Findlays thesis of backwardness advantages.
Expanding on Kokko (1994), Kokko at al. (1996) examined more closely
how spillover e¤ects are related to the apparent technology di¤erences be-
tween foreign and local rms. To do so, they used a cross-section of rm-level
data rather than industry-level to be able to examine how the productivity
of individual plants  not the industry average  are a¤ected by the de-
gree of foreign presence. Based on Uruguayan data, Kokko et al. found no
signicant evidence for productivity spillovers to the whole sample of rms.
Nevertheless, once this sample is divided into two sub-samples characterized
by the values of the technology gap, they found better results in which signif-
icant positive spillovers take place in the sub-samples of domestic rms with
small and moderate technology gaps (measured as the di¤erence between
the domestic rms labor productivity and the average labor productivity
in foreign rms), but not in the sub-sample of considerably low technology
rms. Kokko et al. assert on page 609 that small and moderate technology
gaps seem to identify cases where foreign technologies are useful for the local
rms, and where the local rms possess the skills needed to apply or learn
the foreign technologies. Large gaps, on the other hand, may signal that for-
eign technology is not relevant (because the product varieties manufactured
by foreign rms are very di¤erent from local varieties), that local rms have
nothing to learn from the foreign rms, or that local technological capabil-
ity is so weak that foreign technologies cannot be used in local rms. An
argument similar to Glass and Saggi (1998) who argue that the bigger the
technology gap the lower the quality of technology transferred and the lower
the potential for spillovers.
We recognize that several studies have conrmed the hypothesis that
spillovers depend largely upon the technological characteristics of domestic
rms and that only rms with relatively high technological capabilities expe-
rience positive spillovers. For instance, using panel data on domestic rms
in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland and panel data on UK manufacturing
rms, respectively, Konings (1999) and Girma et al. (1999) found that on
average there was no sign of spillover benets i.e., under the assumption
that spillovers are homogenous across diverse types of domestic rms. How-
ever, while taking into account factors that could inuence the capacity of
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domestic rms to benet from foreign presence, Konings reported evidence
of positive spillovers only for R&D intensive rms and that in Bulgaria and
Poland. And Girma et al. found that spillovers are positive and signif-
icant for all rms with low technology gaps (measured by the individual
rms total productivity factor gap relative to the 90th percentile TFP of
the corresponding industry, in the previous year).
In a similar vein, using panel data for Portuguese manufacturing in-
dustries and cross-sectional data for US manufacturing rms, Flôres et al.
(2002) and Yeaple and Keller (2003) found, respectively, that spillover e¤ects
are related to industries with an intermediate productivity gap (dened as
the ratio of foreign rmsproductivity to the productivity of domestic ones)
and to relatively high technology industries (those with high level of R&D
over sales). Liu et al. (2000) found, using panel data for UK manufacturing
industries, that spillovers are more present in industries with low technol-
ogy gaps and high technological capacities (proxied by intangible assets per
worker). Based on cross-sectional data for manufacturing rms operating in
Greece, Dimelis (2005) also provided evidence that only domestic rms with
a small gap experience positive spillovers.
Using cross-sectional data for Chinese manufacturing rms, Buckley et
al. (2002) found evidence for positive productivity spillovers for collectively-
owned rms and negative spillovers for state-owned rms. They concluded
that the former enjoys a superior capability to absorb external spillover ben-
ets than the latter. Likewise, using panel data for Spanish manufacturing
rms, Barrios and Strobl (2002) found little evidence for spillovers on av-
erage and strong positive e¤ects in the sub-sample of domestic exporters.
They interpreted this result as evidence that absorptive capacity (measured
by export activity) matters. They argued that exporting rms which are
more exposed to international competition tend to use more advanced tech-
nologies and hence are more able to capture spillover benets than non
exporters. However, based on a panel of Irish rms, Barry et al. (2005)
failed to conrm the nding of Barrios and Strobl and provided evidence of
negative spillovers for domestic exporters.
Damijan et al. (2003) analyzed rm level panel data for eight transition
economies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia. They found that results for spillovers did not di¤er
across countries and also reported no signicant evidence for spillovers on
average. Once they controlled for the domestic absorptive capacity, using
an interaction term between the share of foreign presence and rms R&D
expenditure, they found some di¤erences in results. For the Czech republic
and Poland spillovers become negative, while they are positive for Romania.
The result for the Czech Republic is in contrast to that of Kinoshita (2001),
who found that spillovers become positive once absorptive capacity (proxied
also by R&D expenditure) is taken into account. For all other countries,
Damijan et al. found no evidence of spillovers at all. Castellani and Zanfei
(2001) also failed to conrm the hypothesis discussed above which assumes
that only domestic rms with relatively high technological capacity tend to
benet from spillovers from FDI. Using a panel of rm-level data on the
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manufacturing industry in France, Italy and Spain they report the same
surprising results as Damijan et al. They found that high TFP gaps favour
positive spillovers, while a high level of absorptive capacity (proxied by the
average productivity of the rm (TFP)) seems to inhibit such positive ef-
fects. This nding is contradictory to technological accumulation Cantwells
hypothesis which stresses the role of the domestic absorptive capacity and
of the coherence between foreign and domestic technologies in determining
the virtuous e¤ects of inward investment.
The studies described above assume that spillover e¤ects are linearly
related to domestic absorptive capacity. Yet, some extensions allow for pos-
sible non linear specications by which the parameter capturing the extent
of spillovers will be a quadratic function of the absorptive capacity level of
domestic rms. For example, in a study of cross-sectional data for UK man-
ufacturing industries, Perez (1997) suggests that spillovers depend largely
upon the absorptive capacity of UK rms, which in turn are a¤ected by the
level of foreign penetration and its rate of increase. Allowing for a quadratic
relationship between UK spillover e¤ects and the initial technology gap of
UK rms (a proxy of absorptive capacity), he found an increase in produc-
tivity due to foreign presence only for industries in which domestic rms
are characterized by high or very low levels of initial technology gap. Perez
asserts on page 175 that in industries where a relatively wide technologi-
cal gap is associated with a relatively low and slowly growing foreign share,
indigenous rms may be able to catch up gradually. Conversely, where tech-
nological disparities are relatively modest but indigenous rms have to cope
with a foreign presence that is too high or that grows too fast, the same rms
may be unable to compete with foreign rivals and may enter into process of
cumulative decline. A similar argument has been put forward by Cantwell
(1993) in his analysis of the interrelation between spillovers and technologi-
cal capability .
Using rm-level data from UK manufacturing industry over the pe-
riod 1989 to 1999, Girma (2003) also explored the nature of the absorptive
capacity-technology spillovers nexus. He used three di¤erent specications
to assess the signicance of absorptive capacity, viz. linear, quadratic and
endogenous threshold models. He found that a minimum absorptive ca-
pacity threshold is crucial for domestic rms to be able to benet from
productivity spillovers. However the augmenting rate of spillovers dimin-
ishes as the absorptive capacity of domestic rms (proxied by the di¤erence
in TFP between an establishment and the maximum TFP in the industry)
gets past the given critical level. The relationship between spillovers and
absorptive capacity is then an inverted-U shaped; this kind of relationship
remains invariable even when both foreign a¢ liates are located in the same
region as the UK rms and outside the region. Girma claims that domestic
rms with either very low or very high levels of absorptive capacity may be
least likely to benet from spillovers, as they either do not have the su¢ cient
technological ability to do so or they are too similar in their technology to
their foreign rivals. A similar argument has been put forward by Gomulka
(1990) in the context of the technological catch-up of countries.
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Using rm-level data from the UK manufacturing industry over the pe-
riod 1980 to 1992, Girma and Görg (2005) allowed for di¤erent e¤ects of
FDI on domestic rms located at di¤erent quantiles of the productivity dis-
tribution by using a conditional quantile regression technique. In fact, in
the presence of a heterogeneous productivity process, it is more appropri-
ate to examine productivity dynamics at di¤erent points of the distribution
rather than average properties (i.e. conditional means). They allowed for
an absorptive capacity variable (proxied by the di¤erence in TFP between
an establishment and the maximum TFP in the industry) among the set of
regressors, which is also quadratically related to the spillover e¤ects. That
is, even within a particular conditional quantile, the response of rm-level
productivity growth to foreign presence is assumed to vary according to the
initial level of productivity. Girma and Görg conrm the nding of Girma
(2003) in respect that they found an inverted U-shaped relationship between
domestic absorptive capacity and spillovers from FDI outside the region.
Conversely, they provided evidence for U-shaped relationship coming from
FDI located in the same region as UK rms.
1.2. Further domestic characteristics. A further factor discussed
in the theoretical literature is the degree of competition in host markets,
since spillovers are more pronounced in industries with stronger competition
(Wang and Blomström, 1992).
Too often, existing empirical studies implicitly examine this argument
along with the domestic absorptive capacity, i.e. industries with high level
of domestic absorptive capacity are assumed to have high competition level.
Few studies have explicitly analyzed this argument. Sjöholm (1997) ex-
amined FDI spillover e¤ects on Indonesian manufacturing rms according
to the local competition level of Indonesian industries. To do so, he esti-
mated the same spillover model, as discussed above, using two sub-samples
characterized by high and low values of domestic competition (measured
by the interaction term between the Herndahl index and the rate of ef-
fective protection). He found that Spillovers from FDI occur only in the
sub-sample of Indonesian industries with a high degree of competition. Fol-
lowing Sjöholms approach, Girma et al. (1999) also found that spillovers
increase as the competition level (measured by import penetration index) of
the UK industry increases.
In contrast, Chung (2001) found that competitive US industries experi-
ence productivity stagnation from FDI, while relatively uncompetitive US
industries experience productivity growth. Chung asserts on page 224 that
these ndings are consistent with positive technology transfer occurring in
less competitive industries where rms enter to exploit existing skills, and
are consistent with less productive foreign rms entering more competitive
industries to learn best practices. To represent the level of domestic compe-
tition, Chung used the price markup; the ratio of price divided by marginal
cost. When the price markup is high a value greater than 1competition
is low.
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1.3. Foreign characteristics. In addition, we recognize that another
possible determinant of spillovers suggested in prevailing studies is that for-
eign characteristics could inuence spillover e¤ects. Accordingly, we identify
seven di¤erent thoughts.
First, as we have noted in chapter 1, spillovers are assumed to largely de-
pend on the structure of the MNCss ownership. For example, Blomström
and Sjöholm (1999) asked if the degree of spillovers vary with the degree
of foreign ownership (majority, and minority). They used three di¤erent
variables to measure the degree of foreign presence: the share of a 5-digit
industrys total gross output accounted for by foreign rms (irrespective of
majority or minority ownership), the share of an industrys gross output
accounted for by rms with foreign minority ownership, and the share of
industrys gross output accounted for by rms with majority foreign own-
ership. Using rm-level data operating in Indonesia in 1997, they found
that the degree of foreign ownership does not seem to a¤ect the amount
of spillovers in Indonesia. Similarly, Dimelis and Louri (2002)3 analyzed
spillovers and their relationship to the degrees of foreign ownership (ma-
jority, and minority). They said (page 452) that "the degree of ownership
MNCs select is thought to a¤ect the productive e¢ ciency enjoyed by their af-
liates as well as the di¤usion of technology to local rms". Using a sample
of manufacturing rms operating in Greece in 1997, they found that positive
spillover e¤ects for the domestic economy stem exclusively from minority-
owned a¢ liates, especially for the lower productivity domestic rms. This
result contradicts Blomström and Sjöholms ndings for Indonesia. Dimelis
and Louri suggest that these contradictory ndings could be explained by
the fact that the di¤erent development levels of the two economies (Greece
and Indonesia) may a¤ect the way they absorb the benecial e¤ects of FDI,
that is in less developed economies any degree of foreign presence may have
a signicant impact while in more developed economies the e¤ects are di-
versied.
Second, it is argued that spillovers depend on the complexity level of
foreign technology. For example, Kokko (1994) tested spillovers, observed
in a static cross-sector analysis of Mexican manufacturing, according to the
complexity of MNCs technology. He used Cavesspillover model discussed
above and also allowed for an interaction term between foreign presence and
the complexity of MNCs technology (as proxied by either large payment on
patents or high capital intensity) in order to measure the combined e¤ect of
this variable on industry labor productivity. He found that complex tech-
nology does not hinder positive spillover e¤ects even when it is accompanied
by large foreign market shares.
Third, existing studies also suggest that spillovers may be determined
by MNCstype of operations in the host country. Narula and Marin (2003)
found that some MNCs operating in Argentina are able to generate benets
that are not based exclusively on the local exploitation of their own superior
3In their paper, Dimelis and Louri do not distinguish between intra-industry spillovers
and inter-industry spillovers.
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technological assets, but also as a result of superior transaction-type owner-
ship advantages. Such operations do not seem to raise spillover benets for
local rms.
Fourth, as we have mentioned in chapter 1, productivity spillovers are
largely determined by the motivations for FDI in that di¤erent types of FDI
motives have markedly di¤erent amounts and signs of spillovers. Dri¢ eld
and Love (2006a) tested this hypothesis for FDI ows into the UK from 8
leading countries over the period 1984-1995 and found supportive results.
They found that spillover e¤ects are positive when FDI is motivated by the
desire to exploit some competitive advantage possessed by the UK and neg-
ative when FDI is motivated by the desire to access the technology of the
UKs manufacturing rms. This result for the UK manufacturing industry
seems to be conrmed by the work of Girma (2003), using more recent data
between 1989 and 1999. In their 2007 paper, Dri¢ eld and Love conrmed
once more the hypothesis that FDI motivated by di¤erent factors has sys-
tematically di¤erent spillover e¤ects on domestic productivity. Unlike their
2006a paper, they developed a taxonomy of FDI motives, building on the
key distinction between technology exploitation and technology sourcing,
but also allowing for the locational e¤ects of factor price di¤erentials. They
distinguished between four di¤erent types of FDI motivations: technology
sourcing/location advantage, technology sourcing, e¢ ciency seeking, and
ownership advantage. And then they tested whether these di¤erent FDI
motivations have di¤erent spillover e¤ects, using datasets of FDI ows into
the UK from 30 countries over the period 1987-1997. They found that the
UK gains substantial spillover benets only from FDI motivated by a strong
technology-based ownership advantage technology-sourcing FDI led to no
spillovers.
Fifth, Liu and Wei (2006)4 supported the hypothesis that foreign charac-
teristics matter by highlighting the importance of distinguishing the source
of FDI when determining spillovers. Using a sample of 10.000 Chinese and
foreign manufacturing rms for the period 1998-2001, they found that for-
eign invested rms as a whole exert negative and insignicant spillover
e¤ects. After splitting the sample of foreign invested rms into OECD
and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT) rms, better results emerged
wherein spillovers became signicantly positive with HMT-FDI, while they
remained negative but signicant with OECD-FDI. In a similar vein, Karpaty
and Lundberg (2004) provided evidence that the nationality of foreign af-
liates matters for the spillover e¤ects. Using a panel of data for Swedish
manufacturing rms, they found that US rms have a stronger positive
e¤ect on productivity of Swedish owned rms than FDI from the rest of
the world. Likewise, based on Chinese industrial data for 2001, Buckley et
al. (2007a) conrmed Liu and Weis nding in that overseas HMT a¢ liates
generate spillovers to domestic rms, but only in labour-intensive industries.
Nonetheless, Buckley et al. also found that Western a¢ liates have positive
4Liu and Wei (2006) also examine inter-industry spillovers.
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spillover e¤ects and this on the performance of domestic rms in technology-
intensive industries. In addition, they reported that Chinese state-owned en-
terprises gain spillover benets from the presence of both HMT a¢ liates in
labour-intensive industries and of western a¢ liates in technology-intensive
industries. Other domestic rms (including, among others, collectively and
privately owned rms), however, benet only from HMT-FDI in labour-
intensive industries.
Sixth, Kokko et al. (2001) investigated the role of the trade orientation
of foreign investing rms in the size and the extent of spillovers. They noted
that local market oriented foreign investors in Uruguay have apparently a
stronger impact on domestic technology and productivity levels than export
oriented investors. One reason could be that local market oriented MNCs
may have relatively strong interactions with domestic rms, both as com-
petitors and collaborators, whereas export oriented investors are likely to be
relatively isolated from the local market.
Seventh, using data for industrial rms in Argentina over the period
Marin and Bell (2006) tested spillover e¤ects according to di¤erent a¢ liates
own technological activities and found evidence for positive e¤ects when
a¢ liates were technologically active. They claim on page 692 that "not
simply the existence of MNC subsidiaries, linked to the superior knowledge
resources of the parent, generated spillovers. Instead, the subsidiariesown
knowledge creation and accumulation seems to have been a signicant source
of the spillover potential".
2. Measurement and linearity of spillover variable
Four other possible explanations for the misspecication of spillovers are
given in this section. First, some studies point to the possibility of taking
an absolute variable for foreign presence rather than the relative one (the
share of foreign to total sectorial activity). Second, there are studies that
try to use as many proxies for foreign presence as possible so as to o¤er a
careful examination of spillover e¤ects these proxies are treated as di¤erent
channels or sources of FDI spillovers. Third, other studies assume that the
foreign presence variable is not an accurate measure of the overall spillover
benets with respect to the entire e¤ects of demonstration, competition, and
worker mobility. And nally, the relationship between foreign presence and
productivity spillovers may be non linear.
2.1. The measurement of spillover variable. As already mentioned,
the absence of a signicant and positive spillover e¤ects from FDI could re-
sult in some troubles related to the measurement of the spillover variable
itself. Firstly, foreign presence variable which has been used, by and large,
to measure spillovers should not be measured by the share of the total ac-
tivity in the sector accounted for by foreign a¢ liates. In fact, Castellani and
Zanfei (2002) argue that this measurement imposes the restriction, that is
changes of the same magnitude in foreign and aggregate activities within a
sector have no e¤ect on the dependent variable. They suggest instead the
absolute level of foreign activity in the sector to measure foreign presence.
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Using panel data on Italian rms, they found supporting results of posi-
tive spillovers with an absolute variable in place of negative spillovers with
a relative variable. This measurement has been conrmed by Ruane and
Ugour (2005) as they found that the spillover variable became positive and
signicant when they used the absolute rather than the relative measure.
Secondly, Tian (2007) suggested that foreign presence, as measured by
the share of foreign rms in output, or the share of foreign rms in employ-
ment, or the share of foreign rms in capital as a proxy for spillovers tend
to o¤er only a partial description of spillovers. That is, by employing only
one of these three variables to proxy for the presence of FDI, the resulting
estimates could not represent the overall spillover e¤ects of FDI on the pro-
ductivity of domestic rms these proxies, in Tians view, are considered
sources of FDI spillovers. Instead Tian used a number of variables that
represent di¤erent sources of spillovers. In terms of capital, he considered
tangible assets and intangible assets as two di¤erent sources. Regarding
products, new products were separated from traditionalproducts, and ex-
ported products are separated from domestically consumed products. And
in terms of employment, he di¤erentiated foreign rms employing skilled
workers from those employing less skilled workers. Tian considered all of
these variables as individual channels by which FDI may a¤ect the produc-
tivity spillovers of domestic rms. Using panel rm data in China from 1996
to 1999, Tian found positive spillovers occur through tangible assets rather
than intangible assets, via domestically consumed products rather than ex-
ported products, through traditionalproducts rather than new products,
and from foreign rms employing unskilled workers rather than those em-
ploying skilled workers.
Thirdly, foreign presence variable could be inappropriate for capturing
much of the competition-related spillover e¤ects. Kokko (1996) asserts that
spillovers from competition are not necessarily proportional to the presence
of foreign rms, although demonstration and contagion e¤ects are. Thereby,
he suggests disentangling the e¤ect of demonstration and contagion which
characterize the benets of FDI through imitation of introduced foreign
technologies and/or via worker mobility from that of competition by em-
ploying technology and competition control variables. He estimated simulta-
neous equations for domestic and foreign rms and used the foreign presence
variable to capture spillovers from contagion and demonstration e¤ects and
added a second spillover variable the productivity of foreign a¢ liates to
reect the e¤ects of competition-related spillovers. By so doing, he found
that spillovers are not determined by the degree of foreign presence alone,
but rather by the simultaneous interactions between foreign and local rms.5
Using the same methodology, Kokkos nding has been later conrmed by
Lui et al. (2000) in their study of UK manufacturing industries. However,
using US manufacturing data, Chung (2001) found evidence for spillovers
from competition and technology transfer only for low competitive indus-
tries. Knowledge spillovers are determined as above by the degree of foreign
5We have to note that Kokkos results are only supported in a subsample of Mexican
manufacturing industries wherein suspected enclaves  where foreign rms operate in
isolation from Mexican competitors were excluded.
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presence, but competition e¤ects are proxied by the growth of industry price
markup.
Meyer and Sinani (2002)6 also disentangled the e¤ect of technology
transfer from that of competition by employing technology and competi-
tion control variables. They also distinguished between technology transfer
from demonstration and from worker mobility. To do so, they regressed the
productivity of domestic rms on a set of explanatory variables, inter alia an
interaction term between foreign presence and domestic absorptive capacity,
foreign herndahl index, and an interaction term between foreign presence
and domestic labor skills; which capture demonstration, competition and
worker mobility e¤ects, respectively. Thereby, positive and signicant coef-
cients mean that rst, technology transfer from demonstration positively
a¤ects the productivity of domestic rms experiencing high absorptive ca-
pacity; second, competition induced by foreign presence negatively a¤ects
domestic rivals; and third, the movement of skilled labor from foreign to
domestic rms contributes positively to raise the productivity of domestic
rms. Using Estonian manufacturing panel data, they found that domes-
tic rms benet from the competition of foreign rms as the competitive
pressure induces domestic rms to use their existing technologies more ef-
ciently, or search for new ones, in order to maintain their market shares.
Moreover, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term between labor skills and
foreign presence is found to be negative and signicant. This provides evi-
dence for a movement of skilled labor from domestic to foreign rms, which
signicantly harms the domestic rm output growth. And nally, only do-
mestic rms with high absorptive capacity seem to benet from spillovers
from demonstration e¤ects.
Likewise, Ben Hamida and Gugler (2006) also suggested that the assess-
ment of the overall spillovers calls upon a detailed analysis of these e¤ects
according to their diverse channels. They tested this approach rstly for
demonstration-related spillovers proxied as above by the degree of foreign
presence, and they controlled for the inuence of the level of domestic ab-
sorptive capacity in determining the size and the amount of such spillovers.
That is, they tested spillovers according to the diverse levels of technological
capacity of domestic rms and made use of a thorough measure of domestic
absorptive capacity in which the learning and investment e¤orts of domestic
rms came with their existing technological capacities. Using cross-sectional
data for Swiss manufacturing and services/construction rms, they found
evidence for spillovers only for Swiss rms with a mid existing technology
gap and large investment in absorptive capacity.
2.1.1. Worker mobility-related spillovers: A Survey. It is worth noting
that, recently, studies have been interested in measuring the spillover ef-
fects from the movement of trained and/or experienced local workers from
a foreign a¢ liate to an existing or a new domestic rm "worker mobility-
related spillovers". As MNCsa¢ liates are highly active in training local
employees, even more than domestic rms (Chen 1983, Wasow and Hill
6Meyer and Sinani also examine the e¤ects of vertical linkages.
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1986, Katz 1987, Djankov and Hoekman 2000, Sousa 2001). The types of
training depend on the skills needed and range from on-the-job training to
seminars and more formal schooling to overseas education, perhaps at the
parent company (Blomström and Kokko 2002). And they a¤ect most levels
of employees, from simple manufacturing operatives through supervisors to
technically advanced professionals and top-level a¢ liate managers. It is thus
expected to some extent that the transfer of these skills and experiences to
domestic rms will be broadly benecial to them.
Based on an interview of 72 top and middle level managers in 41 manu-
facturing/processing rms, Gershenberg (1987) found that foreign a¢ liates
o¤er more training of various sorts for their managers than private local
rms (Kenyan rms in this case), and provided evidence for the movement
of these trained managers from foreign to Kenyan rms that could con-
tribute to the di¤usion of know-how. However, mobility seemed to be lower
for managers employed in the MNCs a¢ liates than for those in Kenyan
rms. This is not surprising given the common nding that MNCs a¢ liates
pay their employees more than domestic rms (see for example Haddad and
Harrison 1993, Aitken et al. 1996, and Görg et al. 2002). Bloom (1992) also
found substantial technological transfer in South Korea when production
managers left MNCs to join host rms. And Pack (1997) reported that in
the chemical industry in Taiwan during the mid-1980s, almost 50 percent
of all engineers and 63 percent of skilled workers left foreign rms to join
domestic ones.
In a more recent paper, Görg and Strobel (2004) presented their rst
attempt at measuring and analyzing in detail the e¤ects of worker mobility-
related spillovers. They tested these kinds of e¤ects at both intra- and inter-
industry levels. Spillovers are proxied by three dummy variables, which
in turn take one if the owner of the domestic rm had gained experience
working for a multinational within the same industry prior to starting in
the present rm, if he received training by multinational, and if his previous
experience was gained in a multinational in a di¤erent industry. Using panel
data on Ghanian manufacturing rms, they found evidence for spillovers
from worker mobility only if the owners had experience in multinationals
within the same industry. Vera-Cruz and Dutrénit (2005) supported this
evidence,7 in that rms created by former employees of the maquila industry8
had more technological and managerial capabilities than other rms without
this characteristic.
Using Chinese rm data, Hale and Long (2006) also tested for possible
worker mobility-spillovers e¤ects. To do so, he regressed the productivity
of domestic rms on the degree of foreign presence in the industry within
the same city and added another explanatory variable, the share of employ-
ees with foreign experience, by category of employees: production workers,
7Vera-Cruz and Dutrénit do not distinguish between intra- and inter-industry
spillovers and use classication methods, viz. multiple correspondence analysis and hi-
erarchical cluster analysis, to assess the spillovers from worker mobility.
8Maquila industry includes all of foreign rms, mainly from the USA, established on
the border of Mexico and the United States.
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engineering personnel, and managerial personnel. He found evidence that
skilled labor mobility (engineers and managers) enhances positive produc-
tivity spillovers from FDI in China.
2.2. Linearity of spillover variable. Fourthly, the mixed results re-
garding spillovers can be explained by the fact that the relationship between
productivity and the foreign presence variable may not be linear. Buckley et
al. (2003) suggest that the nding of negative spillovers may be explained by
the fact that they come to dominate over the positive e¤ects. They clearly
addressed the possibility of both positive and negative spillovers associated
with the operations of MNCs: spillover benets increase with foreign pres-
ence up to a point, beyond this, increased foreign presence may at least
in part  hinder the rate of growth of local rms performance and then
spillover benets start to decline. Using a Chinese industrial census data
for 1995, Buckley et al. found supportive evidence that the relationship be-
tween the degree of foreign presence and productivity spillovers is non linear
and obtained rather a curvilinear functional form. Based on industry-level
data from in 1997, Buckley et al. (2007b) also controlled for the impact
of the nationality of ownership of foreign investors on spillovers. Doing so,
evidence for a curvilinear relationship with FDI remains true only with data
for overseas Chinese (Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) MNCs, but not for
other (Western) rms. Buckley et al. found this relationship to be most
pronounced for low-technology host industries.
3. Regional dimension
Given that labor mobility and imitation are among the important chan-
nels of spillovers, domestic rms that are located near to foreign a¢ liates
may be more likely to benet than others, since knowledge is transmitted
more e¢ ciently via local proximity and its transmission costs are assumed to
increase with distance (Audretsch 1998). Thereby, spillover benets tend to
be captured rstly by neighboring domestic rms, and gradually spread to
other, more distant ones (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Then, if the spillovers
are received by neighboring local rms only, spillovers are regionalin scale,
but, if they are also received by rms in other regions in the host country,
then spillovers are nationalin scale.
Consequently, we recognize that a further possible source of the absence
of signicant and positive e¤ects of productivity spillovers for domestic rms
may be that the entry and presence of foreign investors generate spillovers,
but only for rms located nearby. Then, when spillovers are measured at
a national level, these regional benets might not be identied if they are
too small to o¤set the overall negative e¤ects across all regions. To test for
the possibility that spillovers occur at the regional level, one should include
regional foreign share and that from outside the region in the specication
rather than sectorial foreign share. Regional foreign share is measured by
the share of employment, value-added or capital in an industry within a
region employed by foreign rms.
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Aitken and Harrison (1999) advanced the idea that spillovers have a
regional dimension. Using rm panel data for Venezuela, they nd that re-
gional foreign investment has positive and signicant impact on the produc-
tivity of Venezuelan rms, while sectorial foreign investment has negative
e¤ects. Similarly, Liu and Wei (2006) found evidence of regional intra-
industry spillovers from FDI, using rm panel data for China. Spillovers
across Chinese regions are negative and insignicant; this may be due to
the existence of barriers to the movement of production and output factors
across regions in China. Also, using sector-level data in the UK, Dri¢ eld
(2004) showed that there are positive productivity spillovers from FDI in
the same region, while FDI outside the region has a negative impact on
productivity. Dri¢ eld argues that this negative e¤ect is consistent with a
negative competition e¤ect from foreign rms outside the region, which is
not o¤set by the positive spillovers at the regional level.
Expanding on Girma et al. (1999) who found no evidence for national
spillovers from UK manufacturing rms,9 Girma and Wakelin (2002) exam-
ined in more detail whether spillovers from foreign to domestic rms have
some regional dimension. Using panel data on UK manufacturing rms,
they concluded that domestic rms gain from the presence of foreign rms
in their region, but loose out if the rms are located in di¤erent regions. In
addition, they supported the fact that local characteristics also inuence the
level of spillovers. Actually, sectors with high levels of competition and a
low technology gap (as a proxy for absorptive capacity) experienced higher
spillovers, and more-developed regions gain more from spillovers than others.
Girma and Görg (2005) also distinguished the e¤ect of FDI in the same
region from that of FDI outside the region. They also allowed, as described
in previous sections, for di¤erent e¤ects of FDI on rms located at di¤er-
ent quantiles of the productivity distribution by using conditional quantile
regression technique. They found, using rm panel data for UK, that the
e¤ect of an increase in the growth of FDI in the region has signicant pos-
itive e¤ects on TFP growth of UK rms in all quantiles, while the e¤ects
of FDI outside the region is largely negative. As in Girma and Wakelin
(2002), Girma and Görg also considered in their specication the domestic
absorptive capacity, which is quadratically related to the spillover e¤ects.
Doing so, they found U-shaped relationship between the absorptive capac-
ity and spillovers from FDI in the region in all quantiles, while there is an
inverted U-shaped relationship for spillovers from FDI outside the region.
Conversely, as we have discussed above, Girma (2003) found that the rela-
tionship between spillovers and absorptive capacity is an inverted U-shape,
either from FDI located in the same region as UK rms or outside the region.
Finally we have to note that there exist studies which failed to conrm
that the regional dimension matters such as Sjohölm (1999) and Halpern
and Muraközy (2005). Sjohölm examined Indonesian rms in 1980 and
1991 and found evidence of positive spillovers at the national level, whereas
regional intra-industry spillovers from FDI were negative. Using panel data
for Hungarian manufacturing rms, Halpern and Muraközy also nd that
9See the description in subsection 1.1 of the study of Girma et al. (1999).
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spillovers within or across regions were not di¤erent from each other, both
were insignicant.10 They attributed this nding to the fact that Hungary is
a homogenous country from the viewpoint of spillovers because of its small
size. Similarly, regional boundaries are not boundaries for spillovers.
4. Discussions
In this chapter we have discussed the existing empirical literature on
spillovers for host economies. We have identied that although the number
of empirical studies analyzing the incidence of spillovers is rapidly grow-
ing, results thus far have been mixed for country analyses and evidence on
spillovers has not been conclusive yet.
What clearly comes out from the existing empirical literature on spillovers
is that these e¤ects occur through a variety of channels and thus the assess-
ment of spillovers calls upon a detailed analysis of those e¤ects according to
the ways they occur. Spillovers are far from being proportional to the share
of foreign presence. This variable does not take into account the e¤ect of
competition increase or that of worker mobility. This is one of the reasons
why is contradictory the scant empirical evidence available. We believe that
additional variables are required to provide a thorough analysis of spillovers
in which the process of spilling-over is exactly identied.
We also nd that the empirical evidence is quite supportive of the im-
portance of domestic absorptive capacity in determining the magnitude and
the scope of spillovers. Nonetheless, results are sometimes conicting. This
could be due to some troubles related to the measurement of the absorp-
tive capacity itself, in that existing studies do not pay attention to the fact
that the level of a rms absorptive capacity depends upon its existing level
of technological competence as well as its learning and investment e¤orts
undertaken to be able to use new technologies productively. So, further in-
vestigations are needed to resolve these ambiguities and o¤er an appropriate
measure of their absorptive capacity.
In addition, we recognize that the regional dimension which has been
considered by a number of empirical studies has a signicant role in assessing
spillover benets and that we highlight, as we previously mentioned in the
conclusion of chapter 2, the importance of taking into consideration this
dimension for the formal specications of spillovers.
Thus, in our view, the assessment of spillovers calls upon a detailed
analysis of the circumstances under which they emerge. Our study suggests
that these e¤ects tend to vary according to diverse factors, mainly spillover
channels, domestic technological characteristics, and the geographical prox-
imity between foreign and domestic rms. It suggests that the size and
the extent of spillovers depend largely upon the interaction between the
mechanisms by which they occur and the existing technological capacities
of domestic rms, in that, as we explain in the following chapter, relatively
10Halpern and Muraközy (2005) also examined the regional inter-industry spillovers.
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high technology rms are likely to benet from spillovers through competi-
tion and/or demonstration e¤ects, while domestic rms with relatively low
technological capacity may gain a lot from worker mobility. It makes use of a
thorough measure of domestic absorptive capacity in which the learning and
investment e¤orts of domestic rms come with their existing technological
capacities. And it allows for the assumption that spillover benets could be
regional. A detailed theoretical and empirical analysis of our approach used
in determining spillovers are presented in parts 2 and 3, respectively.
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Part 2
Our Theoretical Modeling of
Intra-industry Spillovers from FDI
As noted in the previous part, the theory of FDI has been successful
in explaining the existence and growth of MNCs foreign investment. It
has also detailed the e¤ects of this investment and spillovers were identied
as the most important benets that host countries expect to get hold of.
A large body of literature has developed over the last two decades which
treats the concept of intra-industry spillover e¤ects. However, too often, as
we demonstrated in chapter 2, scholars o¤er a partial description of such
spillovers since each of them analyzes merely one kind of these e¤ects, viz.
demonstration-related spillovers, competition-related spillovers, or worker
mobility-related spillovers.
Just as spillovers have not been analyzed at the theoretical level as a
complete picture with respect to their diverse channels, so empirical stud-
ies have also only given partial analyses of these e¤ects. In fact, spillover
e¤ects are by and large measured by the share of foreign presence in the
corresponding industry. Even if foreign presence seems to be an appropri-
ate measure for spillover e¤ects through demonstration, it cannot hold all
the information about competition e¤ects (Kokko, 1996) and about worker
mobility (Ben Hamida, 2006b). This is one of the major reasons why there
is contrasting evidence in the scant empirical evidence available (chapter 3).
Other possible reasons for the apparently contradictory ndings from the
country studies are: rst, local characteristics may inuence the incidence
of spillovers, in that only high technology rms are likely to benet from
FDI spillovers, whereas locations characterized by low technological com-
petence are not able to exploit the technological opportunities arising from
foreign presence (Cantwell, 1989 and Wang and Blomström, 1992). And
second, spillovers are likely to be more pronounced when domestic rms are
located nearby their foreign counterparts. In fact, given that labor turnover
and demonstration are among the most important channels for spillovers,
domestic rms located nearby MNCsa¢ liates may be more likely to ben-
et from foreign a¢ liates than other ones, since knowledge is transmitted
more e¢ ciently via local proximity and its transmission costs are assumed
to increase with distance.
On the basis of spillover models presented in part 1, in this part, we
develop a theoretical model which di¤ers from existing ones with respect
to three main points. Firstly, it o¤ers a more comprehensive picture of
FDI intra-industry spillovers by distinguishing these e¤ects according to
their diverse channels. Secondly, it recognizes that domestic technologi-
cal characteristics inuence spillover benet, but di¤erently from Cantwells
perspective it assumes that the size and the extent of this benet depend
largely upon the interaction between the mechanisms by which they oc-
cur and the technological levels of domestic rms. That is, relatively high
domestic technology rms tend to benet from spillovers through demon-
stration and/or competition e¤ects, while small domestic technology rms
which are not in a position to compete with foreign rms gain a lot from
other forms of spillovers such as worker mobility, since this channel provides
some assistance which can help domestic rms to better understand and
implement foreign technology (Mody, 1989). This being so, we show that
even low technology rms may experience some spillover benets from FDI
and that only rms with very low technological competence, to a point that
they are not capable of reaping prots via any of the spillover channels,
enter into a process of cumulative decline and eventually leave the market.
And thirdly, our model hypothesizes that spillovers are more likely to occur
between neighboring rms than between other more distant ones.
We formulate our spillover model within an evolutionary approach since
we view spillovers as a dynamic learning process  evolutionary theory is
more concerned with the analysis of rm di¤erences and dynamic change
based on the learning process.
This part is organized as follows. Chapter 4 studies the evolutionary
theory we use for the formulation of our model. Chapter 5 presents the
model. And chapter 6 analyzes the simulation results.
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CHAPTER 4
The evolutionary theory: a review
Certainly, understanding the great complex of cumulative change in tech-
nology and economic organization is the most important task in the area of
economic history in a sense that it corresponds to the major determinant
of how to promote economic development. A large body of literature has
developed on the relationship between technological change and economic
growth using diverse theoretical approaches. In particular, the core con-
cern of evolutionary theory is with the dynamic processes by which rm
behavior patterns and market outcomes are jointly determined over time;
elements such as behavioral diversity, learning process, adaptation, and se-
lection mechanisms characterize such processes. For example, the selective
environment makes the link between the behavioral patterns and the real-
ized growth patterns (Verspagen, 1993). Evolutionary theory was rst ex-
pressed in the 1980s by management scholars (especially in Conner, 1991 and
Wernerfelt, 1995) and later by economists (the seminal work of Nelson and
Winter, 1982, Silverberg et al., 1988, etc.) and also by international busi-
ness scholars such as Cantwell and Dunning who investigated the dynamic
of MNCsforeign activities and their e¤ects (among other things spillovers)
on the development of host economies. Formal models of spillovers using
this theory were advanced by Perez (1997).
This chapter tries to give some insights into the basics of evolutionary
theory by presenting in the rst section its main outcomes in the eld of
economic dynamics and analyzing in section 2 the explanatory power of its
models and its usefulness and applicability in the framework of FDI spillover
analyses.
1. Towards an evolutionary theory
Before we explore evolutionary modeling, it is worthwhile to identify to
what extent evolutionary theory di¤ers from the neoclassic one and how it
is useful in studying economic dynamics.
1.1. Classical and evolutionary perspectives in economics. Evo-
lutionary theory provides a theory of rm di¤erences and dynamic change
based on learning, adaptation, and selection processes. Its basics have been
mainly developed by the contributions of Nelson and Winter (1982), who
started with a critique of standard production theory. As Nelson (1995, page
68) states, "the evolutionary theories of economic growth ... all draw inspira-
tion from Joseph Schumpeter"; evolutionary contributions draw inspiration
from Schumpeters (1934) notion of disequilibrium dynamics resulting from
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the introduction of innovations. In fact, Schumpeter described the disturb-
ing e¤ects of main technological breakthroughs on economic growth patterns
by saying that key innovations are introduced in a process of creative de-
struction which drastically changes the structure of the capital stock in the
economy. Schumpeter suggests that his own theory was intended to have the
same kind of explanatory purpose for economics as Darwinian theory had
for biology. He stresses the usefulness of biological analogies for economics.
Evolutionary approach tends to be at a variance with orthodox eco-
nomic theory when it comes to exploring several notions such as equilibrium
theory, prot maximization, representative rm, worldwide production func-
tion, and the act of reconciling. The basic tenets of evolutionary theory are
outlined by Nelson and Winter (1982, page 4) as follows:
"The rms in our evolutionary theory will be treated as motivated by
prot and engaged in search for ways to improve their prots, but their ac-
tions will not be assumed to be prot maximizing over well-dened and exoge-
nously given choice sets. Our theory emphasizes the tendency for the most
protable rms to drive the less protable ones out of business; however, we
do not focus our analysis on hypothetical states of industry equilibrium in
which all the unprotable rms no longer are in the industry and the prof-
itable one are at their desired size. Relatedly, the modeling approach that we
employ does not use the familiar maximization calculus to derive equations
characterizing the behavior of rms. Rather our rms are modeled as simply
having, at any time certain capabilities and decision rules".
Thus, in evolutionary theory, rms are, rst of all, assumed to try to
enlarge their current prots by changing their behaviors and the motive for
a rms behavior is prot-seeking and not prot maximization. Firms, in
evolutionary theory, are continually looking for how to improve their be-
havior and decision rules on the behalf of their prots. Secondly, rather
than searching for a strategic equilibrium based on the concept of ratio-
nality, rms use boundedly rational behavioral procedures. Relatedly, the
evolutionary principle of selection might be a useful substitute for market
equilibrium (Nelson and Winter, 1982 and Silverberg, 1988). That is, the
modeling approach that is employed by evolutionary economists does not use
the rules based on maximizing the behavior of rms, rather, rmsbehavior
is modeled as simply relying, at any given time, on certain capabilities and
decision rules. For that matter, Nelson and Winter (1982, page 4) added
that "Over time these capabilities and rules are modied as a result of both
deliberate problem-solving e¤orts and random events. And over time, the
economic analogue of natural selection operates as the market determines
which rms are protable and which are unprotable, and tends to winnow
out the latter."
The capabilities and decision rules characterizing rms behavior are
then modied over time as a result of both deliberate problem-solving ef-
forts and random events. And like the natural selection of genotypes in
biology, the (past and present) sets of decision rules and capabilities deter-
mine, by means of a market selection mechanism, which rms will grow and
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which will loose their position in the market. Given these assumptions, evo-
lutionary theory rejects the notions of worldwide production function and
the representative rm of a simple neoclassical sort, necessary to calculate
market equilibrium.
Lastly, the orthodox formulation o¤ers no possibility of reconciling analy-
ses of growth at the economy- or the sector- levels with what is known about
the process of technical change at the microeconomic level. Instead, evolu-
tionary formulation provide a fruitful integration of what goes on at the
micro level with what goes on at a macro level, when analyzing, of course,
the processes involved in technological change.
1.2. The use of an evolutionary perspective in economics. Ob-
viously, the use of an evolutionary theory in the analysis of economic phe-
nomena stems from the need for providing a theoretical scheme for the re-
lationship between technological change and economic growth, best repre-
sentative of the empirical reality. This theory provides fruitful analyses in
the eld of economics of technology and growth; it looks at the dynamics
of the economic system (rm, industry, market, etc.) as an adaptative dy-
namic system based on its existing line of technological development and
its motivation to invest in learning. The rm, for example, is considered an
information processor that facilitates its ability to adapt and process new
information. The rms rule-based behavior and routines represent the prin-
ciple bases of the evolutionary paradigm of the rm concerned with change
and development over time. Nelson and Winter (1982) recognize three kinds
of routines1: rst, the "operating characteristics" related to what a rm does
in the short run; second, the routines that determine the period-by-period
changes in the level of a rms capital stock; and third, the routines which
operate to modify over time diverse aspects of the "operating characteris-
tics". Rules are generally used to make decisions about investment in (the
search for) new technologies by typically undertaking either innovating or
imitating activities.2 Accordingly, outcomes emerge that are sometimes pos-
itive and sometimes negative according to the rms ability to succeed in
learning these outcomes are the best the rm could do, given the uncer-
tainty it faces. Firms whose behavior yields to a competitive power survive
and increase their market shares and others loose their position in the mar-
ket. This result leads to a new market structure derived by the market
selection process.
As a matter of fact, evolutionary processes in economic environments
involving innovation and di¤usion are governed to some extent by selection
and learning mechanisms. Dosi et al. (1992) dene learning as a process by
which repetition and experimentation enable tasks to be performed better
and quicker and new production opportunities to be identied. Learning
1More Detailed information on these routines is given in Nelson and Winter (1982),
pages 16-18.
2Note that if technological accumulation in the rm is continuously raising its pro-
ductivity or lowering its costs along a given line of technological development, then no rm
would remove its existing pattern of innovation and introduce technological knowledge of
another (Cantwell, 1999 and Silverberg and Verspagen, 1994b).
71
Chapter 4. The evolutionary theory: a review
arises as a result of either innovating or imitating better technologies, de-
pending on the technological capacity of the rm. As learning activities
succeed in increasing the rms productivity, its competitive power will be
improved as well. Learning is presumed to have several key characteristics: it
is a cumulative process in that the sensibility of a rms growth rate to either
prosperity or di¢ culty is a reexion of its genes; it involves organizational
rather that individual skills; it is an essentially social and collective phe-
nomenon; and it requires common codes of communication, especially when
it comes to imitating activities. Silverberg et al. (1988, page 1034) adds
that learning processes generally occur via (a) the development of intra-
and inter-industry externalities (which include the di¤usion of information
and expertise, interrm mobility of manpower, and the growth of specialized
services); (b) informal processes of technological accumulation within rms
(of which learning-by-doing and learning-by-using are the best known exam-
ples of such internalized externalities); and (c) processes of economically
expensive search (R&D being, of course, the best example).
As what the selection mechanism refers to, Nelson and Winter (1982)
suggest that the evolutionary principle of selection might be a useful sub-
stitute for market equilibrium. This economic selection mechanism is anal-
ogous to the natural selection of genotypes in biology. The general idea
behind the principle of selection is that it is based on di¤erences in mi-
croeconomic behavior. Those di¤erences are the strong driving force of the
economic system. In fact, each economic agent or unit, e.g. rm, is assumed
to have some specic degree of competitive power which stems from its past
behavior and hence di¤ers in general between rms. By way of the selection
process, agents whose (past an a present) behavior resulted in highly com-
petitive power will grow (in terms of market share or prots), and others
will loose the race, eventually forcing them to leave the market. This selec-
tive environment makes the link between behavioral patterns and realized
growth patterns (Verspagen, 1993).
To sum up, we could say that selection mechanisms tend to increase the
economic dominance of some rms e.g. protability, market shares with
particular technological characteristics at the expense of others; while learn-
ing mechanism, on the other hand, may both spread innovative/imitative
capabilities throughout the (possibly changing) set of potential adopters and
reinforce existing disparities via cumulative mechanisms internal to the rm
(Silverberg et al., 1988). This being so brings in both selection and learning
processes that are highly likely to be interdependently determined.
2. The explanatory power of evolutionary modeling
In what follows, we shall give a general description of how scholars have
represented evolutionary theory in more formal models (section 1) and we
will discuss the need for evolutionary modeling in the context of spillovers
(section 2).
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2.1. The general modeling. It seems natural that when we think
about evolutionary modeling rooted in the Schumpeterian tradition we ought
to start with the work of Nelson and Winter (1982) from which several types
of evolutionary models have been developed. Nelson and Winter, as stated
by Andersen (1996), made an evolutionary synthesis by integrating ideas
about behavioral patterns and their transmission, the creation of new be-
havioral patterns, and di¤erent types of selection mechanisms. The state of
the evolutionary process of an industry at any moment (t) is described by
the capital stock and the behavioral rules of each rm. The state in the next
moment (t+ 1) is determined by the state in the previous moment. Figure
4.1 below summarizes the computational structure of the most developed
and documented Nelson and Winter model type which deals with the evolu-
tion of the production techniques and other behavioral rules of an industry
producing a homogeneous product.3 The computational steps of the gure
describe how the state of the industry in the next period (t + 1) is found
when the state of the current period (t) is given.
At any particular time t, the capacity utilization rules of rms and the
magnitude of their capital stocks and other state variables determine their
input and output levels. Output of the industry is found by simple aggre-
gation. Given demand conditions, e.g. a conventional downward-sloping
market demand curve, the market-clearing price per unit of output is then
determined. The protability of each rm is then determined. The rms
behavioral rules include the search for both innovation and imitation. The
rms chance of getting a draw(a successful innovation or imitation tech-
nique) is proportionate to its related search costs as well as to the exoge-
nously given character of technical change in the industry. For the following
period, the rm chooses to use the technique with the highest productivity.
A rms desired expansion or contraction is determined by its protability,
its desired investment, and its investment constraints. A rm that has price
equal to cost, zero R&D expense, and hence zero prot will have zero net
investment. The investment process has no time-lags. The adjusted phys-
ical capital stock is available to the industrys rms in period t + 1. By
multiplying the capital stock with the new level of productivity, we have
the production capacity of the industrys rms in period t+ 1. And so the
computation goes on and on for t+ 2, t+ 3, etc.
Since the publication of the seminal work of Nelson and Winter in 1982,
evolutionary models proliferated enormously which frequently used Nelson
and Winter models as bases. All of these models are dynamic ones, fo-
cused on far-from-equilibrium analysis, and based on the concepts of diver-
sity and heterogeneity among economic agents (rms) and their behaviors.
Search and selection are simultaneous interacting aspects of the evolutionary
process; through their joint action the rms evolve over time.
According to Kwasnickis (2002) comparative analysis of evolutionary
models in the Schumpeterian tradition, there exist three main streams of
modeling e¤orts which are slightly related but in some way independent.
3More formal specications of the Nelson and Winter model type are given in Nelson
and Winter (1982), chapter 12.
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State of the industry's
firms in period t
Output of firms and
thus of industry
Price of the product
of the industry
Net profits of firms
Financial constraint
of firms
Desired investment
Sate of the industry's
firms in period 1+t
t  := 1+t
Selection of
technology by firms
Costs of
innovative
search in firms
Costs of imitative
search of firms
Innovative "draws"
and probabilistic
results
Imitative "draws"
and deterministic
results
Actual investment
Figure 4.1. The computational structure of the typical
Nelson-and-Winter model, source: Andersen, 1996.
The rst is very closely associated with the work of Nelson and Winter
(1982), e.g. Winter (1984), Yildizoglu and Jonard (1999), Winter et al.
(2000), and Yildizoglu (2001). The rm in this kind of model is the basic
unit of evolution and the product is the unit of selection, given that, selection
goes through price mechanism. Price is set as uniform for all rms, the price
and di¤erent production costs generate diverse prots which in turn govern
investment abilities of rms and then generate a variety of growth rates.
Among the economic phenomena explained by these models, Yildizoglu and
Jonard, for example, explore the inuence of localized learning and exter-
nalities on industry dynamics.
In the other streams, the rm is both a unit of evolution and a unit of se-
lection. Selection is modeled using di¤erent forms of the replicator equation;
most of them are based on competitive selection. The second stream refers
to the Silverberg and Verspagen models (SV models), e.g. Silverberg et
al. (1988), Silverberg and Lehnert (1993), Silverberg and Verspagen (1994a,
1994b, 1995). These papers explore (with an evolutionary approach) the re-
lationship between endogenous technological change and economic growth.
In this respect, Silverberg et al., for example, analyze the nature of the dif-
fusion process of new technology, in which two technological trajectories are
considered, learning by doing and learning from the experience of others.
The diversity in a rmscapabilities and expectations about future develop-
ments is the main element driving the di¤usion process. The third stream of
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models is called the Dosi et al. models, e.g. dosi and Chiaromonte (1992),
Dosi and Fabiani (1994), and Dosi et al. (1994). In these studies scholars
address questions about convergence (catching-up) and divergence (forging
ahead and falling behind). Dosi and Fabiani develop a model showing how
evolutionary microfoundations easily allow for the emergence of divergent
patterns of growth (catching-up, falling behind, overtaking) and their per-
sistence.
One distinguished feature of Dosi et al. and SV models is that the selec-
tion mechanism is described by the replicator equation.4 This way of mod-
eling borrows heavily from the biological and ecological methods wherein
selection dynamic is given by:
_Xi = Xi(Ei   E), (2.1)
with
E =
X
i
XiEi, (2.2)
where X denotes the share of an individual (species) i in some variable, E
is competitiveness, and a bar indicates an average level. Thus the replica-
tor equation shows that the proportional rate of growth of the share of an
individual is a function of the di¤erence between this individuals competi-
tiveness (Ei) and average competitiveness ( E).
2.2. The use of evolutionary modeling in studying spillovers.
As previously noted, one of the interesting elds of applicability of evolution-
ary theory is convergence and divergence phenomena, wherein attention in
most of the case studies is tied closely to the analysis of the determinants of
the processes of catching-up and backwardness. These processes are mainly
related to the literature of technology gaps, emphasizing learning as a basis
for technological change and economic growth. One reason is that learning
is obviously the major driving force leading to a narrowing of the technol-
ogy gaps between agents (e.g. rms), permitting them to catch-up. This
mainly occurs when rms have inherited strong technological traditions from
the past, essential for their best technological development, which will raise
their productivity level.
Spillovers emerge as learning activities succeed in increasing a rms pro-
ductivity. It may turn into either virtuous or vicious circles of technological
development in locations a¤ected by, for example, foreign MNCs activity,
depending on the existing level of domestic capabilities. In this respect,
market selectiveness will ensure the survival of the relatively homogenous
rms in terms of technological competence and drives the rms that lag far
behind the technological frontier out of the industry. Heterogeneity among
rms (e.g., between foreign and domestic rms and/or within each group of
4Note that this replicator equation was used in Perez(1997 and 1998) spillover model
and we consider it in the formulation of our model as well (chapter 5).
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rms) is then explicitly recognized as the cause of evolutionary paths, driven
by market selectiveness.
The evolutionary theory was rst discussed within the context of MNCs
by Cantwell (1989, 1991a,b, 1993, and 1994). He analyzed international pro-
duction with an evolutionary perspective to explain the dynamic of MNCs
activities; he developed the technological accumulation approach in which
the internationalization of production is linked to the ability of rms to
accumulate, integrate, and control ownership advantages across national
boundaries5  the growth of MNCs activities is linked to the process of
technological accumulation within the rm. In page 18 of his book, Cantwell
(1989) states that "the theory of technological accumulation emphasises the
cumulative characteristics of innovation...Even radically new technologies,
once they move beyond the purely scientic and experimental stage, often
rely upon or are integrated with earlier technologies in the course of their
development".
Dunning, along the evolution of his OLI thinking, has also incorporated
an evolutionary aspect into this paradigm to be able to take into account
the dynamics of MNCs activities. He has applied the eclectic paradigm to
analyzing the way in which MNCs both generate and respond to technolog-
ical change.6 Similarly, Kogut and Zander (1993) were concerned with the
analysis of the growth of MNCs and examined to this end the technology
transfer process from mother company to its a¢ liates. They found that
MNCs are specialized in the transfer of relatively tacit and idiosyncratic
knowledge; such ndings seem to be consistent with the broader evolution-
ary perspective.
When analyzing the dynamic path of foreign production, Cantwell and
Dunning explicitly discuss the e¤ects of that production on the development
of host economies and afterwards on the embeddedness level of MNCs. In
this context, Cantwell (1989, page 2) asserts that " in order to capture this
kind of e¤ects it is necessary to shift away from the approach of indus-
trial organisation, and towards that of industrial dynamics". Cantwell
discusses, among other things, the spillover e¤ects of foreign investment and
asserts that those e¤ects are subject to the absorptive capacity of domestic
rms spillover benets occur only for domestic rms with higher absorp-
tive capacities. He investigates the response of local rms to the increase in
competition caused by the entry of U.S. multinationals into European mar-
kets between 1955 and 1975 and argues that positive spillovers occurred only
in industries where local rms had some traditional technological strength.
Relying on Cantwells spillover analysis, Perez (1997) developed a model
of spillover e¤ects using an evolutionary perspective. He emphasized the
catching-up process as a path-dependent corporate learning process, in that
the absorptive capacity of local rms, which depends on their past process of
5Details of the technological accumulation approach are given in chapter 1.
6It is worth noting that Dunning has introduced this evolutionary element into his
work on foreign investment since 1979 when he developed the investment development
path which explores the question of FDI growth from the perspective of countries rather
that rms.
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technological accumulation, is the major cause of virtuous or vicious circles
of technological development. Spillovers emerge as a result of a dynamic
interaction between foreign and domestic rms at the technological level.
More formally, Perez extended the dynamic model of Dosi et al. (1992)
aimed at explaining the process of forging ahead and falling behind among
countries by adding equations describing the interaction between foreign
MNCs and domestic rms at the technological level. Thus, as in the Wang
and Blomström (1992) model, the decision by foreign rms to import new
technology depends on the existing technology gap between foreign and do-
mestic rms, while the imitation of foreign technology requires a specic
investment in learning. Simulation results of Perezs model show that highly
technologically developed domestic competitors tend to maintain their com-
petitive power by exploiting the learning e¤ects associated with FDI, while
backward domestic rms are instead completely crowded out by a rapidly
growing foreign presence.
In the following chapter, we develop an evolutionary model of spillovers
based on evolutionary theory. We embed the question of spillovers from
MNCs into a larger one by allowing for the di¤erent mechanisms by which
domestic rms benet from FDI; domestic rms may choose to innovate or
imitate foreign technologies according to their technological competencies.
Domestic rms may choose to acquire the best foreign practice technology
via either the demonstration mechanism or the recruitment of domestic em-
ployees already trained by or having worked in multinationals. Successful
learning drives domestic rms to improve their competitive power relative
to their foreign counterparts, which is more pronounced in locations where
both rms are geographically close.
3. Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented the evolutionary theory we use in the
next chapter to formulate our spillover model. We have explained that the
basics of this theory have been mainly developed by Nelson and Winter in
their seminal work of 1982, wherein they expressed their dissatisfaction with
standard production theory based on the equilibrium approach to explain
the dynamic of economic growth resulting from the introduction of innova-
tions. We recognize that this theory looks at the development of economic
systems (rms for example) as an adaptative dynamic system based on its
existing line of technological development and its motivation to invest in
learning, so as to upgrade its competitiveness. Doing so, we show that evo-
lutionary theory o¤ers a theoretical scheme for relationship between techno-
logical change based on learning and adaptation, and economic growth; the
best representative of the empirical reality. This is the reason why we make
use of the foundations of this theory to develop our spillover model based
on elements such as behavioral diversity, learning, and market selectiveness
to characterize the spilling-over process and the resultant economic change.
Details about the features (our hypotheses) as well as the equations of our
spillover model are given in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
Our evolutionary model of intra-industry spillovers
As shown in the previous chapters of part 1, the main feature of the
models of productivity spillovers from FDI is that spillovers are determined
by the share of foreign presence and the technological characteristics of do-
mestic rms. This conclusion evidently contrasted with the majority of the
recent literature: on the one hand, spillovers do not only result from the
exposure of domestic rms to the entry and presence of foreign rms, but
also from both the technological competition between foreign and domestic
rms and the movement of domestic workers previously trained by and/or
having worked at MNCs to domestic rms. On the other hand, there exist
other factors besides the technological characteristics of domestic rms that
condition the size of spillovers: the geographical proximity between foreign
and domestic rms.
In the model we develop in this chapter, we have tried to bridge the gap
by including, within an evolutionary model of productivity spillovers from
foreign a¢ liates, the diverse spillover mechanisms, the technological char-
acteristics of domestic rms, and the geographical proximity, that we think
represent the major determinants which inuence the size and the extent
of spillovers. In fact, our model di¤ers from previous ones with respect to
three main points: rstly, it o¤ers a more comprehensive picture of FDI
intra-industry spillovers by distinguishing these e¤ects according to their di-
verse channels. Secondly, it hypotheses that the size and the extent of such
spillovers depend largely upon the interaction between the mechanisms by
which they occur and the technological levels of domestic rms. Thirdly, it
argues that geographical proximity plays an important role in determining
the size and the extent of spillovers. Spillover benets tend to be more pro-
nounced in locations where domestic rms are close to the foreign rms, so
that as geographic distance increases, spillovers have a tendency to decrease.
Our hypotheses are later tested against the empirical evidence for the Swiss
economy (in part 3) using both qualitative and quantitative analyses of data
from manufacturing and services/construction.
This chapter is organized as follows. The rst section reviews the deter-
minants of the impact of FDI on the technological development of domestic
rms  viz. spillover mechanisms, domestic technological characteristics,
and geographic proximity between foreign and domestic rms; while the
second section develops a theoretical model that is consistent with these
determinants.
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1. FDI and intra-industry spillover e¤ects: the set of features
Before we introduce the equations of our model, it is worth analyzing
three main factors mediating the size and the extent of spillovers: spillover
channels, domestic technological capacities, and geographical proximity.
1.1. FDI and spillover channels. Generally, productivity spillovers
are said to take place when the entry or presence of MNCs a¢ liates leads
to productivity or e¢ ciency benets in the host countrys local rms, and
the MNCs are not able to internalize the full value of these benets (Blom-
ström and Kokko, 1998). Spillovers may materialize through three chan-
nels: demonstration-imitation, movement of domestic labor who have been
trained and/or worked at the MNCss a¢ liates, and the increase of competi-
tion. Domestic rms may improve their productivity when the foreign rms,
after entering the domestic market demonstrate their advanced technologies,
which may later adapt and imitate them; when the increase of competition,
that results from the entry and existence of foreign rms forces domestic
rms to work harder or introduce new technology; and when domestic work-
ers who were trained by or worked in the MNCsa¢ liates (denoted here by
"MNCslabor") may decide to leave the rm and join an existing or open
up a new domestic rm, taking with them some or all of the rm specic
knowledge of the MNC. In this latter case, foreign a¢ liates are unlikely to
be mute spectators as their technological secrets are disseminated to their
domestic rivals; they choose to pay the "MNCslabor" a benet level (called
a non-wage compensation) in addition to the direct wage in order to pre-
vent them from leaving the rm. Then, in order to gain access to foreign
technologies with personnel assistance, domestic rms should pay "MNCs
labor" a wage mark-up superior to the benet level (Kaufmann, 1997).
Obviously, the importance of FDI spillover e¤ects depends broadly upon
the mechanism by which they occur, given that: on the one hand, rms dif-
fer in their technological competence and in turn they di¤er in their choice
of the way to benet from the presence of FDI. Then, the relevance of each
spillover mechanism, as we shall see in the following section, varies with
the technological characteristics of domestic rms, in that if technological
accumulation is continuous in each domestic rm, raising its productivity or
lowering its costs along a given line of technological development, then no
rm would abandon its existing pattern of innovation and imitate the tech-
nological knowledge of foreign competitor (Cantwell 1999 and Silverberg and
Verspagen 1994b). On the other hand, the amount and nature of the tech-
nologies transferred from foreign to domestic rms depend largely upon the
mechanism by which they are transmitted. That is, spillovers via worker mo-
bility for example are likely to be higher than through demonstration e¤ects,
since worker mobility can lead to substantial improvements in productivity
throughout the local economy by transferring not only public technology
(the so-called "the logy"), but also the tacit element ("the technique") that
is unlikely to be transferred through informal contacts between rms.1 As
1Wojnicka (2004) asserts that the mobility of labor is a source of tacit knowledge
essential for innovativeness and competitiveness of local enterprises.
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stated by Nelson (1982, page 467) research and development scientists from
rival rms give papers at meetings of professional societies. They meet to-
gether for lunch to exchange information on the evolving frontiers of the
logy, while trying to avoid disclosing details of particular techniques their
rms may have under development at the time.
Thus, we strongly believe that the assessment of the existence and the
extent of spillover benets for a given rm, industry, or country calls upon a
detailed analysis of these e¤ects according to the ways they occur. A large
body of literature (theoretical and empirical) has over the last two decades
developed the concept of intra-industry spillovers. Nonetheless, most of the
studies o¤ered only a partial description of FDI spillovers, since each of
them focuses on analyzing only one kind of these e¤ects. Few exceptions,
which mainly are the contributions of Kokko (1996) and Meyer and Sinani
(2002), note that the absence of a signicant and positive e¤ect of foreign
investment on the productivity level concluded by a great amount of studies
can be explained by the fact that the variable "the share of foreign pres-
ence", which has been, by and large, used as a measure of spillover e¤ects
from FDI (e.g. by Kopecky and Koizumi 1977, Findlay 1978, Kokko 1994,
Girma et al. 1999, and Buckley et al. 2002), seems to be inappropriate to
capture much of the competition and worker mobility e¤ects. They suggest
disentangling the e¤ect of demonstration and worker mobility from that of
the competition by employing technology and competition control variables.
Such modeling strategy is likely to describe more correctly the process of
spilling-over and then identify with accuracy the nature and the size of the
resultant e¤ects. Our model developed here is well suited for this purpose;
it is, to our knowledge, the rst theoretical attempt at modeling this idea.
1.2. Domestic technological capacity and spillovers. It is well
known in the literature on FDI spillovers that the absorptive capacity of do-
mestic rms is, by and large, the most important determinant of spillovers.
This concept encompasses the rms ability to recognize valuable new knowl-
edge, internalize it into the rm and use it productively. To be able to utilize
the knowledge of foreign investors and then increase their productivity, do-
mestic rms have to make some training and investment e¤orts. Only rms
possessing su¢ cient levels of absorptive capacity are likely to e¢ ciently ex-
ploit spillovers (Wang and Blomström, 1992). The di¤usion of knowledge
across borders may be limited because of the low absorptive capacity of
potential recipients located abroad (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001).
Besides imitation, we recognize that the domestic rm may improve its
competitive power vis-à-vis its foreign counterparts by learning within its ex-
isting line of technological development. A rms ability to choose either to
absorb foreign technology or to fellow existing independent lines of techno-
logical development, depends on its prior level of technological competence.
Thus, domestic rms benet from spillovers from FDI in accordance with
their existing technological levels or their initial technology gaps. Two very
di¤erent perspectives exist in the literature on this matter: on the one hand,
it is argued, according to the advantages of the backwardness hypothesis,
that the wider the technology gap, the greater the opportunity for domestic
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rms to achieve higher level of productivity by learning from FDI (Findlay,
1978). On the other hand, it is asserted that a large technology gap lessens
the domestic rmsability to catch up with foreign rivals (Cantwell, 1989).
Relying on this second strand of analysis, e¤ective learning activities are
then highly related to the existence of relatively small technology gaps. In
other words, domestic rms with a low technological level are unlikely to
experience positive spillovers and foreign rms in this case do not have any
motivations to import more and newer technologies from mother companies,
since technology imports are costly. An extensive empirical literature has
been done in line with this argument, by among others Kokko at al. 1996,
Glass and Saggi 1998, Girma et al. 1999, and Buckley et al. 2002.
Our model developed here assumes that not only domestic rms with rel-
atively high technological capacity gain benets from FDI, but even low tech-
nology rms may experience some spillover benets in that they may gain
a lot from personnel assistance drawn from the movement of the "MNCs
labor". Low technology rms have a great interest in turning their learning
e¤orts to the recruitment of "MNCspersonnel" so as to get some assistance
in imitating foreign technologies and then raising their productivity level.2
As Mody (1989) states, relatively high technology rms are very likely to
benet from spillovers through demonstration and/or competition e¤ects,
while domestic rms with relatively moderate technological competence,
which are not in a position to compete ercely with foreign rms, gain a
lot from other forms of spillovers such as worker mobility, since this channel
provides a (technical, managerial, etc.) assistance which can help domestic
rms to better understand and implement foreign technology. Then, only
rms with very low technological competence, to a point that they are not
capable of reaping prots via any of the spillover channels, enter into a
process of cumulative decline and eventually leave the market.
Given this assumption, we assume that FDI spillovers are determined
by the interaction between the channels by which they occur and the tech-
nological characteristics of the recipient host rms. Thereby, spillovers in-
crease with the technology gap up to a certain critical level, beyond which
technological competence of domestic rms will be so low that they will
generally, not by any means, be able to e¢ ciently exploit the technological
opportunities arising from foreign MNC presence.3 Obviously, diverse fac-
tors intervene in the determination of this critical level, viz. the capacity of
domestic rms in attracting the "MNCslabor" by giving them a mark-up
superior to the benet level, the level of complexity of foreign technologies,
the appropriability regime, etc.
2Of course domestic rms with high and mid technological levels may also use the
technique of worker mobility to gain access to foreign knowledge. But these kinds of rms
tend rather to make use of other spillover channels from which they have the opportunity
to gain benets with less cost.
3We assume that spillovers to some extent increase with technology gap because
spillovers from worker mobility which are very likely to be used by relatively low tech-
nological rms tend to be higher than through demonstration e¤ects, since the worker
mobility channel leads to substantial improvement of the productivity of those rms by
transferring not only public technology but also the tacit element  this argument has
been described in detail in the previous section.
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1.3. Geographical proximity and spillovers. The binomial spillover
channels/technological conditions of domestic rms already contain most
of the characteristic of our model. Nonetheless, a further important ele-
ment of it is the presence of geographical proximity between domestic and
foreign rms, in that spillover benets are more pronounced in locations
where domestic rms are close to their foreign counterparts, so that as
geographic distance increases, spillovers decrease  i.e. learning is highly
localized (Yildizoglu and Jonard, 1999).
In fact, rms in the same location tend to follow the same technologi-
cal trajectory; wherein technological disparities are expected to be smaller,
since MNCs are more likely to establish a¢ liates in more competitive re-
gions (Dunning, 1992). Then, domestic rms within the same location are
more likely to benet from spillovers than other, more distant ones. Further-
more, given that labor turnover and demonstration are among the important
channels for spillovers, domestic rms located nearby may be more likely to
benet from foreign a¢ liates (also called target rms in this case) than other
ones, since knowledge is generated and transmitted more e¢ ciently via local
proximity and its transmission costs are assumed to increase with distance
(Audretsch, 1998). Thus, spillover benets tend to be captured rst by
neighboring domestic rms, and perhaps gradually spread to other, faraway
ones.
This characteristic of our model ts nicely with some of the most re-
cent empirical studies of spillover e¤ects. Aitken and Harrison (1999), for
instance, found that regional foreign investment has positive and signicant
impact on the productivity of Venezuelan rms, while spillover e¤ects are
negative with industrial foreign investment. Similarly, Girma and Walkelin
(2002), and Liu and Wei (2006) have shown the importance of geographical
proximity in assessing the indirect impact of FDI, in that they concluded
that domestic rms gain from the presence of foreign rms in the region,
but loose out if the rms are located in di¤erent regions.
When spillover e¤ects are measured at a national level, these regional
benets might not be observed if they are too small to o¤set the overall
negative impact across all regions. To test for the possibility that spillovers
occurred at the regional level, existing studies included regional foreign share
and that from outside the region in their specications rather than sectorial
foreign share. Regional foreign share is measured by the share of employ-
ment, value-added or capital in an industry within a region employed by
foreign rms.4
2. The model
In the model developed here, we embed the question of spillovers ex-
amined in Perez work (1998), wherein he explained the process of FDI
spillovers by means of a dynamic interaction between foreign and domestic
rms at the technological level, into a larger one by allowing for di¤erent
4We would like to note that we make use of this measure of regional spillovers when
we test these e¤ects for Swiss case (chapter 9).
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mechanisms by which domestic rms benet from FDI. In fact, to protect
its market share, a domestic rm may choose to innovate or imitate foreign
technologies according to its technological competence. Successful learning
then drives domestic rms to improve their competitive power relative to
their foreign counterparts. Such improvement is likely to be higher when
foreign and domestic rms are neighbors. More specically, the model de-
veloped in what follows embodies the following properties:
(i) The size and the extent of spillovers vary according the mecha-
nism by which they occur, which in turn depends on the level of
technological capacity of domestic rms,
(ii) Besides technological conditions, a domestic rm may acquire the
best foreign practice technology via the recruitment of MNCs work-
ers according to its capacity in attracting the "MNCs labor" by
giving them a mark-up superior to the benet level,
(iii) Domestic rms that are located near foreign rms may be more
likely to benet from spillovers than other, more distant rms; as
geographic distance increases, spillovers decrease.
(iv) A rms market share grows in relation to with its technological
level relative to the other rms operating in the market,
(v) Technology imports by foreign rms are inversely related to the ex-
isting technology gap and to its capacity to protect its technological
advantages from labor turnover,
(vi) The dimension of the market grows with the national income ac-
cording to a "Keynesian" mechanism of demand formation.
2.1. The selection environment. The model developed here is of an
industry in which a number (n) of rms produce a single homogeneous prod-
uct. Each rm undertakes two activities, namely learning (via innovation
and imitation) and production; labor is the only input in both activities.
The basic framework of the model is taken from Dosi and Fabiani (1994).
Let dots stand for growth rates, fi be the market share of rm i, Ei its
absolute competitiveness, and E the average competitiveness in the market.
Then, the dynamics of the market share of rm i depends on its relative
competitiveness as follows
_fi (t; t+ 1) = a

Ei (t)
E (t)
  1

fi (t) , (2.1)
with
fi (t) =
Yi (t)
Y (t)
, (2.2)
Ei (t) =
1
pi (t)
, (2.3)
E (t) =
X
i
fi (t)Ei (t) , (2.4)
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where pi is the price charged by the i-th rm, Yi its output (= income), and
Y the total output.
This replicator dynamic (equation (2.1)) associated with market selec-
tion entails the coexistence of rms characterized by diverse levels of e¢ -
ciency and various behavioral rules. The parameter a represents market
selectiveness, in that rms whose behavior resulted in highly competitive
power will grow (in terms of market share) and others will loose the race,
eventually forcing them to leave the market. Firms consequently exit the
industry when
fi < fmin. (2.5)
Given the equations (2.1) and (2.2) and assuming the existence of two
groups of rms foreign and domestic interacting with each other in the
industry, the output dynamic of the domestic rm is
_YiD (t; t+ 1) = a

EiD (t)
E (t)
  1

YiD(t)
Y (t)
Y (t+ 1) +
YiD(t)
Y (t)
_Y (t; t+ 1) , (2.6)
While the output dynamic of foreign rm is determined by its relative com-
petitiveness as well as the ows of new FDI, measured in terms of the
extra investment available to employ new domestic workers (NFDIi (t) =
FDIi(t)
(wiF (t)+bi(t))
); where b, as we shall see later, refers to the non-wage compen-
sation (benet) the foreign rm chooses in order to minimize the movement
of its labor.
_YiF (t; t+ 1) = a

EiF (t)
E (t)
  1

YiF (t)
Y (t)
Y (t+ 1) +
YiF (t)
Y (t)
_Y (t; t+ 1)
+NFDIi (t+ 1)iF (t+ 1)piF (t+ 1) , (2.7)
where  is the real labor productivity and FDI is endogenously determined
as follows
FDIi (t+ 1) = iYiF (t). (2.8)
where i depends on the existing technology gap between foreign rm and
domestic leader (Gap
0
i(t) = iF (t)=

iD(t); the star denotes the foreign
leader) as
i(t) = exp( Gap0i(t)). (2.9)
Pricing is based on mark-up procedure
pi (t) =
wi(t)
i(t)
(1 + ) , (2.10)
where w is the nominal wage and, for the sake of simplicity, we take (wiD =
wiF ),  for the mark-up.
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Workers N employed in both production and learning (innovating and
imitating activities)5 use all their wages received at time t to buy goods in
the following period (t+ 1). Thus, total demand which is equal to national
income Y (t) is given by
Y (t+ 1) =
X
i
wi(t)Ni(t). (2.11)
2.2. Innovating and imitating activities. To face the foreign com-
petition, domestic rms have to improve their competitive power by either
innovating or imitating foreign technologies. Then, spillovers emerge as
learning activities succeed in increasing the rms productivity. However,
performing any learning activity depends broadly upon the technological
capacity of the corresponding rm here, the technology gap between do-
mestic and foreign rms is taken as a proxy of technological capacity. As the
technology gap increases, spillovers increase up to a certain critical value and
thereafter turn down. Then, in similar way to Perez(1998)formulation, the
productivity of the domestic rm is determined by the number of domestic
employees engaged in learning activities NLearningD and its initial technology
gap is given by
_iD (t; t+ 1)
iD(t)
= 1 + 0i
h
1  exp( 1NLearningiD (t))
i Gapi(t)
exp(1Gapi(t))
,
(2.12)
where in this case the technology gap is dened as the ratio between labor
productivity in foreign leader and the domestic rm: Gapi(t) = iF (t)=iD(t);
where the star denotes the domestic leader.
If the technology gap is too small, in that the productivity of the do-
mestic rm is greater than or equal to the productivity of the best practice
technology of foreign rms, then the domestic rm has no interest in imi-
tation and vice versa. Given that N innD and N
imi
D denote, respectively, the
number of domestic employees engaged in innovating and imitating activi-
ties, domestic learning is distributed as follows
NLearningiD (t) =

N inniD (t) if iD(t) > iF (t)
N imiiD (t) if iD(t) < 

iF (t)

, (2.13)
As previously noted, the domestic rm may choose to acquire the best
foreign practice technology via either the demonstration mechanism or the
recruitment of the "MNCslabor", or both.6
N imiiD (t) = N
Dem
iD (t) +N
Re c
iD (t), (2.14)
In the case of foreign rms, productivity growth depends upon the de-
cision to import new technologies from the mother company, which in turn
5The measurement of N is given by equation (2.32).
6As we will see in the subsection 2.4, this choice is determined by its existing tech-
nology gap.
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depends on the existing technology gap between the foreign rm and the do-
mestic leader Gap
0
and its capacity to protect its technological advantages
from labor mobility b; and on the imitation of the best domestic practice
technology (the so-called reverse spillovers).7
_iF (t; t+ 1)
iF (t)
= 2 + 2i

1  exp( 2N imiiF (t))
 1=Gap0i(t)
exp[3(1=Gap
0
i(t))]
+ 4 exp( (Gap0i(t)), (2.15)
where the benet b is determined as
b(t) = 1  exp( Gap0i(t)). (2.16)
2.3. Localized learning. Learning tends to occur within rmsneigh-
borhoods, that is, for example, a successful imitative draw of rm i stems
mostly from the acquisition of the best practice technology in its neighbor-
hood Vi()8
Vi() = fj j d(i; j) 6 g, (2.17)
where d(i; j) represents the distance between rm i and its neighbors, and
equals to
d(i; j) = ((xi   xj)2 + (yi   yj)2) 12 , (2.18)
where the pair of coordinates (xi,yi) represents the horizontal and the ver-
tical location of the corresponding rm i. As shown by gure 5.1, which
depicts the interaction structure for a set of 24 rms, the neighborhood of
dimension 1 (= 1) of rm i with (xi,yi) = (3,3) is represented by the circle
frame.
As 0i and 2i in previous section refer respectively to the size of spillover
benets of domestic and foreign rms, then they depend broadly upon the
distance between these rms and the corresponding target ones. Relatedly,
in the case of the domestic rm
0i = 1  log(id(i; j)), (2.19)
and for the foreign rm
2i = 1  log(id(i; j)), (2.20)
7Our model allows for two-way- spillover e¤ects (from and to MNC).
8Localized learning formal presentation is based on Yildizoglu and Jonard (1999).
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Figure 5.1. The neighborhood of rm i (3,3) for = 1. The
pair of coordinates (x,y) represents the horizontal and the
vertical location of the rms represented by .
2.4. Labor market dynamics. The rms investment in learning (RD)
is proportional to its previous-period output since
RDi (t+ 1) = Yi (t) . (2.21)
The rms number of workers in productive activities NPi is dened by
NPi (t) =
Yi(t)
pi (t)i(t)
. (2.22)
Regarding domestic rms, if the technology gap is too small, all their
R&D resources are devoted to innovative activities
N inniD (t) =
RDi(t)
wiD(t)
. (2.23)
As concerns the foreign rm, all R&D resources are assumed to be de-
voted to imitating activities, independently of technology transfer mecha-
nisms
N imiiF (t) =
RDi(t)
wiF (t)
. (2.24)
Imitative learning of the domestic rm is proportional to the R&D re-
sources devoted to both the imitation of the technology drawn from the
demonstration process and recruitment of the "MNCs labor" when some
additional personnel assistance is required for a successful imitative draw
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N imiiD (t) =
iDRDiD(t)
wiD(t)
+
(1  iD)RDiD(t)
wiD(t)(1 +mi(t))
, (2.25)
when  and (1   ) are respectively the fractions of the rms workforce
engaged in the adaptation and the imitation of foreign technology acquired
through demonstration e¤ects (NDem) and by means of worker mobility
(NRe c). The domestic rm may choose to acquire the foreign best practice
technology via either the demonstration mechanism or the recruitment of
the "MNCs labor", or both, according to its existing technology gap. 
is then a function of the technology gap, that is, as the gap increases, 
declines and domestic learning e¤orts are more devoted to the recruitment
of the "MNCslabor" to gain from personnel assistance
iD(t) = exp( Gapi(t)). (2.26)
In addition, the fraction of employees engaged in the imitation of the
technology drawn from the recruitment of the "MNCslabor" depends on
( (t) = m(t)b(t) ), the ratio between the mark-up (m) the domestic rm at-
tempts to pay to acquire the "MNCslabor" and the benet level the foreign
rm pays over wages to protect their technological advantages from labor
turnover. Obviously, the domestic rm attempts to recruit the "MNCs
labor" by choosing a mark-up superior to the benet level
NRe ciD (t) =
(
(1 iD)RDiD(t)
wiD(t)(1+mi(t))
if  iD(t) > 1
0 if  iD(t) < 1
)
, (2.27)
and
mi(t) = iGapi(t). (2.28)
The wage dynamic is the same for both foreign and domestic rms and
is driven by labor productivity growth ( _), consumer price changes ( _p), and
changes in the levels of employment ( _N)
_wi(t; t+ 1) = 1 _(t  1; t) + 2 _p(t  1; t) + 3 _N(t  1; t), (2.29)
where
 =
X
i
fii, (2.30)
p =
X
i
fiipi, (2.31)
N =
X
i
(NPi +N
Learning
i +N
FDI
i ). (2.32)
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3. Conclusions
In this chapter we have developed an evolutionary model of spillovers
which di¤ers from previous ones presented in chapter 2 concerning three
main points. First, it attempts to o¤er a more comprehensive picture of FDI
spillovers by distinguishing these e¤ects according to their diverse channels,
viz. the e¤ects of the increase of competition, the e¤ects of demonstration,
and the e¤ects of worker mobility. It argues that the di¤erent channels of
spillover benets lead to di¤erent amounts of benets since, inter alia, the
amount and nature of the technologies transferred from foreign to domestic
rms depend broadly on the mechanism by which they are transmitted.
Second, it hypothesizes that the size and the extent of such spillovers
depend largely upon the interaction between the mechanisms by which they
occur and the existing technological levels of domestic rms, in that domestic
rms may improve their competitive power by either innovating or imitating
foreign technologies depending on their existing technology gaps relative to
foreign a¢ liates and only rms with very low technological capacity, to a
point that they are not capable of reaping prots via any of the spillover
channels, enter into a process of cumulative decline and eventually leave the
market. And thirdly, it assumes that geographical proximity is an important
element in determining the size and the extent of spillovers, in that spillovers
are more pronounced in locations where domestic rms are close to foreign
a¢ liates, so that as geographic distance increases, spillovers decrease i.e.
learning is highly localized.
To explore the outcome of our spillover model, we use a simulation tech-
nique. The following chapter is devoted to presenting this technique and
discussing the simulation results we obtain by way of computer implemen-
tations.
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Simulation results
In this chapter we report and analyze the results of a simulation ex-
periment using our spillover model developed in the previous chapter. This
experiment is an exploration of the inuence of learning activities, technolog-
ical characteristics, and regional proximity on the productivity performance
of domestic rms in terms of spillover benets. Given the complexity of the
dynamics dened by the equations of the model, we use simulation tech-
niques to explore its outcome. The set of di¤erential equations is solved
using the language for simulation models named the laboratory for simula-
tion development (Lsd).1 Each simulation counts 1500 iterations, so that
the trend of the model tends to converge towards a lasting quasi-stationary
state. The case considered is of one industry. Firms within this industry
are divided into foreign and domestic in which each one undertakes both
learning and productive activities.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We discuss in the
rst two sections the results obtained by way of computer implementation
and in section 3 the policy implications. Section 1 comments on the relation-
ship between spillover e¤ects and the interaction between spillover channels
and technology gaps, while, section 2 will make explicit the relationship
between regional proximity and spillovers.
1. On the role of the interaction between spillover channels and
technological capacities
As have been previously outlined, our model developed in chapter 5
suggests that productivity spillovers are measured through di¤erent factors.
Simulation results reported in this section are used to assess the inuence
of learning activities and technology gaps on the size and the extent of
spillovers. We use four indicators to observe the number and the nature of
these results, viz. the domestic rmsproductivities, their market shares,
their technology gaps, and the number of their learning employees.
Figure 6.1 plots the relationship between the initial technology gap and
the dynamic of domestic productivity. The simulation results are drawn
from an industry of thirteen domestic rms with diverse initial technology
gaps and two foreign a¢ liates.2 On the horizontal axis of the gure, the dif-
ferent values of the initial technology gap are depicted, and on the vertical
1It is a software developed by Marco Valente as part of his PhD rstly at IIASA and
then at Aalborg University (Valente, 1999).
2Particular numerical values used in this simulation experiment are given in appendix
4.
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Figure 6.1. Simulation results: The percentage change in
productivity of the 13 domestic rms over their initial tech-
nology gaps. The numbers from 0.98 to 1.48 are the values
of initial technology gaps of these domestic rms.
axis, there are bins for the observed values of the domestic rms produc-
tivity change. Two conclusions emerge from this gure. First, locations
characterized by high, mid, and even relatively low prior levels of technolog-
ical development initial Gap between 0.98 and 1.45 benet from the FDI
inows in terms of productivity growth, while locations characterized by
very low technological competence are not able to exploit the technological
opportunities arising from foreign presence. Second, the extent of produc-
tivity spillovers grows with initial technology gaps up to a certain critical
level (here, Gapt=0 = 1.45), thereafter spillovers are wiped out as domestic
rms couldnt face foreign competition and then loose their market shares.
The results obtained seem consistent with Perezs analysis.
Figure 6.2 plots the relationship between initial technology gaps and the
dynamic of domestic technology gaps, using the same rms as in gure 6.1.
Likewise, an increasing process of catching up by domestic rms emerges up
to Gapt=0 =1.45, which subsequently changes into a rapid process of falling
behind.
These observations point to a conclusion which can be summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 1. the greater spillovers are , the wider the technology gap
up to a certain critical level, thereafter absorptive capacity of domestic rms
declines.
In what follows and for the sake of simplicity, we conne our sample
to six rms in which we keep the same foreign rms and the four domestic
rms considered as representative of the diverse technological categories of
the industry3. Figures 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 resume the learning activities
3Particular numerical initial values used in this kind of simulation experiment are also
given in appendix 4.
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Figure 6.2. Simulation results: The percentage change in
technology gaps of the 13 domestic rms over their initial
gaps. The numbers from 0.98 to 1.48 are the values of initial
technology gaps of these domestic rms.
undertaken by those domestic rms to improve their competitive power vis-
à-vis their foreign counterparts, while gure 6.8 reports the e¤ects of those
activities on the catching up processes of the four domestic rms.
Figure 6.3 depicts the market shares of domestic and foreign rms over
a period of 1500 "years". Firm D1, whose initial technology gap is less
than 1, does not need, at least in the beginning of the period, to learn from
foreign technologies to maintain its market share (gure 6.4). Instead, this
rm benets from foreign presence via competition e¤ects as the competi-
tive pressure generated by the presence of foreign rms induces it to more
e¢ ciently use its existing technology by mainly learning within its existing
line of technological development.4 Doing so, it succeeds in maintaining its
competitive power and remains the leader of the industry. Firm D2, whose
initial technology gap is slightly greater than one, adopts the best foreign
technology as soon as it is no longer competitive to improve its technologi-
cal competence. As shown in gure 6.5, this rm uses to a great extent the
technique of demonstration to imitate foreign technology. Indeed, since this
rm is not far behind the technological frontier of the industry, it manages
to fully exploit the technological opportunities merely using demonstration
e¤ects. Firm D3, which belongs to the low level of technological develop-
ment group with a relatively high initial gap, also manages to recover its
market share by imitating foreign technologies. However, this rm is not
able to benet from foreign a¢ liates via demonstration e¤ects alone, rather,
as given by gure 6.6, it gains a lot from worker mobility as this channel pro-
vides a (technical, managerial, etc.) assistance which can help it to better
understand and implement the foreign technology. Firm D4 demonstrates
4Note that rm D1, as showing in 6.4, attempts to constantly observe at the best
foreign technology and sometimes use it, if required.
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the pitfalls of missing the boat by loosing its market share. This rm ex-
erts a very low competitive pressure over foreign counterparts. The market
selection process drives it out of the market, eroding its protability and,
hence, its investment in learning.
Figure 6.3. Simulation results: Market shares of the 4 do-
mestic and 2 foreign rms over a period of 1500 years. D1,
D2, D3, and D4 are domestic rms with, respectively, high,
mid, low, and very low existing technological capacity. F1
and F2 are foreign rms with, respectively, low and high ex-
isting technological capacity.
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Figure 6.4. Simulation results: Learning distribution of the
domestic rm D1 (the rm with high existing technological
capacity). NInn refers to the share (in percent) of domestic
employees engaged in innovating activities. NDem and NRec
refer to the shares (in percent) of domestic employees engaged
in imitating activities through, respectively demonstration
and worker mobility techniques.
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Figure 6.5. Simulation results: Learning distribution of the
domestic rm D2 (the rm with mid existing technological
capacity). NInn refers to the share (in percent) of domestic
employees engaged in innovating activities. NDem and NRec
refer to the shares (in percent) of domestic employees engaged
in imitating activities through, respectively demonstration
and worker mobility techniques.
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Figure 6.6. Simulation results: Learning distribution of the
domestic rm D3 (the rm with low existing technological
capacity). NInn refers to the share (in percent) of domestic
employees engaged in innovating activities. NDem and NRec
refer to the shares (in percent) of domestic employees engaged
in imitating activities through, respectively demonstration
and worker mobility techniques.
Regarding foreign rms, they also gained in terms of spillovers or "re-
verse spillovers" from their presence in the host country (gure 6.7). For-
eign rm F1 for example, which experienced a large technology gap at t =
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Figure 6.7. Simulation results: Learning distribution of the
foreign rm F1 (the rm with low existing technological ca-
pacity). NImi refers to the share (in percent) of domestic
employees engaged in imitating activities.
0, manages to guard its market share by imitating best domestic practice
technologies (gure 6.7).
These observations point to a conclusion which can be summarized in
proposition 2 as follows:
Proposition 2. High and mid technology rms tend to benet from
spillovers through competition and demonstration e¤ects, respectively. While,
domestic rms with relatively low technological competence gain a lot from
worker mobility.
For gure 6.8, we have plotted the dynamic of technology gaps of the four
domestic rms over their initial technology gaps. A rst glance at this gure
shows that rm D3 benets the most from foreign presence with reference
to the catching up process, since worker mobility can lead to substantial
improvements in its productivity by transferring not only public technology
but also the tacit element that is unlikely to be transferred through informal
contacts between rms. What clearly emerges from this gure is that the
size and the extent of spillover benets depend upon the mechanism by
which they are transmitted as spillovers from imitation seem to be higher
than from innovation e¤ects, and similarly, spillovers via worker mobility
are higher than via demonstration e¤ects. Hence, the following proposition
is obtained:
Proposition 3. The size of spillover benet depends upon the mech-
anism by which they are transmitted. Spillovers via worker mobility for
example are found to be higher than those through demonstration e¤ects.
2. On the role of geographical proximity
In order to study the pure e¤ects of regional proximity on spillovers, we
assume di¤erent values for the geographic distance between domestic and
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foreign rms (di   = 1 and di >  = 1)5, where  = 1 corresponds to the
regional frontier. The two gures describing the outcomes of this simulation
experiment, gures 6.10 and 6.11, summarize the outcomes for the change
from time 0 to 30 of the domestic rmsproductivity gap as in gure 6.8,
but respectively at the regional level (di   = 1) and outside the region
(di >  = 1). Figure 6.10 indicates that convergence becomes tighter as the
rate of catching up on the whole becomes higher when regional proximity is
taken into account. The results reported in gure 6.11 conrm this point,
in that only rms D1 and D2, whose initial technology developments are
at a comparable level to their foreign counterparts, maintain their compet-
itive power and gain from the foreign presence even outside their regions.
Conversely, rm D3, for example seems to be unable to compete with its
foreign counterparts and enters into a process of cumulative decline, since
the foreign knowledge this rm acquires becomes more costly when it is lo-
cated faraway from its foreign counterpart. It is clear then that the greater
the geographic distance is, the smaller the learning is and the smaller the
spillover e¤ects are. This result seems also to be conrmed for foreign rms,
at least for foreign rm F1 (gures 6.9, 6.12 and 6.13). Hence, the following
proposition is obtained:
Proposition 4. Spillover benets are found to be more pronounced in
locations where domestic rms are close to their foreign counterparts, so
that as geographic distance decreases, spillovers increase.
3. Concluding remarks
The results of the simulation experiments reported in this chapter are
drawn from the evolutionary model of intra-industry spillovers we developed
in the chapter 5. Our model suggests that the e¤ects of foreign presence on
the productivity development of domestic rms in terms of spillovers are
likely to vary according to a number of indicators, namely, spillover chan-
nels, local characteristics, and regional proximity. In this respect, spillovers
are assumed to be determined by the interaction between the channels by
which they occur and the technological characteristics of the recipient host
rms, in which relatively high/mid technology rms are highly likely to bene-
t from spillovers through demonstration and/or competition e¤ects. While,
domestic rms with relatively low technological competence may gain a lot
from other forms of spillovers such as worker mobility. Moreover, the lo-
cation of domestic rms that are near to their foreign counterparts creates
room for a large amount of spillover benets.
The simulation results seem to conrm our hypotheses and show that,
on the one hand, high/mid technology rms benet a lot from either compe-
tition or demonstration e¤ects, while low technology rms manage to reap
the benet from foreign presence via the recruitment of the "MNCs la-
bor", in that this channel provides a (technical, managerial, etc.) assistance
which can help domestic rms to successfully imitate foreign technology. On
the other hand, spillover benets are more pronounced in locations where
5These numerical values are given in appendix 2.
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domestic rms are close to their foreign counterparts. These results also
demonstrate that the size and extent of spillovers vary according to the
mechanism by which they occur, spillovers via worker mobility, for example,
are higher than through demonstration e¤ects.
Our theoretical ndings uphold to some extent host countriesactions to
attract foreign investors because they expect spillover benets for the pro-
ductivity development of their domestic rms. However, as positive spillover
e¤ects from foreign entry are found to be determined by the ability and moti-
vation of domestic rms to invest in absorptive capacity, we are in agreement
with Blomström and Kokko (2003) that actions supporting learning and in-
vestment in domestic rms, raising their ability and motivation to invest
in absorbing foreign technologies and skills, are also important in leverag-
ing the potential benets of spillovers. In addition, foreign rms might be
established near their domestic counterparts, in particular, low technology
rms, in order to better absorb foreign resources and then upgrade their
technological competitiveness, given that those kind of rms largely use the
worker mobility mechanism to get foreign knowledge, and this channel is
costly. Its cost is assumed to increase with geographic distance.
Testing the theoretical ndings underlying the above against empirical
evidence would also be promising and of a great importance to policy-makers
in leveraging the potential benets of inward FDI spillovers. The next part
of the thesis ts well with this purpose wherein Swiss data will be explored.
We use both qualitative and quantitative analyses to examining spillovers
in Switzerland.
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Figure 6.8. Simulation results: The percentage change be-
tween t=0 and t=194 in technology gaps of the 4 domestic
rms over their initial gaps. The numbers from 0.9375 to
1.875 are the values of these initial gaps. D1, D2, D3, and
D4 are domestic rms with, respectively, high, mid, low, and
very low existing technological capacity.
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Figure 6.9. Simulation results: The percentage change be-
tween t=0 and t=194 in technology gaps of the 2 foreign rms
over their initial gaps. The numbers 1.333 and 1.066 are the
values of these initial gaps. F1 and F2 are foreign rms with,
respectively, low and high existing technological capacity.
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Figure 6.10. Simulation results: The percentage change
between t=0 and t=194 in technology gaps of the 4 domestic
rms over their initial gaps (di   = 1). The numbers from
0.9375 to 1.875 are the values of these initial gaps. D1, D2,
D3, and D4 are domestic rms with, respectively, high, mid,
low, and very low existing technological capacity.
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Figure 6.11. Simulation results: The percentage change
between t=0 and t=194 in technology gaps of the 4 domestic
rms over their initial gaps (di >  = 1). The numbers from
0.9375 to 1.875 are the values of these initial gaps. D1, D2,
D3, and D4 are domestic rms with, respectively, high, mid,
low, and very low existing technological capacity.
100
3. Concluding remarks
F2F1
-0.4
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
1.33333 1.06667
Initial technology gap of the 2 foreign firms (t=0)T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
ga
p 
ch
an
ge
 in
 p
er
ce
nt
be
tw
ee
n 
(t=
0,
t=
19
4)
Figure 6.12. Simulation results: The percentage change
between t=0 and t=194 in technology gaps of the 2 foreign
rms over their initial gaps (di   = 1). The numbers 1.333
and 1.066 are the values of these initial gaps. F1 and F2 are
foreign rms with, respectively, low and high existing tech-
nological capacity.
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Figure 6.13. Simulation results: The percentage change
between t=0 and t=194 in technology gaps of the 2 foreign
rms over their initial gaps (di >  = 1). The numbers 1.333
and 1.066 are the values of these initial gaps. F1 and F2 are
foreign rms with, respectively, low and high existing tech-
nological capacity.
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Part 3
FDI Intra-Industry Spillover
E¤ects in Switzerland
In part 2 of this thesis we developed an evolutionary model which o¤ers
a more comprehensive picture of FDI intra-industry spillovers by distin-
guishing these e¤ects according to their diverse channels. It hypothesizes
that the size and the extent of such spillovers depend upon the interaction
between the mechanisms by which they occur and the technological levels
of domestic rms. That is, high and mid technology rms tend to benet
from spillovers through competition and demonstration e¤ects, respectively,
while, domestic rms with relatively low technological competence may gain
a lot from worker mobility. Our model further assumes that spillovers are
more likely to occur in neighboring rms than between other more distant
ones. The results of the simulation reported in chapter 6 seem to conrm
the hypotheses of our model.
In this part of the thesis we attempt to test our hypotheses against the
empirical evidence for the Swiss economy using both qualitative and quanti-
tative analyses of data.6 Switzerland is a particularly interesting example for
this study given that it experiences increasing ows of inward FDI over time.
It is regarded to have achieved competitive technological levels in many in-
dustries; MNCs tend to concentrate their activities in more dynamic and
competitive industries. And Swiss government authorities (mostly at the
cantonal level) are more and more active in attracting foreign MNCs.
Regarding qualitative analysis, we interviewed managers of 43 rms op-
erating in Switzerland, divided into 30 domestic rms and 13 majority-
owned foreign a¢ liates, of diverse industries from manufacturing and ser-
vices/construction. The interview results are given in chapter 8. For the
quantitative analysis, we tested the size and the extent of intra-industry
spillovers at both the industrial and the regional levels according to the
mechanisms by which they occur, the levels of technological capacity of
domestic rms  expressed in terms of technology gaps, and the levels of
their learning and investment e¤orts undertaken to absorb foreign knowl-
edge measured by the level of investment expenditures in new equipment and
training activities for product/process innovation. The regression analysis
we discuss in chapter 9 makes use of a sample of 657 rms, derived from
the Swiss institute for business cycle research "KOF" innovation activity
surveys (2002 and 2005) and divided into 370 in manufacturing and 287 in
services/construction.
The structure of this part is as follows. Following this introduction,
chapter 7 analyzes data and descriptive statistics about FDI in Switzerland
and the performance of domestic rms vis-à-vis foreign rms. Chapter 8
summarizes the results from a number of interviews conducted with Swiss
and foreign rms. And, chapter 9 discusses the estimation results.
6To the best of our knowledge, this study is the rst to explore the Swiss case.
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Switzerland has an open and welcoming attitude towards FDI (UNC-
TAD, 2006). Swiss government authorities, especially cantons, attempt to
attract MNCs to Switzerland using substantial scal and nancial incentives;
favorable tax treatment is provided for many forms of foreign investment
(Sermet, 2003).1 Switzerland also has an excellent geographical location
as it is in the center of Europe with political and monetary stability and
a high quality infrastructure. It is the leading industrialized country after
Israel, Sweden, Finland, and Japan in terms of R&D expenditures2 (g-
ure 9.1 in appendix 5). In 2004 the R&D expenditures are to some degree
at the same level as (or even lower than) in 2000 for all the countries ex-
cept Switzerland which experiences increased ows. These R&D e¤orts are
markedly noticed in pharmaceuticals, the R&D sector,3 and high technology
instruments (gure 9.2 in appendix 5). A more detailed analysis of R&D ex-
penditures across sectors, given by gures 9.3 and 9.4 in appendix 5, shows
that apparel, energy/water, watches, electronics/instruments, vehicles, com-
puter services/R&D, and other business services represent the main sectors
investing in their own R&D within the period of 2000-2002.4
Such technological strengths and political interventions have largely con-
tributed to an expansion of the ows of inward FDI in Switzerland.5 The
distribution of these ows both in Switzerland and in the world is examined
in section 1. The performance of domestic rms vis-à-vis their foreign coun-
terparts is analyzed in section 2, and the contribution of foreign rms to the
development of human capital in Switzerland is discussed in section 3.
1Recently, after the failure to attract the American MNC "Amgen" to set up a¢ liate
in Switzerland, Joseph Deiss "the head of economic department in Switzerland" claims
that e¤orts should be gathered to reinforce the attractiveness of Switzerland on the part
of foreign MNCs by developing clusters, essential to increasing the competitive power of
the Swiss economy (Nussbaum, 2006).
2R&D is a key factor of economic competition. Firms cannot absorb outside knowl-
edge unless they invest in their own R&D (Narula and Marin, 2003).
3This sector includes all rms giving R&D services for others active in R&D.
4In terms of innovation expenditures, gures 9.3 and 9.4 in appendix 5 demon-
strate that vehicles, electronics/instruments, machinery, apparel, textiles, trans-
port/communication, and computer services/R&D are the main investing sectors.
5As we shall see in the next section, the Swiss economy recorded sharp increases in
inward FDI which in 2003, for example, surpassed outward FDI.
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1. FDI distribution in the global economy and in Switzerland
This section examines, rstly, the distribution of FDI over all the world,
secondly, the regional distribution of FDI in Switzerland, and, nally, the
contribution of MNCs to Swiss economic activity (in terms of total sales and
employment).
The global ows of inward FDI worldwide grew up in 2004 after a sharp
decrease in previous years reaching 41% in 2001 (UNCTAD, 2005). As
gure 7.1 shows, this growth reects increased ows to developing countries
and to South East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). The di¤erence between inows of FDI to developed countries and
developing countries is reduced to $147 billion a signicant narrowing of
the gap compared with previous years, for example in 2000 it was $881
billion (UNCTAD, 2005).
Figure 7.1. FDI inows (in billions of dollars), global and
by groups of economies, 1980-2004. Source: UNCTAD
(2005).
Figure 7.2 shows that the United States was the major recipient country
of FDI ows in 1996 and 2003 ahead of other OECD countries, although
they experienced a large decrease in their ows between 1996 and 2003.
Switzerland is one of the smaller European countries which, like Austria and
Norway, recorded sharp increases in inward FDI in 2003 (OECD, 2004b);
it is the sixth OECD country that sees increased ows in 2003, which even
surpass those of outward investment (gure 7.3).
FDI in Switzerland is not equally distributed across regions; there is
no spatial di¤usion of international investments in Switzerland (Crevoisier
and Roth, 2005). As shown by gure 7.4 there exist regions with inward
or outward FDI or even both and others without any international invest-
ment. The Alpes for example are not internationalized, while the cantons
of Vaud, Geneva, Zurich, Basel, Fribourg, and Ticino experience large in-
ward investment which is above the national average. Crevoisier and Roth
claim that the most internationalized regions correspond, to a large extent,
to Switzerlands nancial centres (Geneva, Lugano, Zurich and Basel) and
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Figure 7.2. OECD direct investment from abroad: inows
(in millions of dollars). Source: OECD (2004a).
to traditionally industrial regions (eastern Switzerland and the arc of the
Jura).
Table 7.1. FDI participation in manufacturing and ser-
vices/construction in Switzerland: annual shares of foreign
rms in sales and employment (percent)
Year Total Total Number of Number of Total number
employment sales foreign rms domestic rms of rms
2001 11.6 21.9 314 1992 2306
2004 13.8 20.3 316 1989 2305
Source: Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innovation surveys (2002 and 2005)
of manufacturing and services/construction rms.
In what concerns the role of MNCs in Swiss economic activity, tables
7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 present a summary of MNCsactivity in total employment
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Figure 7.3. Direct investment ows in Switzerland. Source:
OECD (2004a).
and sales. Information in these tables are based on the authors calculations
of data derived from innovation activity surveys (2002 and 2005) of man-
ufacturing and services/construction rms (domestic and majority-owned
foreign), with at least 5 employees, conducted at the Swiss institute for busi-
ness cycle research "KOF".6 The rmssamples include 2306 rms 314
majority-owned foreign a¢ liates  in 2001 and 2305 rms 316 majority-
owned foreign a¢ liates in 2004.7 All of the authors calculations are based
on weighted data sets8 so as to give a representative picture of the Swiss
economy.9
As shown in table 7.1, the share of foreign investment in manufacturing
and services/construction total employment accounted for 2001 is about
11.6 (21.9 in total sales). This share hides signicant di¤erences across
sectors as shown in table 7.2, in that 84 percent (94.7 in sales) of computer
and o¢ ce equipment is foreign owned compared to only 2.5 percent (8.8 in
sales) for printing and publishing. The foreign presence is also preeminent
in among others paper, electrical machinery, transport equipment, R&D
institutions, and computer services. In spite of the slight change of the
6Questionnaires can be downloaded from www.kof.ethz.ch (Industrieökonomik).
7Unfortunately, data for 2001 and 2004 are the most recently available ones.
8Except the calculations related to the number of rms.
9The weights are used to correct for the selection bias resulting from "unit" non-
response and for the deviations of the sample structure from that of the underlying pop-
ulation.
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Figure 7.4. Regional distribution of FDI in Switzerland:
specialisations of the regions as divided according to Spa-
tial Mobility regions, in 2001 (location quotients). Source:
Crevoisier and Roth (2005), Swiss Federal Statistical O¢ ce,
Business Census 1995, 2001.
foreign employment and sales shares at the aggregate level from 2001 to
2004, there is a signicant change in foreign share across sectors. That is 9
of the sectors recognize a substantial increase in foreign employment share
(13 in foreign sales share), while in other sectors it falls by as much as 50
percent (insurance in terms of total sales; food, watches, computer and o¢ ce
equipment, retail trade, and computer services in terms of total sales and
total employment).10
Table 7.3 illustrates the importance of FDI for regional development in
Switzerland. It shows some variation in the share of foreign rms across
regions11 in 2001, markedly in total sales for which Ticino and the Lemanic
region experienced the highest shares (49.58 and 38.8 respectively) while
North West Switzerland had 10.4 percent and only 6.48 in Mittelland space
in terms of employment.12 From 2001 to 2004 foreign share recognizes a
signicant change across regions in which it increases substantially within
10Note that the change of foreign share in sectors from 2001 to 2004 may result, as we
shall see later, from the substantial change these sectors experience in some Swiss regions
relative to others.
11The regional repartition used in this thesis corresponds to the division used by the
KOF institute.
12The di¤erence between regions may be explained by large disparities betwen cantons
in terms of tax treatment and nancial incentives.
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Table 7.2. FDI participation in manufacturing and ser-
vices/construction in Switzerland: sectoral shares of foreign
rms (percent)
Sector Total employment Total sales
2001 2004 2001 2004
Manufacturing
Food 13.3 4.3 15 2.9
Textiles 13.8 14.9 16.5 13.6
Wood products 9.5 5.4 25.3 6.5
Paper 32.1 25 38.3 29
Printing and publishing 2.5 8.3 8.8 12.7
Chemicals 25 22.2 21.8 25.6
Pharmaceuticals 13.2 13 7.1 23.5
Plastics 20.6 23.7 29.1 32.4
Non-metal mineral products 16.9 11.3 15 13.4
Metal production 6.9 11.9 10.9 13.8
Metalworking 12.9 10 17.7 13.9
Machinery 28.9 22.9 32.4 21.3
Electrical machinery 26.4 49.7 31 59.3
Computer and o¢ ce equipment 84 11.6 94.7 11.4
Communication equipment 15 40.1 13.5 54.1
Medical instruments 20.1 27.1 21.8 35.4
Watches 5.1 2.2 9 0.7
Transport equipment 33.2 24.8 43.9 23.2
Other manufacturing 15.9 4.4 21.7 8.1
Other industries
Trading and maintenance of motor vehicles 9.3 18.2 32.9 46.2
Wholesale trade 23.5 20.6 31.5 40.7
Retail trade 9.4 4.5 17.8 8.3
Tourism 4.4 5.8 5.4 7.7
Transport 2.9 7.7 3.4 15.6
Banking 22.1 20.6 21.7 14.4
Insurance 6.7 4.8 10.9 0.7
Real estate and leasing 8 40.3 6.7 0.4
Computer services 27.1 19.6 31.7 27.4
R&D institutions 24.8 51.2 39.9 70
Other business services 7.8 4.7 25.1 69.5
Construction 4.7 5.3 6.4 9.9
Source: Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innovation surveys (2002 and 2005) of
manufacturing and services/construction rms.
Mittelland space (about triple, passing to 16.2 percent in generating em-
ployment) while in regions such as Ticino it falls bellow 50 percent in terms
of total sales despite its increase in employment.
Regarding sectors, in 2001 gure 7.5 shows that foreign share in whole-
sale trade, chemicals, machinery, and medical instruments was preeminent
in the Lemanic region. Central Switzerland also holds large foreign share
110
1. FDI distribution in the global economy and in Switzerland
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
C
onstruction
W
holeslae
trade
Tourism
B
anking
Insurance
C
om
puter
services
O
ther
business
C
hem
icals
N
on-m
etal
m
ineral
M
etalw
orking
M
achinery
Electrical
m
achinery
M
edical
instrum
ent
Sectors
Fo
re
ig
n 
sh
ar
e
2001
2004
Figure 7.5. Percent share of foreign rms in total sales
in the same sector and region "Lemanic region". Source:
Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innova-
tion surveys (2002 and 2005) of manufacturing and ser-
vices/construction rms.
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Figure 7.6. Percent share of foreign rms in total sales
in the same sector and region "Mittelland space". Source:
Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innova-
tion surveys (2002 and 2005) of manufacturing and ser-
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Table 7.3. FDI participation in manufacturing and ser-
vices/construction in Switzerland by region: annual shares
of foreign rms (percent)
Region Total Total Number of
employment sales foreign rms
2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004
Lemanic regiona 17.36 9.8 38.8 35.3 12.8 10.55
Mittelland spaceb 6.48 16.2 13.4 19.57 10.26 10.3
North West Switzerlandc 9.9 10.4 10.5 12.3 13 13.38
Zurich 14.9 13.95 20.4 21.3 13.5 15.3
Western Switzerlandd 10.6 11.4 14.3 16.36 10.9 11.3
Central Switzerlande 11.9 9.15 19.3 15.98 10.8 12.35
Ticino 11.59 14.47 49.58 11.2 10.3 7.69
a: Lemanic region includes the cantons of Vaud, Valais, and Geneva.
b: Mittelland space includes the cantons of Bern, Fribourg, Jura, Neuchâtel, Solothurn.
c: North West Switzerland includes the cantons of Aargau, Basel-Stadt, and Basel-Landshaft.
d: Western Switzerland includes the cantons of Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Appenzell Innerrhoden,
Glarus, Graubünden, Scha¤hausen, St-Gallen, and Thurgau.
e: Central Switzerland includes the cantons of Lucerne, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Schwyz, Uri, and Zug.
Source: Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innovation surveys (2002 and 2005)
of manufacturing services/construction rms.
in chemicals and wholesale trade sectors as well as in plastics (gure 7.10).
While foreign share in Mittelland space is preeminent in trading and main-
tenance of motor vehicles and paper (gure 7.6). Zurich recognizes large
shares mainly in computer services, transport equipment, and banking (g-
ure 7.8). Foreign rms dominate in R&D institutions within both North
West and Western Switzerland13 (gures 7.7 and 7.9), while in Ticino they
are rather dominant in personal services and pharmaceuticals (gure 7.11).
In 2004, the results change considerably across regions; some sectors recog-
nize a decrease in foreign shares, mainly chemicals in the Lemanic region
and Central Switzerland, computer services and food in Western Switzer-
land, and insurance and textiles in Zurich; whereas an increase in foreign
shares is identied within, for example, Western Switzerland in mainly per-
sonal services, communication equipment, R&D institutions, transport, and
tourism; also within Zurich in electrical machinery and other business ser-
vices. Other sectors such as banking and pharmaceuticals witness, respec-
tively, a decrease in foreign share within the boundaries of Zurich and Ticino
and at the same time an increase within the Lemanic region and Mittelland
space.
13North West Switzerland holds large foreign shares in others such as electrical
machinery.
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Figure 7.7. Percent share of foreign rms in total sales
in the same sector and region "North West Switzerland".
Source: Authors calculations of data derived from KOF in-
novation surveys (2002 and 2005) of manufacturing and ser-
vices/construction rms.
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Figure 7.8. Percent share of foreign rms in total sales in
the same sector and region "Zurich". Source: Authors cal-
culations of data derived from KOF innovation surveys (2002
and 2005) of manufacturing and services/construction rms.
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Figure 7.9. Percent share of foreign rms in total sales in
the same sector and region "Western Switzerland". Source:
Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innova-
tion surveys (2002 and 2005) of manufacturing and ser-
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rms.
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Figure 7.10. Percent share of foreign rms in total sales in
the same sector and region "Central Switzerland". Source:
Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innova-
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Figure 7.11. Percent share of foreign rms in total sales
in the same sector and region "Ticino". Source: Authors
calculations of data derived from KOF innovation surveys
(2002 and 2005) of manufacturing and services/construction
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2. A¢ liatesbehavior relative to domestic rms in Swiss industry
Based as above on the authors calculations of individual data of 2306
rms  314 majority-owned foreign a¢ liates  in 2001 and 2305 rms 
316 majority-owned foreign a¢ liates in 2004 derived from innovation ac-
tivity surveys (2002 and 2005) of manufacturing and services/construction
rms conducted at the KOF institute, this section presents descriptive sta-
tistics of the relative position of foreign versus domestic rms in terms of
economic performance and human capital development in Swiss industries.
Table 7.4 compares the relative performance of foreign and domestic rms
across sectors in 2004, measured by total sales, total employment, and ex-
ports as a percentage of total sales, using the ratio of foreign to domestic
means. In general, the di¤erences in the aggregate indicate that foreign
rms in Switzerland are larger in sales and exports (about twice) than do-
mestic rms, but they do not recruit more employees. When disaggregating
the sample into manufacturing and other industries, sales and export di¤er-
ences that support foreign rms become quite large and strongly signicant
in services/construction.14 This stems from the signicant dominance of
foreign rms, in terms of sales, mainly in sectors such as beverage, plastics,
transport equipment, computer and o¢ ce equipment, trading and mainte-
nance of motor vehicles, and other business services; and in terms of exports
in insurance, construction, transport, banking, R&D institutions, watches,
and wood products. Labor di¤erence still favors domestic rms especially in
14It is worth noting that sales and export di¤erences also highlight the dominance of
foreign rms in manufacturing but they are less important than in services/construction.
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Table 7.4. The relative position of foreign versus domestic
rms: sales, labor, and export (2004)
Ratio of the mean of the foreign variable to the mean of the
corresponding domestic variable#
Sector sales labor exports
All sectors 1.6 0.9 2.2***
Manufacturing 1.5 1.14 1.7***
Food 0.8 0.9 1
Beverage 4** 2 0.3
Textiles 0.8 1 1.6*
Wood products 0.8 0.8 3.8*
Paper 1.8 0.9 1
Printing and publishing 1.2 1.4 1.5
Chemicals 0.5 0.7 1.4*
Pharmaceuticals 0.4 0.4 1.5
Plastics 2.4** 1 1.9*
Non-metal mineral products 1.9 1 2
Metal production 1.1 0.7 1.4
Metalworking 2.5*** 1.2 1.5
Machinery 1.1 1.1 1.3**
Electrical machinery 4 2.1 1.1
Computer and o¢ ce equipment 4.5*** 7.7* 0.04
Communication equipment 3.2 1.5** 1.3
Medical instruments 1.2 1.2 1.3
Watches 0.5 0.7 3.3***
Transport equipment 5.5** 2.6* 1.8
Other manufacturing 1.8 0.8 2.3*
Other industries 1.9 0.98 3.7***
Trading and maintenance of motor vehicles 4.2* 1.3 0.1
Wholesale trade 3.7 0.9 1
Retail trade 0.5 0.4 1.6
Tourism 2.7 1 2
Transport 4.7 1 3.9***
Banking 0.4 1 5.3***
Insurance 0.04 0.3 6.3***
Computer services 2.3* 1.4 0.7
R&D institutions 2.1 1.7 5.7***
Other business services 60*** 0.7 4.5***
Construction 3.1 1.9* 15.1***
# Two-sample t-test for equal means, which for simplicity does not take into account
the sample design specicities.
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innovation surveys (2002 and 2005)
of manufacturing and services/construction.
service industries even if it is insignicant the ratio of foreign to domestic
means is mostly less or equal to 1.
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Table 7.5 analyzes the relative technological position of foreign versus
domestic rms in 2001 and 2004, measured by the share of innovative prod-
ucts in sales,15 the share of R&D labor, and the labor productivity expressed
as value-added per employee. In 2001, the data for the aggregate suggests
that on average, foreign rms hire R&D employees and innovate more than
domestic rms; their share of R&D labor is one and half more than that
of domestic rms, which is signicant at the 10% level. In 2004, these dif-
ferences in favor of foreign rms markedly increase, stemming mainly from
services/construction. However, across sectors this result changes consid-
erably; that is, in some sectors the change from 2001 to 2004 remains in
favor of foreign rms, particularly in banking and wholesale trade in terms
of innovative products and in printing and publishing, machinery, and other
business services in terms of R&D labor. While in other sectors such as
in banking and in metal production, the change, although insignicant, is
in favor of domestic rms in terms of R&D labor and innovative products,
respectively.16
The di¤erence in terms of productivity denotes the industrial technology
gap between domestic and foreign rms, which is signicant at the 1% level
for both years at the aggregate level (1.6 and 3.6 in 2001 and 2004 respec-
tively) with larger coe¢ cients for services/construction. This shows that on
average the gap is relatively high, which marks the relative productivity per-
formance of foreign rms over their domestic counterparts, and appears not
be associated with a catching-up process by domestic rms between 2001
and 2004. Nevertheless, when the sectors are considered individually these
results change considerably and show that in some sectors the gap is small
while in others is tripled. In food, retail trade, and trading and maintenance
of motor vehicles, for example, foreign rms perform better than domestic
ones, while in chemicals and transport, domestic rms seem to be head
and shoulders above the foreign rms. Moreover, sectors like construction
and other business services experience a large gap in 2001 associated with a
process of falling behind in 2004, whereas food, wood products, watches, and
computer services succeed in catching-up with and even in forging ahead of
foreign rms. This catching-up process, in our view, may result from the in-
vestment e¤ort of domestic rms in learning activity, since, in wood product,
machinery, and watches sectors the decrease in the technology gap appear
to be jointly related to the increase of the share of innovative products.
Table 7.6 compares the relative technological performance of foreign and
domestic rms across regions in 2004, measured by the share of innovative
products in sales.17 At the aggregate level, the di¤erence in favor of do-
mestic rms is in Ticino, mainly in manufacturing (medical instruments).
This shows that MNCs attempt to invest in Ticino to be close to domes-
tic knowledge, and this could result, in our view, in spillover benets for
15Innovative products could be goods or services and include new products as well as
those that have been consideraly changed. The share of innovative products is measured
as a percent of the rms total sales realized in Switzerland.
16Note that there exist sectors in which domestic rms perform better than foreign
ones in both periods but these di¤erences are also not signicant, except for chemicals.
17See denition in footnote 15.
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Table 7.5. A¢ liatestechnological behavior relative to do-
mestic rms: labor productivity, R&D labor, and the share
of innovative products in sales
Ratio of the mean of the foreign variable to the mean of the corresponding
domestic variable#
Labor R&D labor The share of
productivity innovative
products
Sector 2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004
All sectors 1.6*** 3.6*** 1.5* 1.7*** 1.1* 1.2*
Manufacturing 1.2*** 1.2 1.3* 1.4*** 1.1 1.1
Food 1.8*** 1.1 1.9 1 0.9 0.7
Beverage 2.2 2 0.2 3.3 0.2 0.1
Wood products 2.5*** 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.05
Paper 1.3 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.6 1.5
Printing and publishing 2.2*** 1.2 8*** 8*** 1.3 1.7
Chemicals 1 2* 0.5** 0.6* 1.1 1.3
Pharmaceuticals 1.3 1.3 0.9 2.3 1.3 1.4
Plastics 1.2 1.2 0.3 0.9 1 1.5
Non-metal mineral products 1.2 1.6 1.1 0 0.6 0.6
Metal production 1.3 1.2 0.2 1 1.5 0.2
Metalworking 1.1 1.3* 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.7
Machinery 1.2*** 1.1* 1.3 1.4* 1.1 0.9
Electrical machinery 1.1 1.4*** 1 1.6* 0.8 0.9
Computer and o¢ ce
equipment 1.4 1.2 1.4 0.2 1.5 0
Communication equipment 1.1 1.5** 0.6 1.9* 1.1 1.1
Medical instruments 1.1 1.5*** 1.2 0.6 1.1 0.9
Watches 1.6** 0.26 1.7 0.5 2.4* 1.5
Other manufacturing 1.3 2.1*** 0.2 3.4* 0.7 1.8
Other industries 2.2*** 6.6*** 1.7 2.5*** 1.1 1.4*
Trading and maintenance
of motor vehicles 3*** 2.5** 0 0 1.9* 2.5
Wholesale trade 1.6*** 1.7*** 2.2 0.2 1.5* 1.6*
Retail trade 1.7*** 1.4* 0 2.4 1 0.7
Tourism 1.1 1.3* 0 0 2.6* 1.4
Transport 0.9 1.5*** 0.8 1.9 0.4 1.5
Banking 1.2 0.6 2.9 0.5 1.9* 2.4**
Insurance 1 0.1 0.7 1.2 0.1 1.5
Computer services 1.7* 1.1 0.4 0.04 1 1.4
Other business services 7.6*** 70*** 3.8** 5.1*** 1.4 0.5
Construction 1.6*** 2.4*** 2.3 1.6 1.4 2.1
# Two-sample t-test for equal means, which for simplicity does not take into account the
sample design specicities.
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innovation surveys (2002 and 2005) of
manufacturing and services/construction.
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Table 7.6. A¢ liatestechnological behavior relative to do-
mestic rms: the share of innovative products in sales within
region
Ratio of the mean of the foreign variable to the mean of the corresponding
domestic variable#
The share of innovative products in sales
Sector Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.3 Reg.4 Reg.5 Reg.6 Reg.7
All sectors 1.1 1.3* 1 1.4** 1.1 1.1 0.6
Manufacturing 0.4** 1.1 0.5* 1.2 1.7 0.7 0.2
Food 0.8 0.4 1.4
Beverage 0.2
Textiles 1 1.4 0.6
Wood products 0.1
Paper 1.4 3.3
Printing and publishing 2.5 1.4
Chemicals 1.2 1 0.9 0.8 3
Pharmaceuticals 1
Plastics 1 5.3* 1.1
Non-metal mineral products 1.4 0.4
Metal production 0.5 0.1*
Metalworking 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Machinery 1.1 0.9 0.1* 1.1 0.9 1.9
Electrical machinery 0.9 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.6
Computer and o¢ ce
equipment 0
Communication equipment 3** 0.7 1.7 0.6
Medical instruments 1.8 1 1 0.4 1 0.4
Watches 1.2
Other manufacturing 2.4
Other industries 1.3 1.2 1 1.2 0.9 1.2 0.7
Trading and maintenance
of motor vehicles 1.2
Wholesale trade 0 1.1 2 1.5 2.5* 1.8
Retail trade 0 0.6 0.8 1
Tourism 0.5 1.4 1.7
Transport 2.5 2.2
Banking 0 0 2.4 6*** 35
Computer services 1.5
R&D institutions 2.6
Other business services 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.3
Construction 9.3** 1.1
# Two-sample t-test for equal means, which for simplicity does not take into account the
sample design specicities.
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Reg.1 refers to Lemanic region, Reg.2 is Mittelland space, Reg.3 is North West Switzerland,
Reg.4 is Zurich, Reg. 5 Western Switzerland, Reg.6 Central Switzerland, and Reg.7 Ticino.
Source: Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innovation surveys (2002 and 2005)
of manufacturing and services/construction.
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foreign a¢ liates. Equal shares are found in North West Switzerland with
a strong domestic dominance in manufacturing. This dominance stems,
for the most part, from wood products, machinery, and electrical machin-
ery.18 While in other regions foreign rms predominate, stemming mainly
from services/construction, except in Western Switzerland where domestic
rms innovate more.19 Across sectors, in the Lemanic region for example,
foreign rms seem to innovate more in sectors like non-metal mineral prod-
ucts, medical instruments, and chemicals, whereas domestic rms perform
largely in tourism and metal production. In Mittelland space, foreign rms
predominate in paper, printing and publishing, communication equipment,
and construction; while sectors like food, metalworking, and other busi-
ness services are rather dominated by domestic innovations. These results
clearly demonstrate that within the same region, possible signs of spillovers
from and to the MNCsa¢ liates may take place  this provides evidence
conrming our hypothesis that spillovers are highly likely to be localized.
Moreover, the table shows that for some sectors foreign rms dominate in
a region while their domestic counterparts dominate in another; this shows
that for the same sector both may occur spillovers and reverse spillovers
depending on the region.20
Finally, table 7.7 analyzes the relative contribution of foreign rms to
domestic human capital development versus their domestic counterparts, in
2004. The variables used are the share of professionals  engineers, man-
agers, and all other professionals in production and R&D activities in total
employees, the labor quality index expressed in terms of the ratio of pro-
fessional to non professionals, the share of R&D employees, and the share
of labor cost in sales (including salary, training expenditures, etc.). The
data for the aggregate suggests that, although foreign rms are not larger
than domestic ones in terms of employment, they hire more professionals
which for the most part consist of R&D employees, the quality of their la-
bor force is signicantly higher, and they invest more in labor cost. The high
level of labor costs observed in foreign a¢ liates relative to similar domestic
rms may result from the large amount they spend on training.21 In this
way, MNCs a¢ liates may be particularly valuable sources of new technol-
ogy and hence we believe that more opportunities for spillover benets are
expected. As suggested by Blomström and Kokko (2002), the labor market
is one of the main ways in which new technological knowledge is expected to
disseminate to the domestic economy, workers already trained by or having
worked in foreign a¢ liates may be potentially available to work in domestic
rms or start their own rms in the same industry. These di¤erences in
favor of foreign rms are signicantly larger in services/construction than
18Note that in sectors like paper, wholesale trade, and transport, foreign rms
dominate.
19Although across sectors, this region shows a large share of innovative products
in favor of foreign rms in for example banking and wholesale trade -foreign rms also
predominate in those sectors in Zurich and Central Switzerland.
20For example, the machinery and chemicals sectors are dominated by foreign rms
in Western Switzerland and by domestic rms in Central Switzerland.
21Chen (1983) and Gershenberg (1987) found evidence that foreign rms spend more
on training than domestic rms in Kenya and Hong Kong, respectively.
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in manufacturing, and show that human capital is most important in ser-
vices. Across sectors, the results in table 7.7 show that foreign rms hire
more professionals and possess a more skilled labour force in sectors such as
chemicals, trading and maintenance of motor vehicles, and wholesale trade;
and invest more in labor costs in banking, retail trade, plastics, transport
equipment, electrical machinery, and also trading and maintenance of motor
vehicles and wholesale trade.
3. Conclusions
This chapter has examined the FDI distribution in the global economy
and in Switzerland, and studied the relative position of foreign versus do-
mestic rms in terms of technological behavior, productivity performance,
and human capital development. We nd that Switzerland experiences in-
creasing ows of inward FDI over time; it is is one of the small European
countries which, like Austria and Norway, recorded sharp increases in inward
FDI over the last few years, mainly in 2003, which even surpassed those of
outward investment. In general, foreign a¢ liates are well involved in Swiss
economic activity, in that, rstly, the share of foreign presence is quite large:
in total sales it is as high as 21% in 2001. And secondly, foreign rms per-
form better than domestic ones, innovate more, and hire more professionals
which mostly consist of R&D employees.
The degree of foreign presence in Switzerland as well as the relative
performance of foreign rms compared to their domestic counterparts are
neither evenly distributed across sectors and regions, nor just the same main-
tained over time. Some sectors and regions have experienced a large presence
with a signicant dominance of foreign rms while others have not. Also,
some of the domestic rms seem to have succeeded in catching up with for-
eign a¢ liates between 2001 and 2004 during which time their productivity
increased and their technology gap narrowed.
Whether at least some of the increases in domestic productivity are due
to spillover benets arising from the learning process of foreign technologies
is the focus of our empirical analysis discussed in the following chapters. This
issue is rst addressed in chapter 8 on the basis of a qualitative analysis from
interviews with both foreign and domestic rms.
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Table 7.7. Human capital development: di¤erence between
foreign and domestic rms (2004)
Ratio of the mean of the foreign variable to the mean of the corresponding
domestic variable#
Sector Professional Labor R&D Labor
employees quality employees cost
All sectors 1.1*** 1.7*** 1.7*** 1.2***
Manufacturing 1.1*** 1.7*** 1.4*** 1.2**
Food 1.2 3*** 1 1.1
Beverage 1.3 2.1 3.3 1.1
Textiles 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.1
Wood products 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.2
Paper 1 1 0.4 1
Printing and publishing 1.1 2.6*** 8*** 1.1
Chemicals 1.1* 3.2*** 0.6* 1.1
Pharmaceuticals 1.1 2.2 2.3 1.1
Plastics 1 0.9 0.9 1.2**
Non-metal mineral products 1 0.7 0 1.1
Metal production 1.1 0.9 1 1.1
Metalworking 1 0.9 0.3 1.1
Machinery 1 1.4 1.4* 1.2***
Electrical machinery 1.1 1.2 1.6* 1.3***
Computer and o¢ ce equipment 1.4 7.5*** 0.2 1.3*
Communication equipment 1 0.7 1.9* 1.3*
Medical instruments 1 1.2 0.6 1.1
Watches 1.4 1.1 0.5 0.4
Transport equipment 1 1 0 1.5**
Other manufacturing 1 0.7 3.4* 1.3
Other industries 1.2*** 1.9*** 2.5*** 1.4**
Trading and maintenance of motor vehicles 1.3*** 1.7* 0 1.8***
Wholesale trade 1.3*** 2.9*** 0.2 1.4***
Retail trade 1 2.2*** 2.4 1.3*
Tourism 0.9 0.7 0 1.2
Transport 1 0.5 1.9 0.9
Banking 1* 2.2*** 0.5 1.5***
Insurance 1 0.4 1.2 1.1
Real estate and leasing 1.2 1 0 1.1
Computer services 1 1.4 0.04 1
R&D institutions 1 0.3 1.7 0.7
Other business services 1 0.7 5.1*** 1.1
Construction 1 0.8 1.6 1.3**
# Two-sample t-test for equal means, which for simplicity does not take into account the
sample design specicities.
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors calculations of data derived from KOF innovation surveys (2002 and 2005) of
manufacturing and services/construction.
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CHAPTER 8
Empirical evidence: interview analysis
This chapter focuses on analyzing a number of interviews with managers
of domestic and foreign rms in Switzerland. The objective of this analysis
is to examine qualitatively the pertinence of our hypotheses discussed in
previous chapters as applied to Swiss industry. Our hypotheses suggest that
the size and the extent of spillover e¤ects depend largely upon the interaction
between the mechanisms by which they occur and the technological levels
of domestic rms. And spillovers are more pronounced in locations where
domestic rms are close to their foreign counterparts. The interview results
seem to support the hypotheses.
In the next section we present the methodology adopted for our inter-
views. Then we discuss in section 2 the interview results with Swiss and
foreign rms.
1. Setup and methodology
83 foreign and domestic rms operating in Switzerland were contacted
for interviews,1 but, as we note in the next section only 43 rms were e¤ec-
tively interviewed. The rms and industries have been selected according
to the industrys and the rms technological capacities, so as to have a
heterogeneous rm sample with diverse technological levels. The industrys
and rms technology gaps are used to measure the industrys and rms
technological capacities, derived from innovation activity surveys (2002) of
manufacturing and services/construction rms, conducted at the Swiss insti-
tute for business cycle research "KOF". The rms technology gap is dened
as the ratio of the average labour productivity of foreign-owned rms in the
relevant industry to the domestic rms own labor productivity.2
In the case of domestic rms, we are rst interested in the principal ac-
tivities of the rm; then, whether it benets from the foreign presence in its
industry and specically if this benet occurs through the increase of compe-
tition or the acquisition of foreign technology. Third, we are looking at how
foreign technology is transferred to the domestic rm, especially whether
it is through discovering foreign comparative advantage and/or recruiting
domestic employees previously trained by or having worked in foreign rms
1It is worth noting that a larger number of rms could be more relevant to interview
to test our hypotheses. Unfortunately, this is not possible due to the constraint of names
condentiality set by the KOF institute.
2For industrial technology gap, we apply the ratio of the average labour productivity
of foreign-owned rms in the relevant industry to the average domestic rms own labor
productivity.
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("MNCs labor"). Fourth, we seek to understand through which channel
such benet is maximized. And nally we are interested in the existence
of nearby foreign a¢ liates and their importance in increasing the benet of
domestic rms. A detailed list of the questions addressed to domestic rms
is given in box 1.
Box 1. Questionnaire for Swiss rms
 Could you describe the principal activities of your rm?
 What are your responsibilities within the rm?
 Could you explain how your rm maintains its market share
and survives with the foreign competition? Is it an easy
task?
 Does your rm benet from the foreign presence in the in-
dustry? How? And at kind of benet is it?
 Does your rm benet from the increased competition that
occurs as a result of foreign entry? Could you describe how?
Does this kind of competition force your rm to introduce
new technology and/or work harder so as to increase its
productivity?
 Does your rm benet from foreign presence in the industry
in terms of technology transfer when foreign rms demon-
strate their products to clients and also in rmsmeetings?
Could you describe how?
 Does your rm recruit domestic employees trained by or
have worked at foreign rivals? "If yes", which kind of em-
ployees and how many? Does your rm benet from the
know-how these employees took with them after leaving the
foreign rms? Could you describe how?
 Through which channel (demonstrations, the increase of
competition, and/or the recruitment of domestic employees
previously trained by or having worked at foreign rivals), is
the benet from foreign rivals maximized?
 Are there any foreign rivals in your region? "If yes", is your
presence near these foreign rms benecial, in terms of the
benet discussed previously?
 Has the boss of your rm gained experience or been trained
by foreign multinationals and/or their a¢ liates in the same
industry?
Denition of technology: Intangible assets such as methods, tech-
niques, technological know-how, marketing and managerial skills,
and international experience.
In the case of foreign rms, we are also looking at the principal activities
of the rm, but especially its reasons for choosing to be present in Swiss
territory. Second, we want to know whether it gains the estimated benets
from its presence in Switzerland, close to its domestic counterparts. And
nally, we are interested in the domestic employees it recruits, whether they
need some training courses, and whether they leave the rm after having
126
1. Setup and methodology
been trained or worked in it. A detailed list of the questions addressed to
foreign rms are given in the box 2.
Box 2. Questionnaire for foreign a¢ liates established in Switzerland
 Could you describe the principal activities of your rm?
 What are your responsibilities within the rm?
 Why did your rm choose Switzerland and this particular
region to set up an a¢ liate? Does your rm benet from
its presence in Switzerland? How? (Is it from high quality
infrastructure, attractive tax system, and/or Competitive
environment, etc)?
 Does your rm benet from the competition with domestic
rivals? How does this benet materialize?
 Does your rm benet from its presence in Swiss industry
in terms of technology transfer when domestic rms demon-
strate their products to clients and also in rmsmeetings?
Could you describe how?
 Are there any Swiss rivals in your region? "If yes", is your
presence near those domestic rms benecial, in terms of
the benet discussed previously?
 Does your rm recruit domestic employees? Are they qual-
ied? Do they need some training courses? What kind of
employees do you recruit (i.e. simple manufacturing oper-
ative, supervisor, technically advanced professional, and/or
top-level managers), and how many per year (approxi-
mately)?
 Do domestic employees you have recruited leave the rm
after working or training within your rm? If yes, why?
How many (approximately), and does this a¤ect your per-
formance?
Denition of technology: Intangible assets such as methods, tech-
niques, technological know-how, marketing and managerial skills.
After the selection of the rms to interview, a phone call was made with
each of them so as to collect the individual information on "top and middle
level managers" whom we want to interview. Then, a letter describing the
aim of our project with an overview of the questionnaire was sent to each
person. Boxes 3 and 4 in appendix 6 summarize the letters sent to managers
of domestic and foreign rms, respectively. And after a while phone calls
were made with those managers asking them for interviews. We o¤ered two
types of interviews: personal and by phone, since some key actors were not
able to take the time to give personal interviews.
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2. Interview results with Swiss and foreign rms
This section makes use of a sample of 43 rms operating in Switzerland,
divided into 30 domestic rms and 13 majority-owned foreign a¢ liates of di-
verse industries from manufacturing and services/construction.3 Individual
rm information is derived from interviews we made with managers of such
rms. The response rates were 50% for domestic rms and 57% for foreign
rms, which is quite satisfactory in view of the reluctance of rms to reveal
data considered as condential and also the irrelevance of the topic for some
of them. Our interviews with managers of enterprises suggest that all of
our hypotheses are prevalent to Switzerland. Results from these interviews
are grouped into the following points. The rst four points are drawn from
interviews with managers of foreign rms and the rest analyzes those held
with domestic rms:
(i) The main motives of foreign MNCs for setting up a¢ liates or acquir-
ing existing domestic rms in Switzerland are: 1) to seek new competitive
markets since the Swiss environment is characterized as competitive in many
industries; 2) Switzerland is in the center of Europe and it is easy to use its
high quality infrastructure to quickly reach any other European country; and
3) to acquire additional assets which protect or augment their existing cre-
ated assets in some way; this attitude is markedly observed in sectors such
as banking, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals where Swiss rms are highly
competitive using state-of-the-art technologies.
(ii) Foreign rms are active in training domestic employees; they pro-
vide di¤erent kinds of training which can be on-the-job training or training
courses in Switzerland or abroad. Those courses could be summarized as
follows: 1) the basic course for any new domestic employees makes them
familiar with the rms policies, its structure and the work environment; 2)
technical training directed towards enhancing the technical expertise of the
employees in some specic rms technology; and 3) management training,
noting that managers are in some cases expatriated from parent companies.
Dr. Ravi Yellepeddi, Technical Director, XRF & XRD, of the scientic
instruments division for Thermo Electron SA states that "95% of the em-
ployees are domestic, the rm expatriates only a few employees, namely in
the eld of accounting and controlling, in order to bring the MNCsactiv-
ities under common control. Thermo Electron spends a large amount on
di¤erent forms of training, rst courses for every new employee, general
(such as organizational, managerial or marketing skills) and rm-specic
technology-courses per responsibility, in the a¢ liate and abroad".
In addition, according to the data, foreign rms give high salaries for
domestic employees even for unskilled ones.
3Those industries consist on pharmaceuticals, chemicals, medical instruments, ma-
chinery, tobacco, printing and publishing, wood products, beverage, electrical machinery,
computer and o¢ ce equipments, trading and maintenance of motor vehicles, transport,
construction, computer services, insurance, banking, R&D institutions, wholesale trade,
and other business services.
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(iii) For Swissemployees, we recognize that the social dimension is of
great importance in order to preserve their position in the rm, in the sense
that they may leave the foreign a¢ liate to join an existing domestic rm so
as to get better work conditions for the same salary or even for a slightly
less.
(iv) Most foreign rms in Switzerland are engaged in R&D and have
their own laboratories, but also in some cases they do import technologies
consisting mostly of complementary technologies from mother companies to
improve their technological development.
(v) In terms of domestic rms, most of them argue that the entry and the
presence of foreign counterparts are benecial in the sense that they stim-
ulate their productivity development in many ways. For industries such as
insurance, chemicals, medical instruments, and electrical machinery, produc-
tivity enhancement of domestic rms mainly results from their interaction
with foreign counterparts, inducing them to use their existing technology
more e¢ ciently by learning within its existing line of technological develop-
ment. Domestic rms in such industries do not need to learn from foreign
technologies to increase their productivity since, as shown in the previous
chapter, they perform as much as foreign counterparts. Moreover, such rms
are generally on the alert, trying to constantly observe what foreign rms
do. Mr. Michel Segesser, Vice President and Head HR Business Support
of Winterthur insurance claims that "foreign presence is important to keep
e¢ ciency, in that the market becomes more dynamic and then each actor
(domestic and foreign rms) has to improve its position by upgrading its
technological and market capacities. Particularly for Winterthur insurance,
competition with foreign rms motivates the technological upgrading of the
rm and o¤ers the opportunity to evaluate its capacities".
(vi) However, to face foreign competition and maintain their position in
the market, domestic rms from industries such as machinery and computer
and o¢ ce equipment, qualied as a mid-technological level group, attempt to
improve their technological competence by learning the best foreign knowl-
edge. They attend lunches with foreign and other domestic rms operating
at di¤erent levels of technology to exchange information. They try to recog-
nize valuable new knowledge and integrate it into their technological process
in order to reduce ine¢ ciency by observing product innovation, new man-
agement techniques, etc. when foreign rms demonstrate their advanced
technologies.
Obviously, sine local businesses come into contact with existing users,
information about the best technology is di¤used and imitation levels in-
crease. However, the results show that domestic rms do not just imitate
foreign knowledge, they also invest in their own R&D to make their private
adjustments and so progress and not by simply following.
(vii) Besides, there exist domestic rms prefer to get hold of information
about new techniques and methods not only through observing what others
do, but also by trying to acquire technological know-how via the acquisition
of human capital. For example, domestic rms that are far behind the tech-
nological frontier in industries such as trading and maintenance of motor
129
Chapter 8. Empirical evidence: interview analysis
vehicles, beverage, computer services, and other business services provide
some evidence for productivity development by the use of foreign knowledge
embedded in "MNCslabor". They gain a lot from the international expe-
rience of these employees. This is not surprising in a way, given the nding
in the previous section that foreign rms in, for example, computer services
and other business services seem to spend a large amount on training with
a relatively high quality of labor.
Moreover, some domestic rms claim that recruiting "MNCslabor" is
too di¢ cult regarding the cost and the availability of the valuable employees.
In wine industry for example such labor is not available on the Swiss market
since foreign MNCs in this industry keep both innovative and productive
activities in the origin country while their a¢ liates in Switzerland are only
responsible for selling the product. So, to get in touch with foreign knowl-
edge some domestic rms invest in training their employees within foreign
rms abroad.
It is worthy to note in addition that the technique of recruiting "MNCs
labor" seems to have not been used by domestic rms in industries using
traditional technologies such as construction; these are instead satised by
simply observing what foreign rms do.
(viii) A great number of the head managers of domestic rms have
gained experience in the foreign counterparts within either the a¢ liates or
the mother companies.
(ix) Finally, it seems that the geographical dimension plays an important
role in the productivity enhancement of domestic rms, especially for mid
and low technology rms, in that the proximity of foreign rms to domestic
counterparts allows for a better transfer of foreign technologies with less cost;
for example, it becomes easier to go to meetings and lunches. Nonetheless,
as asserted by key actors of rms from machinery and computer services, if
domestic rms are still not able to get access to the best foreign technology,
the pressure of the foreign competition together with geographical proximity
hinder their development process since those rms are not in a position to
compete ercely with foreign counterparts.
3. Conclusions
In this thesis we attempt to o¤er a more comprehensive picture of FDI
intra-industry spillovers by distinguishing these e¤ects according to their
diverse channels. We assume that the size and the extent of such spillovers
depend largely upon the interaction between the mechanisms by which they
occur and the technological levels of domestic rms. And regional prox-
imity is an important element in determining the size and the extent of
spillovers. Our hypotheses are tested against the empirical evidence for the
Swiss economy using qualitative and quantitative data analyses .
Chapter 8 has discussed a number of interviews made with managers
of domestic and foreign rms established in Switzerland and characterized
by various technological capabilities. We nd that all of our hypotheses are
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prevalent in Switzerland, a country in which high and mid technology rms
tend to benet a lot from, respectively, competition and demonstration ef-
fects; while low technology rms which are not able to benet from foreign
a¢ liates via demonstration e¤ects alone manage to reap benets via the
recruitment of the MNCshuman capital since this channel provides some
assistance which can help them to successfully imitate the best foreign tech-
nology. Interview results also show that geographical proximity is of great
importance for spillovers, especially for mid and low technology domestic
rms.
However, the scant empirical evidence available in this chapter does not
allow for the measurement of the size and the extent of spillovers; so addi-
tional quantitative analyses would help to make this kind of measurement
(chapter 9).
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CHAPTER 9
Empirical evidence: regression analysis
In the previous chapter we empirically analyzed the spillover e¤ects of
FDI based on a number of interviews made with managers of domestic and
foreign rms in Switzerland. We found that the interview results seem to
support the hypotheses of the thesis in which high and mid technology rms
tend to benet a lot from competition and/or demonstration e¤ects; while
low technology rms which are not able to benet from foreign a¢ liates via
demonstration e¤ects alone, manage to reap the benets via the recruitment
of the MNCshuman capital. The results also demonstrate that geographical
dimension matters for spillovers in Switzerland.
However, as mentioned before, interview analysis does not allow for the
measurement of the size and the extent of spillovers. Obviously, further
quantitative analysis would help to make this kind of measurement. This
chapter attempts to test for spillovers from FDI using rm-level data from
both manufacturing and services/construction1 industries in Switzerland.2
Particularly, our attention is focused on testing the size and the extent of
intra-industry spillovers according to the mechanisms by which they occur,
the levels of technological capacity of domestic rms expressed in terms
of technology gaps, and the levels of their learning and investment e¤orts
undertaken to absorb foreign knowledge.3 We also test whether spillovers in
Switzerland are regional.
The data for econometric analysis is derived from innovation activity
surveys (2002 and 2005) of manufacturing and services/construction rms,
with at least 5 employees, conducted at the KOF institute. The regression
analyses make use of a sample of only 657 rms, 370 in manufacturing and
287 in services/construction, because of missing data for some variables
when matching the two data sets from the 2002 and 2005 surveys.
Our regression ndings seem to conrm to a large extent the interview re-
sults, in which we nd that domestic rms with a high technological capacity
appear to benet from spillovers which are basically from the FDI height-
ening competition. Mid technology rms benet a lot from demonstration
e¤ects, while low technology rms which are not able to benet from foreign
1This study tries to bridge the gap by testing the presence and the extent of spillovers
for service/construction industry since there is hardly any of this aspect.
2We have to note that future work aiming at testing for reverse spillovers could also
be interesting since in some industries MNCs set up a¢ liates in Switzerland to be able to
learn from the best Swiss technologies.
3Doing so, we make use of a thorough measure of domestic absorptive capacity in
which the learning and investment e¤orts of domestic rms come with their existing tech-
nological capacities.
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a¢ liates via demonstration e¤ects alone manage to reap spillover benets
via the recruitment of the MNCslabor which can help them to successfully
imitate foreign knowledge. Regression results also demonstrate that only the
rms that largely invest in the absorptive capacity benet from spillovers
which mainly result from the technology transfer. In addition our ndings
conrm that regional dimension matters for spillovers in Switzerland. Our
empirical results are found to be more consistent in manufacturing than
services/construction.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Following this introduction,
section 1 presents the econometric model, section 2 presents the estimation
results, and section 3 concludes the empirical ndings and o¤ers some policy
prescriptions.
1. Econometric model
We model the e¤ects of FDI intra-industry spillovers within the context
of a production function,4 in which the change in the natural log value-added
of the i-th domestic rm is determined as follows:
LnYi;j = 0 + 1LnKi;j + 2LnLi;j + 3FPj + 4HCi;j
+ 5FPj HCi;j + 6Compi;j + 7 Si zei;j
+ 9Industryj + "i;j, (1.1)
where the subscripts i and j denote rm and industry,  represents changes
in the variables between 2001 and 2004, and 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8
and 9 the parameters to be estimated. Table 9.1 describes the variables
and their measurements.
Y denotes value-added at rm level, K its physical capital, L its em-
ployment, and HC the level of its human capital. The coe¢ cients of those
variables are expected to be positive and signicant. Si ze, dened by the
sales of rm i, is expected to increase productivity since larger sized rms
may be more e¢ cient (Dimelis and Louri, 2002). The inclusion of industry
dummies,5 Industry, in equation (1.1) and the use of changes over time
control for industry-specic productivity di¤erences; they correct for the
omission of unobservable variables that might undermine the relationship
between spillover variables and the productivity growth of domestic rms
(Aitken and Harrison, 1999 and Narula and Marin, 2003).
To assess the overall spillover e¤ects of foreign rms on domestic com-
petitors, we employ three di¤erent control variables with respect to three
possible intra-industry spillover mechanisms: rst, the main e¤ect6 of the
4The derivation of this model is explained in appendix 7.
5There are 32 industry dummies accounted for manufacturing and 19 dummies for
services/construction.
6It is also called the average e¤ect (Aiken and West, 1991) since it denotes the e¤ects of
the FP on domestic productivity at the mean of HC as those variables used for interaction
are centered (more details are given in the table footnotes of appendix 8)
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Table 9.1. Variable denitions
Variables Denitions
LnY i;j The log change in value-added at the rm level.
LnKi;j The log change in physical capital, measured by gross
capital income rm level.
LnLi;j The log change in total number of employees in a rm.
FP j The share of total sales in an industry j accounted for by
foreign rms.
FP j;r The share of total sales in an industry j within the region
r accounted for by foreign rms, r = 1...R, with R = 7.
FP j;R r The share of total sales in an industry j outside the region
r accounted for by foreign rms.
HCi;j The average labor cost of the rm (in 100000 CHF)
constructed as the ratio of the rms labor costs to the
number of employees.
Compi;j The change in price markup at rm level measured by
the di¤erence between rms total sales and costs over
total sales.
Si zeij The log total sales of the rm.
GAP i;j The ratio of the average labour productivity of foreign-
owned rms to domestic rms own labor productivity,
calculated for 2001.
INV EST i;j The level of investment expenditures in new equipment
and training activities for product/process innovation,
within the period 2002-2004.
share of foreign presence at the four-digit industry level,7 FP ,8 reects
spillovers from demonstration e¤ects, resulting from the technology transfer
that occurs from the direct contact between local agents and foreign a¢ l-
iates operating at di¤erent levels of technology (Ben Hamida and Gugler,
2006).
Second, the interaction term FP HC between foreign presence and hu-
man capital is assumed to determine the e¤ect of worker mobility related to
the presence of foreign rms in the domestic market. In fact, this interaction
assesses the combined e¤ect of those variables on the productivity of domes-
tic rms; that is the inuence of foreign rms would be co-determined by the
level of human capital of the domestic rms. It is argued that human capi-
tal increases the ability of domestic rms to benet from positive spillovers
(Borensztein et al., 1998 and Meyer and sinani, 2001) the sign of the in-
teraction e¤ect is then expected to be positive. Moreover, the technique
of upgrading the level of the rms human capital depends on its existing
7We make use of the maximum available disaggregation industry level to be able to
e¤ectively assess the intra-industry spillover benets.
8Note that at this stage we do not take ino consideration the e¤ect of the regional
dimension on spillovers and instead assume that spillover e¤ects dissipate through the
whole industry, regardless of location.
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technological level. On the one hand, relatively high technology rms at-
tempt to benet from spillovers through demonstration and/or competition
e¤ects (Mody, 1989). Thus, the ability of such rms to either absorb for-
eign technology or pursue independent lines of technological development,
associated with the quality level of human capital, would be largely deter-
mined by the amount these rms spend on training their existing employees
and/or the new ones so as to acquire the specic techniques required ei-
ther for the implementation of foreign knowledge or for the development of
the existing one. On the other hand, small technology rms are not able
to benet from foreign a¢ liates via demonstration e¤ects alone as they do
not possess a su¢ cient level of human capital to allow them to e¢ ciently
exploit the foreign technological opportunities, rather they gain a lot from
worker mobility, since this channel provides a (technical, managerial, etc.)
assistance which can help them to better understand and implement foreign
technology (Ben Hamida, 2006a). For that, to upgrade their level of human
capital and then be able to properly use the best foreign technology, these
rms tend to invest in recruiting domestic employees already trained by or
having worked in foreign rms by giving them higher salaries than foreign
rms do9 it is assumed that when leaving the MNCs these employees will
take with them some or all of the rms specic knowledge (Blomström and
Kokko, 2002). Note that tables 7.5 and 7.7 in chapter 7 describe the rela-
tive technological position of foreign versus domestic rms in 2001 and 2004
and their relative contribution to the development of human capital in 2004,
respectively. We nd that many relatively small technology rms in 2001,
which spend as much as or even more than foreign rms on labor costs, expe-
rience in 2004 an increasing level of their technological development.10 This
could be explained by the fact that these rms have succeeded in attracting
skilled domestic employees working in foreign rms, qualied as appropriate
to their productivity enhancement.
Third, regarding competition-related spillovers, we use price markup
or the so-called Lerner index as a measure of competition the di¤erence
between the rms price (p) and its marginal cost (mc) over its total price.
Lerner Index measures the degree to which rms can markup prices above
marginal cost; the larger the Lerner index, the greater the power of the
monopolist. The Lerner index is also known as the Market Power index
(Baye, 2006) as it describes the power a rm has within a market; e.g. a
monopoly has the power to set high di¤erences (p - mc) and so will have
a high Lerner Index, while, in a highly competitive market, each rm will
have a tight value of (p - mc) and low Lerner index.
Unfortunately the data sets available do not allow for the rms price
and marginal cost information. So, following Narula and Marin (2003) and
Chung (2001) we use the di¤erence between the rms sales and its costs
over its total sales as a measure of the rms price markup. When markup
is high, a value near 1, competition is low. While, when markup is low, a
9As noted in part 2 of the thesis, foreign a¢ liates are unlikely to be mute spectators
since their employees move to domestic competitors taking with them their secrets.
10Domestic rms of industries such as computer services and watches succeeded in
catching-up with foreign rivals.
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value near 0, competition is high.11 since competition-related spillovers are
associated with the increase in the level of competition that occurs as a result
of foreign entry and presence, it seems more appropriate to use the change
in markup to measure the change in the level of competition. A negative
coe¢ cient estimate attracted by the change in markup is consistent with
the expectation that decreased markup (increased competition) is followed
by a productivity increase.
To test our hypotheses, in which the size and the extent of spillover
e¤ects may vary according to the diverse levels of technology capacity of
domestic rms and their absorptive capacity with respect to learning and
investment e¤orts, we proceed to make various tests using equation (1.1).
As a rst step, we divide our full sample of domestic rms into three sub-
samples characterized by the size of their existing technological capacities
and estimate equation (1.1) separately for domestic rms with high, mid,
and small technological capabilities. The existing technological capacities of
domestic rms are measured by their technology gaps, GAP , compared to
their foreign counterparts. GAP is dened as the ratio of the average labour
productivity of foreign-owned rms in the relevant four-digit industry to a
domestic rms own labor productivity, calculated for 2001. Hence, GAP is
equal to one if domestic rms operating at the same labour productivity as
the average of their foreign counterparts. Values that are smaller than or
equal to one the technological frontier of the industry are interpreted as
signs of small productivity gaps. Values which are higher than one but not
far behind the technological frontier of the industry are interpreted as signs
of mid productivity gaps, and those which are far behind the technological
frontier characterize high productivity gaps. We expect to nd stronger signs
of competition-related spillovers in the sub-sample with small technology
gaps, whereas demonstration- and worker mobility-related benets tend to
take place in sub-samples with mid and high technology gaps, respectively.
As a second step, we divide the full sample into two sub-samples accord-
ing to the investment level of domestic rms, INV EST , in the absorptive
capacity. INV EST is measured by the level of investment expenditures
in new equipment and training activities for product/process innovation,
within the period 2002-2004. We expect that only domestic rms which
largely invest in absorptive capacities benet from FDI spillovers.
It is argued in previous chapters that geographic proximity is an im-
portant element in determining the size and the extent of spillovers. In
fact, given that labor turnover and imitation are among the more important
channels for spillovers, domestic rms that are located near foreign rms
may be more likely to benet than other more distant rms since knowledge
is generated and transmitted more e¢ ciently via local proximity and its
transmission costs are assumed to increase with distance (Audretsch 1998).
Then spillover benets are highly likely to materialize in locations where do-
mestic rms are close to their foreign counterparts (argument advanced by
Aitken and Harrison in 1999) in this case, spillovers are called regional
11Note that in some cases a higher markup may be due to industry specicities such
as, for example, in the luxury industry (Narula and Marin, 2003).
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in scale.12 Following Aitken and Harrison, in order to test for the regional
dimension, we include in the specication above (equation (1.1)) both the
regional foreign share and that from outside the region rather than sectorial
foreign share. Regional foreign share is measured by the share of sales in an
industry within a region employed by foreign rms. The regions considered
here are the same as in chapter 7: the Lemanic region, Mittelland space,
North West Switzerland, Zurich, Western Switzerland, Central Switzerland,
and Ticino.
As some foreign rms could be attracted to regions which benet from
agglomeration economies (Aitken and Harrison, 1999), we include in equa-
tion (1.1) seven regional dummies to account for agglomeration e¤ects that
may result in an upward bias of a region-specic spillover coe¢ cient.13
We test for the equality of coe¢ cients across sub-samples using Chow-
tests. All results are robust and refer to OLS estimations of equation (1.1).
2. Regression results
Regression estimates, tables 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 in appendix 8 show the
results of the spillover tests, at both the sectorial and the regional levels, for
Swiss manufacturing and services/construction rms regarding GAP and
INV EST , respectively.
2.1. Spillovers at sectorial level. Columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 in tables 9.2
and 9.4 and columns 1, 3, and 4 in tables 9.3 and 9.5 are conned to spillover
tests at the sectorial level. The value-added of the rms in Switzerland for
the full samples increases with changes in the employment and the human
capital of domestic rms, in which manufacturing rms appear more sensi-
tive than services/construction ones. However, as expected, the estimated
coe¢ cient of the variable FP is positive but insignicant signicantly neg-
ative in column 1 of table 9.4, showing that foreign presence does not have
any e¤ect on the productivity growth of domestic rms; so on average there
is no evidence of technological spillovers from demonstration e¤ects. The
interaction term between FP and HC is also insignicant for both manu-
facturing and services/construction, indicating that the full sample data has
not demonstrated that the change in response with FP depends on the level
of human capital. Similarly, the increase in Competition seems to impede
the productivity growth of domestic rms since the Comp estimate is per-
sistently positive and highly signicant only in column 1 of table 9.5 is the
Comp coe¢ cient negative but not signicantly so. And the physical capi-
tal and Si ze do not signicantly a¤ect the productivity change of domestic
rms except in services/construction where the LnK estimate appears to
12The data available allows only for testing the role of the regional dimension in
determining the size of spillovers arising from the technology transfer process. To make
such test for the competition-related spillovers, we would need additional information,
particularly those related to the type of the rms product.
13The industry dummies are also taken into account when testing for regional spillover
e¤ects. Due to missing data, the number is reduced to 23 dummies for manufacturing and
13 for services/construction.
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be positive and highly signicant (see column 1 of tables 9.4 and 9.5), and
the Si ze coe¢ cient is positive and signicant only in column 1 of table 9.4.
In column 3, 4, and 5 of tables 9.2 and 9.3, we have proceeded to divide
the samples of manufacturing and services/construction, respectively, into
three sub-samples characterized by the values for the variable GAP . The
results for manufacturing rms suggest that the estimated coe¢ cients of
FP and FP  HC are only positive and signicant in the sub-samples of
rms with mid and large technology gaps when GAP is greater than one.
Both kinds of rms manage to fully exploit the technological opportunities
arising from their direct contact with foreign rms demonstration-related
spillovers. The size of such benets is 0.009 for mid technology rms while
0.005 for low technology ones, implying that an increase in the share of
foreign investment from 0 to 10 percent leads to as much as 0.05 percent-
point increase in domestic productivity of the low-level group and about
twice that for the mid-level group.14 Mid and low technology rms also gain
benets from FDI by investing in human capital; the amount these rms
spend on training their existing employees and/or the new ones appears to be
of great importance for the successful implementation of foreign knowledge.
The positive and signicant interaction the e¤ects of FP with HC indicate
that the e¤ect of foreign rms is broadly co-determined by the level of human
capital of the domestic rms this nding conrms the strong association
between FDI e¤ects and the level of domestic human capital. Moreover, as
we have mentioned in the previous section, domestic rms and especially low
technology ones tend to upgrade their level of human capital by recruiting
domestic employees already trained by or having worked in foreign rms. By
doing so, low technology rms may get hold of some personnel assistance,
essential to be able to decode and e¤ectively use the best foreign technology.
In this respect, the positive and highly signicant interaction e¤ect of FP
with HC  column 5 of table 9.2  could be a sign of worker mobility-
related spillovers. This result seems consistent with Ben Hamidas (2006a)
theoretical analysis.
The estimated coe¢ cient of Comp is negative and signicant only for
the sub-sample of domestic rms with small technology gaps, suggesting
that heightened competition (decreased markup) is followed by a produc-
tivity increase  the sub-samples of mid and low technology rms do not
benet from the competition-related spillovers since Comp is signicantly
positive there. The estimated coe¢ cients of FP and FP HC are insignif-
icant for the high technology manufacturing rms. This is not surprising
given that the high technology rms do not need to learn from foreign tech-
nologies to increase their productivity since they perform as much as or even
better than their foreign counterparts in the industry. Instead, we nd that
these rms gain benet from FDI via competition e¤ects; the competitive
pressure generated by the presence of foreign rms induces them to more
14Compared to Ben Hamida and Guglers (2006) regression results of demonstration-
related spillovers for manufacturing, the e¤ect of FP in 2001 on the productivity change
of mid technological rms between 2001 and 2004 is smaller than that of 1998 on the
change between 1998 and 2001.
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e¢ ciently use their existing technology by learning within their existing line
of technological development.
The estimated coe¢ cients of HC are positive and signicant for all sub-
samples, with larger e¤ects in the mid and low technology rms. This can
be explained by the fact that these kinds of rms invest substantially in
upgrading their human capital to fully exploit the technological opportuni-
ties arising from foreign presence; in turn this investment e¤ort has a great
impact on their productivity growth.
The results for services/construction seem to be very similar to those for
manufacturing. Nonetheless, there exist some di¤erences mainly with regard
to the interaction e¤ect between FP and HC for the sub-sample of large
technology gap rms. In this case, the corresponding estimate is negative
and signicant, indicating a negative association between FDI e¤ects and
the level of domestic human capital, and hence no evidence of spillovers from
worker mobility. This can be explained by the fact that the amount that low
technology services/construction rms spent on human capital might not be
su¢ cient or the quality of their human capital might not be good enough to
successfully exploit foreign technological opportunities; also it might be that
foreign rms succeeded in keeping their employees or that worker mobility-
related spillovers are regional. Other di¤erences appear with regards to
the estimated coe¢ cients of FP and FP  HC for high technology ser-
vices/construction rms, which are, in this case, insignicantly negative and
signicantly positive, respectively. The negative e¤ect of the FP coe¢ cient
may be the result of a reverse-spilling-over process, wherein foreign rms
that is no longer competitive try to acquire the best domestic technology
via demonstration. Meanwhile, the positive interaction e¤ect denotes that
besides competition-related spillovers high technology services/construction
rms appear to benet from foreign presence by investing in human capital.
It is argued that the technology in the service sector is much more embedded
in human capital than in machinery and equipment and so, it is expected to
be highly specic to the originating rm and largely tacit in nature. Given
that human capital is of extreme importance in the services/construction
industry, even high technology rms might invest in recruiting, for example,
top-level domestic managers of foreign a¢ liates, considered as important for
their productivity improvement.
Columns 3 and 4 of tables 9.3, and 9.5 report the results of spillovers
according to the level of the absorptive capacity in terms of learning and
investment e¤orts for manufacturing and services/construction rms, re-
spectively. Estimated coe¢ cients of both FP and FP  HC are positive
and signicant only for high-INV EST sub-samples, indicating that only
domestic rms which highly invest in the absorption of foreign knowledge
have more e¢ ciently internalized FDI spillovers from technology transfer;15
15This result seems consistent with Narula and Marin (2003)s analysis.
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the size of spillovers is larger for services/construction than for manufactur-
ing.16 The estimated coe¢ cients of Comp for high-INV EST sub-samples
are signicantly positive for manufacturing and insignicantly negative for
services/construction, suggesting that there is no evidence for competition-
related spillovers. Moreover, domestic rms which invest little in the absorp-
tive capacity are not capable of reaping prots via any of the spillover chan-
nels. Our ndings conrm the importance of the investment and training
e¤orts of domestic rms in productively absorbing foreign knowledge occur-
ring from demonstration e¤ects and worker mobility. Both channels require
high investment levels to be able to e¢ ciently use the best foreign technology
once having introduced it into their existing technological process.
2.2. Spillovers at the regional level. Regarding the role of the re-
gional dimension on spillover e¤ects, columns 2, 6, 7, and 8 in tables 9.2
and 9.4 and columns 2, 5, and 6 in tables 9.3 and 9.5 report the spillover
results at both the regional level and from outside the region. Compared
with the regression results for the full sample of manufacturing and ser-
vices/construction, wherein spillovers do not seem to occur at the industrial
level, column 2 reports di¤erent results in which the coe¢ cients of FP and
FP HC become positive and signicant at the regional level and remain
insignicant and even signicantly negative outside the region. Yet, the
Comp estimates remain positive and signicant. Then the results conrm
that spillovers seem to have a regional dimension. Domestic rms gain from
the presence of foreign rms in their region, but loose out if the rms are
located in di¤erent regions. This benet seems to be only in the form of tech-
nology transfer. There is still no evidence for competition-related spillovers
all the rms are taken together. The coe¢ cients of HC and LnL remain
positive and signicant, suggesting that the change in human capital and
employment levels of domestic rms is broadly associated with productiv-
ity increase. The LnK estimate remains positive and highly signicant
only for services/construction while Si ze becomes positive and signicant
in column 2 of table 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5.
As for the three sub-samples characterized by the values for the variable
GAP , the FP at the regional level "FPj;r" remains positive and signicant
for all the sub-samples except for the small technology services/construction
rms, with mid technology rms experiencing the larger regional demonstration-
related spillover e¤ects. In sharp contrast, the FP outside the region "FPj;R r"
is not signicant for all the sub-samples except for the mid technology man-
ufacturing rms which appear to benet also from outside their region 
such benet is by far smaller than that of FPj;r. This indicates that the in-
dustrial demonstration-related spillover benets previously reported for mid
and low gap groups are mainly the outcome of regional e¤ects.17 Besides
16It is worth noting that Ben Hamida and Guglers (2006) results of the FDI ef-
fects of 1998 on the productivity change between 1998 and 2001 were not consistent for
services/construction rms.
17It is worthy to note that the size of regional demonstration-related spillovers do not
seem to be larger than that at the industrial level.
141
Chapter 9. Empirical evidence: regression analysis
the positive e¤ects of FPj;r, mid technology services/construction rms ap-
pear to succeed in reaping spillover benets from the interaction between
FPj;R r and HC;18 this implies that those rms do not benet from outside
FP unless they upgrade their human capital level this kind of interaction
does not seem to have any signicantly positive e¤ects for other groups of
rms. The estimated coe¢ cients of FPj;rHC are signicantly positive only
for the high gap rmssub-samples and the small gap services/construction
rms, indicating that for such kinds of rms the combined e¤ect of these
variables contribute to a productivity increase. For low technology rms,
the size of such an interaction e¤ect is larger than that of FPj;r, suggesting
that the inuence of regional FDI on the productivity development of these
rms is broadly co-determined by the level of their human capital  this
could be evidence for worker mobility-related spillovers. Low technology
rms do not seem to benet from foreign rms located outside their re-
gion, since as we have mentioned before neither FPj;R r nor FPj;R r HC
are signicantly positive. Given that, we can conclude that the industrial
spillover benets gained through the mechanism of worker mobility are also
for the most part the outcome of regional e¤ects. Indeed, even low tech-
nology services/construction rms which seem to not benet from worker
mobility-related spillovers at industry level appear to gain a lot from these
kinds of e¤ects at regional level.
As for Comp, it remains negative and signicant for small gap rms;
mid and large gap rms do not seem to benet from competition-related
spillovers. in the opposition to the industrial level, high technology rms
appear to also gain benets from spillovers from technology transfer since
FPj;r and FPj;r HC are positive and signicant these benets are much
smaller than that of Comp.
In columns 5 and 6 in tables 9.3 and 9.5 we report the results of spillover
e¤ects at the regional level for the sub-samples characterized by the val-
ues for the variable INV EST . Only domestic rms which have highly
invested in the absorption capacity gain benets from spillovers. Such ben-
ets are mainly regional and result from technology transfer manufactur-
ing rms seem to also gain spillover benets from outside the region since
FPj;R r is signicantly positive.19 Comp does not appear to have any
positive spillover e¤ects on the productivity increase in manufacturing and
services/construction.
Finally, it is worthy to note that the Chow tests soundly support our divi-
sions at industrial and regional levels (with respect to GAP and INV EST )
of both manufacturing and services/construction samples.
3. Concluding comments
In part 2 we developed a theoretical model for spillovers distinguishing
these e¤ects according to their diverse channels. We recognized that domes-
tic technological characteristics inuence spillover benets, and we argued
18Such benet is also by far smaller than that of FPj;r.
19Note that the benet from outside the region is smaller than that of FPj;r.
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that the size and the extent of this benet depend largely upon the inter-
action between the mechanisms by which they occur and the technological
levels of domestic rms. And we assumed that regional proximity matters
for spillovers.
Our theoretical hypotheses are tested against empirical evidence for
Switzerland. Chapter 8 contained our analysis of interviews conducted with
foreign and domestic rms operating in Switzerland, while this chapter fo-
cused on testing econometrically the e¤ects of spillovers at industrial and
regional levels according to their channels and to the level of the absorptive
capability of domestic rms.
Based on samples of Swiss manufacturing and services/construction rms,
we show that it is important to disentangle the spillover e¤ects of technol-
ogy transfer from that of competition increase by employing technology and
competition control variables, and to distinguish between technology trans-
fer from demonstration and that from worker mobility. Also taking into
account a thorough measure of absorptive capacity, wherein the level of
technological capacity of the domestic rms is associated with their invest-
ment e¤orts in their absorptive capability appears to be highly signicant,
when evaluating productivity spillovers generated from FDI.
In fact, taking all the rms together, the results do not report signicant
evidence for spillover benets via any spillover channel, either for manufac-
turing or for services/construction. However, looking separately at three
sub-samples of rms characterized by the size of the technology gap between
domestic and foreign rms, yields di¤erent results. We nd that domestic
rms with high technological capacity appear to benet from spillovers from
FDI heightening competition, while mid technology rms benet a lot from
demonstration e¤ects. Yet, low technology rms which are not able to ben-
et from foreign a¢ liates via demonstration e¤ects alone, manage to reap
the spillover benets via the recruitment of the MNCslabor that can help
them to successfully imitate foreign knowledge. The regression results are
found to be more consistent in manufacturing than services/construction.
Furthermore, when taking into account the investment level of domestic
rms in their absorptive capacity, we nd evidence for positive spillovers
only in the sub-sample of rms with relatively high INV EST level. This
benet results from the FDI technology transfer. Spillovers, however, nega-
tively a¤ect the productivity of domestic rms which do not actively engage
in investment and learning to be able to absorb foreign knowledge. Our
ndings also demonstrate that the regional dimension matters for spillovers
in Switzerland.
To sum up, our empirical ndings (chapters 8 and 9) consider that FDI
promotion measures should take into account that potential spillovers re-
quire a su¢ cient level of human capital for domestic rms, especially for mid
and low gap rms, to be able to e¢ ciently use foreign knowledge. Robin-
son and Schweizer (2006), looking at measures for the Swiss government
to take to improve attractiveness, identify the development of training and
education as well as the simplication of administrative procedures as the
strongest suggestions.
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Like our theoretical ndings, our empirical analysis goes along with many
scholars proposals (such as Blomström and Kokko, 2001 and Meyer and
Sinani, 2004) that support learning and investment in domestic rms as a
necessary condition for maximizing the technological spillovers from inward
FDI. And foreign rms might be established near their domestic counter-
parts, in particular mid and low "services/construction" technology rms, in
order to better absorb foreign resources and then upgrade their technological
competitiveness.
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As previously noted, the present study attempts to contribute to the
literature on MNCs e¤ects and tends to propose some components for a
research agenda on intra-industry spillovers for host countries. Unlike exist-
ing studies, it calls upon a detailed analysis of these e¤ects according to the
mechanisms by which they occur (viz. demonstration e¤ects, competition
e¤ects, and worker mobility). Relatedly, it suggests that the size and the
extent of spillovers depend largely upon the interaction between the mech-
anisms by which they occur and the technological capacities of domestic
rms. In addition, our study makes use of a thorough measure of domestic
absorptive capacity in which the learning and investment e¤orts of domestic
rms come with their existing technological capacities; an argument disre-
garded by existing empirical studies except Narula and Marin (2003). And,
in line with Audretsch (1998) and Aitken and Harrison (1999) it argues that
geographical proximity is also an important element in determining the size
and the extent of spillover e¤ects.
On the basis of these hypotheses, this study o¤ers a more complete
picture of intra-industry spillovers at both the theoretical and the empirical
levels.
With regards to our theoretical contribution, we develop an evolutionary
model which suggests that the e¤ects of foreign presence on the productivity
development of domestic rms in terms of spillovers is likely to vary accord-
ing to a number of indicators, namely, spillover channels, local technological
characteristics, and geographical proximity. In this respect, spillovers are
determined by the interaction between the channels by which they occur
and the technological characteristics of the recipient host rms. And geo-
graphical proximity is an important element in determining the size and the
extent of spillovers. The simulation results seem to conrm the hypotheses,
in which high and mid technology rms benet a lot from, respectively, com-
petition and demonstration e¤ects, while low technology rms are not able
to benet from foreign a¢ liates via demonstration e¤ects alone, rather they
manage to reap this benet via the recruitment of the MNCshuman capital,
in that this channel provides some assistance which can help domestic rms
to imitate successfully. Simulation results also show that the size and the
extent of spillovers vary according to the mechanisms by which they occur;
spillovers via worker mobility for example are higher than through demon-
stration e¤ects. And the geographical dimension matters for spillovers in
that spillover benets are found to be more pronounced in locations where
domestic rms are close to their foreign a¢ liates.
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We test the theoretical ndings outlined above against empirical evi-
dence for Switzerland. The empirical evidence consists of, rstly, qualitative
analyses of data and interviews made with managers of foreign and domestic
rms established in Switzerland; and secondly, a regression analysis wherein
we test the size and the extent of spillovers at both the industrial and the re-
gional levels according to the mechanisms by which they occur, the levels of
the existing technological capacity of domestic rms, and the levels of their
learning and investment e¤orts in the absorptive capacity. The interviews
and regression analyses seem to conrm our hypotheses for Switzerland.
We nd that domestic rms with high technological capacity benet from
spillovers from the FDI competition e¤ects, while mid technology rms ben-
et a lot from demonstration e¤ects. And low technology rms which are not
able to benet from foreign a¢ liates via demonstration e¤ects alone, man-
age to reap the spillover benets via the recruitment of the MNCslabor,
which can help them to successfully imitate foreign knowledge. The regres-
sion results also demonstrate that only domestic rms that largely invest in
the absorptive capacity benet from spillovers, which mostly result from the
technology transfer. In addition our ndings conrm that the regional di-
mension is an important element in assessing spillovers in Switzerland. The
regression results are found to be more consistent in manufacturing than
services/construction.
Thus, it is clear from our simulation and empirical ndings that spillover
channels, domestic technological characteristics, and geographical proximity
between foreign and domestic rms determine FDI intra-industry spillover
e¤ects; and that systematic di¤erences between domestic rms should there-
fore be expected. That is we nd strong evidence that domestic rms, ac-
cording to their existing technological capacities, do not benet from FDI
intra-industry spillovers in the same way. In addition, the ability and the
motivation of domestic rms, especially mid and low gap rms, to engage in
learning and investment e¤orts to absorb foreign technologies and skills have
a great impact on spillovers. And foreign a¢ liates established in proximity
to domestic rms, in particular mid and low "services/construction" tech-
nology rms, are better able to absorb foreign resources and then upgrade
their technological competitiveness.
Inevitably this study has some limitations. Firstly, the data set available
for the analysis conducted in this study does not allow for a detail examina-
tion of the MNCsa¢ liatestechnological characteristics (mainly the type of
technology transferred abroad and the complexity level of this technology),
the MNCsmotives for foreign production, and the types of foreign owner-
ship as determinants of spillover e¤ects since these factors are also of great
importance to policy-makers in leveraging the potential benets of inward
FDI spillovers.20 Future studies aiming at exploring these features along
with domestic characteristics and spillover channels could be promising.
Secondly, since our study has concentrated on a detailed analysis of
spillover e¤ects from the MNCs a¢ liates to domestic rms, the reverse
20These factors have been analyzed in, among others, Kokko (1994), Kokko et al.
(2001), Dimelis and Louri (2002), Marin and Bell (2004), and Dri¢ eld and Love (2006a).
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e¤ects  from domestic rms to the MNCsa¢ liates have not been well
examined. As already emphasized by other authors (for example, Dri¢ eld
and Love 2006b, and Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers 2007), the test for
the reverse spillover e¤ects, especially for developed economies, could also
be interesting.21 As we have noted from the analysis of interviews with
managers of foreign rms (chapter 8), in some industries such as banking
and insurance MNCs set up a¢ liates in Switzerland to be able to learn from
the best Swiss technologies and hence we expect that foreign a¢ liates gain
benets from spillovers from Swiss-leaders.
Moreover, exploring other kinds of spillovers such as inter-industry and
market access spillovers could be also of a great importance, since it is ar-
gued that on the one hand, the commercial ties between MNCs a¢ liates and
either upstreamdomestic suppliers or downstreamdomestic customers
lead to a transfer of technical and commercial information to suppliers and
customers. And on the other hand, the foreign a¢ liatesown export oper-
ations may facilitate the entrance of domestic rms into the same markets.
To test for these kinds of spillovers, additional information is needed which
is not available from our data. For example, spillover e¤ects operating across
sectors requires a detailed analysis of the inter-industry relationships (input-
output matrices) to identify domestic customers and suppliers detailed in-
formation on the ow of commodities from production through intermediate
use by industries and purchases by ultimate customers so as to determine
the share of foreign a¢ liates in the output of both upstream and downstream
sectors.22
Finally, we suggest that it is also important for future research to analyze
the e¤ects of spillovers on the home countries of the MNCs, since there
is little empirical evidence on this aspect (Veugelers et al. 2005).23 For
example, R&D is one of the most interesting production stages of a rm
and MNCs prefer, under some conditions, to carry on part of their R&D
activities abroad. Particularly, Swiss MNCs are increasingly investing in
R&D abroad Arvanitis and Hollenstein (2006) nd that knowledge-seeking
FDI is among the main motives for Swiss MNCs that conduct R&D abroad;
in turn it is expected that some of the potential benets of such investment
would be to the home country. Blomström and Kokko (1998) claim that the
impact on the home country is likely to depend on what activities MNCs
concentrate on at home.
21Singh (2007), for example, nds no signicant knowledge inows from foreign MNCs
to host country organisations, but signicant outows back from the host country to
foreign MNCs.
22For empirical studies analyzing inter-industry spillovers see, among others, Javorcik
(2003), Chung et al. (2003), and Giroud (2007).
23More details on the home countrys spillover e¤ects from FDI are given in the
empirical papers of, among others, Globerman et al. (2000), Bitzer and Görg (2005), and
Vahter and Masso (2006).
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Appendix 1: The eclectic paradigm of
international production, Source: Dunning (1993)
Ownership-specic Internalization incentives Location specic
advantages advantages variables
- Property right and/or - Avoidance of search - Special distribution of
intangible asset advantages: and negotiating costs. natural and created resource
such as, product innovations, - To avoid costs of moral endowments and markets.
production management, hazard and adverse selection, - Input prices, quality and
organizational and marketing and to protect reputation of productivity.
systems, noncodiable internalizing rm. - International transport and
knowledge, etc. - Buyer uncertainty about communication costs.
- Advantages of common nature and value of inputs. - Investment incentives and
governance: 1) those that -When market does not permit disincentives.
branch plants of establishes price discrimination. - Articial barriers to trade
enterprises may enjoy over - Need of seller to protect quality in goods and services.
de novo rms. 2) which of intermediate or nal products. - Societal and infrastructure
specically arise because - To capture economies of provisions.
of multinationality. interdependent activities. - Cross-country ideological,
- To compensate for absence of language, cultural, business,
future markets. political, etc. di¤erences.
- To avoid or exploit government - Economic of centralization
intervention. of R&D production and
- To control supplies and marketing.
conditions of sale of inputs. - Economic system and policies
To control market outlets. of government.
- To be able to engage in
practices (cross-subsidization,
etc.) as a competitive strategy.
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Appendix 2: Derivation of the model of Fosfuri et
al. (2001)
More formally, the Model of Fosfuri et al. is represented in a game tree
(g. 1, page 209) which consists of two periods and includes a domestic rm
(d ) and a multinational (f) that has some technological advantages and
decides at time t = 0 whether to export (E) or to do FDI. When exporting,
the rm makes use of production facilities and trained workers located in
the home country. When investing in the host country, the MNC incurs a
xed cost G which includes all the expenses associated with operating in
an unfamiliar foreign environment and the training cost of local worker F
which is equal to zero for simplicity.
At time t = 1, Fosfuri et al. assume that production takes place, the
goods are sold and prots are realized. The MNC is considered a monopolist
(M) in the market in the rst period, because the domestic rm has no access
to its technology. If it exports, MNCs prot is N1EM (t)  t is the export
cost and N1the size of the market in period 1 and equals to 1. If it does
FDI, the prot is N1M with M > EM (t).
After production takes place, the domestic rm recognizes the possibility
of gaining access to foreign technology by hiring the trained worker. The
MNC tries to retain this worker to avoid the di¤usion of its technology. At
time t = 1
0
, the MNC decides once more whether to export or do FDI,
production then takes place and the second-period payo¤s are realized. If
the MNC succeeds in keeping the trained worker within its boundaries, its
second period prot is given by N2M , while is N2EM (t) if it exports, where
N2 is the size of the market in period 2. Note that it is assumed that the
MNC does not export in the last period of the game.
If the domestic rm succeeds in hiring the trained worker and enters the
market, both rms earn prot N2D(), where D stands for duopoly and
the parameter  2 [0; 1] is an inverse measure of the degree of competition
in the industry   = 0 in case of homogenous products and the price
competition, while  = 1 in case of independent markets. It is assumed
that D() is di¤erentiable and increases with  where D(0) = 0 and
D(1) = M .
It is argued that the domestic rm has to pay a xed cost k > 0 to benet
from the technology embedded in the trained worker. This parameter is
interpreted as an inverse measure of the absorptive capability of the domestic
rm. If the worker receives general training, k will be very low  i.e. the
technology is easily transferable. If instead he receives training in rm-
specic technology, k will be very high.
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Given that the domestic rms valuation of the trained worker is
vd = N2D()  k, (3.1)
the MNCs valuation is
vf = N2(M  D()). (3.2)
Then, the rm whose valuation of trained worker is highest hires him.
Thus two solutions emerge: either vf > vd, and the MNC keeps the worker
by paying him w = N2D()   k; or vf  vd, and the local rm hires of
the trained worker by paying him w = N2(M   D()). In the rst case,
the MNC pays the local worker more than the wage in the pool, and the
local economy enjoys pecuniary spillovers. In the second case, technology
spillovers occur, since the local rm manages to acquire the MNCs tech-
nology embedded in the trained worker. Accordingly, technology spillovers
never arise if
N2(M   2D()) + k > 0. (3.3)
Solving this game gives rise to three possible equilibrium solutions:24
1) FDI and Technology spillovers: The MNC invests in the rst period
and there exist technology spillovers if equation (3.3) does not hold true and
M  EM (t) > N2(M  D()). (3.4)
2) FDI and pecuniary spillovers: the MNC invests in the rst period
but technology spillovers do not occur if the condition embodied in equation
(3.3) holds and
M  EM (t) > N2D()  k. (3.5)
3) Exports: the MNCs exports in the rst period, and no spillovers
arise.
24As illustrated in g.2, page 214 of Fosfuri et al. paper, these equilibrium outcomes
largely depend on the degree of competition in the industry,  and the level of absorptive
capability of domestic rm, k 1. Technology spillovers are more likely to occur when both
 and k are low.
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exploring intra-industry spillovers from FDI
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Authors Countries Data
period 
analyzed
 Data 
type 
Level of 
analysis 
Proxies of spillover 
variables 
Dependent 
variables 
First 
results 
Second results 
Caves (1974) Australia 1966 CS Industry Share in  employment Value-added/labor +  
Globerman (1979) Canada 1972 CS Industry Share in  value-added Value-added/labor +  
Blomström & Persson
(1983) 
 Mexico 1970 CS Industry Share in  employment Value-added/labor +  
Blomström (1986) Mexico 1970,75 CS Industry Share in  employment Deviations of 
Value-added/labor 
from the best 
industry practice 
+  
Cantwell (1989) European 
Countries 
1955,75  CS Industry Change in Industry’s 
market share 
Changes in the 
market shares 
- + only for industries where 
domestic firms had some 
traditional technological 
strength  
Haddad & Harrison (1993) Morocco 1985-89 Panel Firm 
 
Share in  assets  1) Change in 
Value-added 
2) Value-
added/labor 
n.s. 
 
- 
 
Kokko (1994) Mexico 1970 CS Industry Share in  employment Value-added/ labor + + even for industries with a 
large productivity gap or with 
complex foreign technology 
Blomström and Wolff
(1989) 
 Mexico 1965,84 CS Industry Share in  employment Change in 
output/labor 
 
Change in 
technology gap 
+ + in sectors where existing 
technology gap is greater 
Kokko (1996)     Mexico 1970 CS Industry 1) (a) Share in
employment fo
demonstration effects 
 
r 
Value-added/ labor
And (b) foreign 
value-added/labor for 
competition effects 
 + only for samples without 
enclave industries 
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Kokko et al. (1996) Uruguay 1990 CS Firm  Share in  total output Value-added/ labor n.s. + only for firms with a small 
technology gap 
Sjöholm (1997) Indonesia 1980,91 CS Firm  The average share in  
total gross output
between 1980 and 1991 
 
1) Value-
added/labor 
2) Change in 
Value-added/labor 
+ + only for firms with a high 
degree of competition 
Perez (1997) U K 1983,89 CS Industry Initial (1983)
technology gap  
  1) Change in
value-added / labor 
  
2) Change in 
technology gap 
 
+ only (for high and low 
technology industries)  
Aitken & Harrison (1999) Venezuela 1976-89 Panel Firm 
 
1) Share in  equity, 
weighted by each 
firm’s share in industry 
employment 
 Log of total output 
2) (a) Share in  
employment in the 
same industry and 
region 
And (b) Share in 
employment in same 
industry but outside the 
region 
- + with regional FDI 
Sjöholm (1999) Indonesia 1980,91 CS Firm 1) Share in industry 
gross output 
2) Share in industry 
gross output within the 
region (province and 
district) 
 
Change in 
value-added 
+ -  with regional FDI 
Girma et al. (1999) UK 1991-96 Panel Firm Share in total output 1) Value-
added/labor (at 
level and growth 
rates) 
n.s. + only for firms with a 
relatively low technology gap, 
operating in competitive 
industries 
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2) total factor 
productivity (at 
level and growth 
rates) 
 
Konings (1999) Bulgaria, 
Romania 
and Poland 
1993-97 Panel Firm Share in  output Log output n.s. for 
Bulgaria 
and 
Romania  
- for Poland 
+ only for firms with a high 
level of absorptive capacity 
(only for Poland and Bulgaria) 
n.s. for Romania  
Blomström and Sjöholm 
(1999) 
Indonesia 1997 CS Firm 1) Share in output 
2) (a) Share in otput 
with a minority foreign 
ownership, 
And (b) Share in output 
with a majority foreign 
ownership 
Value-added/labor + + for both (a) and (b) 
Djankov & Hoekman
(2000) 
 Czech 
Republic 
1992-97 Panel Firm  Share in total assets Change in total 
factor productivity 
-  
Liu et al. (2000) UK 1991-95 Panel Industry 1) (a) Share in total 
physical capital stock 
to measure knowledge 
spillovers 
And (b) foreign 
value-added/labor for 
competition effects 
Value-added/labor + + and more pronounced in 
industries with high 
technological capacities  and 
low technology gaps 
+ for spillovers from 
competition effects 
Yudayeva et al (2000) Russia 1993-97 Panel Firm  Share in  output Output/labor +  
Barrios (2000) Spain 1990-94 Panel Firm Share in value-added Log(value-added) n.s.  
Kinoshita (2001) Czech 
Republic 
1995-98 Panel Firm Share in employment Value-added/labor 
growth 
n.s. + only for firms which actively 
perform R&D  
Chung (2001)    US 1987-91 Panel Industry 1) (a) Change in
percent foreign sales to 
measure knowledg
spillovers 
 
e 
Change in total 
factor productivity 
n.s. + competition related spillovers 
and knowledge spillovers only 
for relatively uncompetitive US 
industries 
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And (b) Change in 
industry markup to 
measure 
competition-related 
spillovers 
Kokko et al. (2001) Uruguay 
 
1988 
 
CS Firm Share in output 
 
Value-added/labor  + only with local market 
oriented foreign investors 
Castellani and Zanfei
(2001) 
 France, 
Italy and 
Spain 
1993-97 Panel Firm Share in employment Log real output + for Italian 
firms 
n.s. for 
Spanish and 
French 
firms 
+ for all firms with high gaps  
+ for firms in science based 
industries with low gaps and 
high absorptive capacities 
Girma and Wakelin (2002) UK    1988-96 Panel Firm 1) (a) Share in
employment in the 
same region and sector 
 Log output 
And (b) Share in 
employment in the 
same sector but outside 
the region 
 
 
 + in the same region 
 
-  outside the region 
Meyer and Sinani (2002) Estonia 1995-99 Panel Firm 1) Share in 
(employment, sale or 
equity)  
2) (a) Share in 
(employment, sale or 
equity)*labor quality 
for labor mobility 
effects, 
(b) Share in 
(employment, sale or 
equity)  
for demonstration and 
Change in output  + when 
spillover  
is measured 
by the share 
in 
employment 
and equity 
n.s. when 
the share in 
sale is used 
+ for spillovers from 
competition and demonstration-
vertical linkages effects 
 
- for spillovers from worker 
mobility 
                               Appendix 3: Summary of empirical studies exploring intra-industry spillovers from FDI 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 182 
vertical linkages 
effects, 
and (c) foreign 
herfindahl index for 
competition effects 
Haskel et al. (2002) UK  1973-92  Panel  Firm Share in  employment  Change in real 
gross output  
+   
Schoors and Van Der Tol 
(2002) 
Hungaria 1997-98 Panel Firm  Share in sales  Output/labor  +  
  
 
Flôres et al. (2002) Portugal 1992-95 Panel Industry Share in  value-added Value-added/labor n.s. + only for industries with an 
intermediate productivity gap 
Barrios and Strobl (2002) Spanish 1990-98 Panel Firm Share in  sales Total factor 
productivity 
+ + only for domestic exporters 
Castellani and Zanfei
(2002) 
 Italy  1992-97 Panel Firm 1) Share in
(employment, capital
or output) 
 
 
Log change in 
total factor 
productivity  
2) Levels of 
(employment, capital 
or output) 
 
- + with absolute variable 
Buckley et al. (2002) China  1995  CS  Industry Share in (employment 
or capital)  
Output/labor   + + for industries with 
collectively-owned firms 
Dimelis and Louri (2002) Greece 1997   CS Firm 1) Share in
(employment, capital
or sales) 
 
 
Log output/labor 
2) (a) Share in 
(employment, capital 
or sales) with a 
minority foreign 
ownership, 
And (b) Share in 
(employment, capital 
or sales) with a 
majority foreign 
+ + for (a) irrespective to the 
spillover measure used and 
more pronounced for lower 
productivity domestic firms 
 
n.s. for (b) only in terms of 
foreign share in sales. 
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ownership 
 
 
Narula and Marin (2003) Argentina 1992,96 CS Firm Change in percent 
foreign employment 
Log change in 
total assets 
- + only for firms which have 
invested more in their 
absorptive capacities 
Damijan et al. (2003) Bulgaria, 
Czech 
Republic, 
Estonia, 
Hungary, 
Poland, 
Romania, 
Slovak 
Republic 
and 
Slovenia 
1994-98   Panel Firm Share in (sales or 
export) 
Change in total 
factor productivity 
n.s. + only for Romanian firms 
which actively perform R&D 
Yeaple and Keller (2003) US 1987,96 CS Firm Change in percent 
foreign employment 
Change in total 
factor productivity 
+ + only for relatively high 
technology industries 
Girma (2003)     UK 1989-99 Panel Firm 1) (a) Share in
employment in the
same region and sector 
 
 
Total factor 
productivity 
 
And (b) Share in 
employment in the 
same sector but outside 
the region 
+ only for moderately 
high-tech firms and when FDI 
is motivated by the desire to 
exploit some competitive 
advantage possessed in the UK   
Buckley et al. (2003) China   1995 CS Industry 1)  Share in (capital or 
employment) 
Output/labor + + and more pronounced when a 
curvilinear relationship 
between foreign presence and 
productivity spillovers is 
accounted for 
Driffield (2004) UK 1984-97 Panel Industry 1) The stock of foreign 
capital in the industry 
across all regions 
Log output  + with regional FDI 
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2) The stock of foreign 
capital in the industry 
and region 
 
Karpaty and Lundberg 
(2004) 
Sweden   1990-00 Panel Firm 1) Share in
employment 
 Log total factor 
productivity 
2) (a) US Share in 
employment 
And (b) Share in 
employment from the 
rest of the world 
 
+ + and more pronounced with 
US foreign share 
Lenger and Taymaz (2004) Turkey 1983-00 Panel Industry Share in employment Log output/labor -  
Görg and Strobl (2004) Ghana 1991-97 Panel Firm 1) (a) Dummy variable 
(1 if owner received 
training by
multinational, 0
otherwise), 
 
1) Log change in 
total factor 
productivity  
 2) Log change in 
output/labor  
(b)   Dummy variable 
(1 if owner had gained 
experience working for 
a multinational within 
the same industry, 0 
otherwise), 
And (c) Dummy 
variable (1 if owner 
had gained experience 
working for a 
multinational in a 
different industry, 0 
otherwise) 
 
3) Log change in 
value-added/labor  
 + only for firms which are 
running by owners who had 
gained experience working for 
a multinational within the same 
industry 
Girma and Görg (2005)     UK 1980-92 Panel Firm 1) (a) Share in
employment in the
 
 
Total factor 
productivity 
 + with regional FDI, only for 
both extremely high-tech and 
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same region and sector 
And (b) Share in 
employment in the 
same sector but outside 
the region 
low-tech firms 
+ with FDI outside the region, 
only for moderately high-tech 
firms    
Ruane and Ugour (2005) Ireland 1991-98 Panel Firm 1) Share in 
employment 
2) Levels of
employment  
 
2) Change in net 
output/labor  
1) Net output/labor n.s. + with absolute variable 
Dimelis (2005) Greece 1992,97 CS Firm Share in equity Change in log of 
real output 
n.s. + for domestic firms with small 
gaps 
Barry et al. (2005) Ireland 1990-98 
 
Panel Firm Share in employment 1) Total factor 
productivity 
2) Output/labor 
n.s.  - for domestic exporters
n.s. for domestic non-exporters 
Halpern and Muraközy 
(2005) 
Hungary 1996-01 Panel Firm 1) Share in total sales 
in the industry 
2) share in total sales in 
an industry within a 
region 
 
Log of 
value-added 
n.s. n.s. even for regional spillovers 
Liu and Wei (2006) UK 1998-01 Panel Firm 1) Share in 
(employment, Capital 
or sales) in an industry, 
in a region, or in an 
industry within a 
region 
2) (a) OCDE Share in 
(employment, Capital 
or sales) in an industry, 
in a region, or in an 
industry within a 
region 
 
And (b) HMT Shares in 
Log 
value-added/labor 
n.s. + in the same region  
+in an industry within a region 
+ only with HMT-FDI in an 
industry. 
+ with OECD-FDI in a region, 
or in an industry within a 
region 
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(employment, Capital 
or sales) in an industry, 
in a region, or in an 
industry within a 
region 
 
Driffield and Love (2006a) UK 1984-95 Panel Industry Share in  investment Value-added n.s. + only when FDI is motivated 
by the desire to exploit some 
competitive advantage 
possessed in the UK 
Ben Hamida and Gugler 
(2006) 
Switzerland 1998,01 CS Firm Share in sales Change in Log 
value-added 
n.s. + for domestic firms largely 
invested in absorptive capacity 
+ for domestic firms with mid 
technology gap 
Marin and Bell (2006) Argentina  1992,96 CS Firm Share in employment Change in log of 
value-added 
n.s. + only with technologically 
active affiliates 
Hale and Long (2006) China 2001 CS Firm 1) Share in 
employment in an
industry within the 
same city 
 
Log of value-
added 
2) (a) Share in 
employment in an 
industry within the 
same city 
And (b) the share of 
employees with foreign 
experience 
- + for domestic firms with 
skilled labor mobility 
Driffield and Love (2007) UK 1987-97 Panel Industry Share in 
investment*binary 
dummy variable to
control for the type of 
FDI motives  
 
Log of value-
added 
 + only from FDI motivated by 
a strong technology-based 
ownership advantage 
Buckley et al. (2007a) China   2001 CS Industry 1) Share in capital  
2) (a) HMT shares in  
 + + for HMT-FDI only in labor-
intensive industries 
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capital  
And (b) other 
(Western) share in  
capital  
 
+ for Western-FDI  only in 
technology-intensive industries 
+ for state-owned enterprises 
from HMT-FDI in labor-
intensive industries 
and Western FDI in 
technology-intensive industries 
 + for other domestic firms 
only from HMT-FDI in labor-
intensive industries 
Buckley et al. (2007b) China 1997 CS Industry 1) (a) HMT shares in  
capital  
And (b) other 
(Western) share in  
capital  
 
Value-added/labor  + only from HMT-FDI with a 
curvilinear relationship  
Tian (2007) China 1996-99 Panel Firm 1) Share in 
(employment, capital
or output) 
 
2) Share in tangible 
assets and share in 
intangible assets, share 
in new products and 
share in traditional 
products, share in  
exported products and 
share in domestically 
consumed products, 
and share in skilled 
employment and share 
in less skilled 
employment 
Log output + only for 
foreign 
capital 
share  
+ only from foreign firms using 
tangible assets, producing 
domestically consumed 
products, producing traditional 
products, and employing 
unskilled workers 
Notes: 
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i. Data: “CS” denotes the cross-sectional data, while “Panel” denotes the use of combined cross-sectional time-series data in the respective 
analysis. 
ii. Aggregation: use of either the industry or the firm level data in the analysis. 
iii. Result: regression analysis finds a “+” positive and statistically significant, “-” negative and statistically significant and “n.s.” statistically 
insignificant sign of spillovers for the aggregate sample. 
iv. First result: the estimation of spillover effects using Caves’s (1974) model. 
v. Second result: the estimation of spillover effects after controlling for local and foreign characteristics, the regional dimension and/or the 
linearity and the measure of spillover variable.
Appendix 4: Summary of the parameters and the
initial values employed in simulation
A summary of the parameters and the values employed in the runs an-
alyzed in the paper is presented below.
a = 0.01
 = 0.1
1 = 1.5
1 (if N
imi
iD (t  1) < 0) = 0.2
1 (if N
imi
iD (t  1) > 0) = 0.3
wiD = wiF = 0.16
1 = 2 = 0
1 = 2 = 3 0.1
When the industry has 6 rms: 2 foreign and 4 domestic rms, with
geographical dimension is not taken into account.
0i (if N imiiD (t  1) < 0), i= D1...D4 = 0.5
0D1 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 0.62
0D2 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 0.7
0D3 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 0.77
0D4 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 0.75
D1 = 0.9
D2 = 0.92
D3 = 0.95
D4 = 1
F1 = F2 = 0.6
D1 = 0.04
D2 = 0.05
D3 = 0.07
D4 = 0.07
2 = 0.15
3 = 0.3
4 = 0.05
2 = 0.33
D1 = 0.8
D2 = 0.7
D3 = 0.55
D4 = 0.4
F1 = 0.6
F2 = 0.75
fD1 = 0.23
fD2 = 0.18
fD3 = 0.13
fD4 = 0.10
fF1 = 0.15
fF2 = 0.20
When the industry has 6 rms: 2 foreign and 4 domestic rms, with
geographical dimension is taken into account.
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Appendix 4: Summary of the parameters and the initial values
employed in simulation
When di   = 1
D1 (if N imiiD (t  1) < 0) = 1.832
D2 (if N imiiD (t  1) < 0) = 2.06
D3 (if N imiiD (t  1) < 0) = 1.812
D4 (if N imiiD (t  1) < 0) = 1.809
D1 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 1.559
D2 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 1.537
D3 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 1.30
D4 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 1.3
dD1 = 0.9
dD2 = 0.8
dD3 = 0.91
dD4 = 0.91
F1 2.95
F2 2.6
dF1 0.794
dF2 0.9
When di >  = 1
D1 (if N imiiD (t  1) < 0) = 1.832
D2 (if N imiiD (t  1) < 0) = 2.06
D3 (if N imiiD (t  1) < 0) = 1.812
D4 (if N imiiD (t  1) < 0) = 1.81
D1 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 1.559
D2 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 1.537
D3 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 1.30
D4 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 1.3
dD1 = 1.102
dD2 = 1.069
dD3 = 1.253
dD4 = 1.27
F1 = 1.95
F2 = 2.12
dF1 = 1.2
dF2 = 1.09
When the industry has 15 rms: 2 foreign and 13 domestic rms
0i (if N imiiD (t  1) < 0) = 0.601
0D1 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 0.711
0D2 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 0.721
0D3 (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0) = 0.722
0i (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0), i= D4...D8 = 0.723
0i (if N imiiD (t  1) > 0), i= D9...D13 = 0.73
D1 = 0.913
D2 = 0.921
i, i= D3...D8 = 0.94
i, i= D9...D11 = 0.95
D12 = 0.951
D13 = 0.968
F1 = F2 = 0.65
D1 = 0.03
D2 = D3 = 0.031
D4 = 0.0317
D5 = 0.032
D6 = D7 = 0.033
D8 = D9 = 0.034
D10 = D11 = 0.036
D12 = D13 = 0.04
2 = 0.184
3 =0.301
4 = 0.03
190
D1 = 0.82
D2 = 0.78
D3 = 0.75
D4 = 0.72
D5 = 0.71
D6 = 0.7
D7 = 0.69
D8 = 0.67
D9 = 0.63
D10 = 0.57
D11 = 0.56
12 = 0.55
13 = 0.54
F1 = 0.76
F2 = 0.8
2 = 0.17
fD1 = 0.079
fD2 = 0.076
fD3 = 0.074
fD4 = 0.073
fD5 = 0.072
fD6 = 0.071
fD7 = 0.069
fD8 = 0.068
fD9 = 0.061
fD10 = 0.055
fD11 = 0.054
fD12 = 0.053
fD13 = 0.043
fF1 = 0.075
fF2 = 0.077
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Appendix 5: Further illustrations for data analysis
* or nearest available year.
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Figure 9.1. International comparison of gross domestic
R&D expenditures of private rms (% of GDP), 2000 and
2004. Source: SFSO (2006).
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Figure 9.2. Intra-muros R&D expenditures in Switzerland
(in million CHF, round numbers), 2000 and 2004. Source:
SFSO (2006).
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Figure 9.3. Accumulated amounts of innovation expendi-
tures in Switzerland for manufacturing, 2000-2002 (wherein
the Balck parts in bars denote the share of R&D expendi-
ture). Source: Arvanitis et al. (2004).
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Appendix 5: Further illustrations for data analysis
Figure 9.4. Accumulated amounts of innovation expen-
ditures in Switzerland for construction/services, 2000-2002
(wherein the Balck parts in bars denote the share of R&D
expenditure). Source: Arvanitis et al. (2004).
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Appendix 6: Models of letters sent to foreign and
domestic rms
Box 3. A model of the letter sent to Swiss rms
Mr. University of Fribourg
Bd de Pérolles 90,
CH - 1700 Fribourg.
Neuchâtel, April 13, 2006.
Concern: Research project at the University of Fribourg on
rms in Switzerland.
Dear Sir,
The University of Fribourg is currently undertaking, in the context
of a PhD project, a study of the importance of inward direct
investment for the economic performance of Switzerland.
The object of this study is to explore the role of foreign a¢ liates es-
tablished in Switzerland for the economic development of our rms
so as to gain more prots: do our rms benet from the foreign
presence in their industry, through which channels do these benets
occur, does the presence of foreign rms nearby increases their ben-
ets, etc. For this study, we invite 120 people from rms across
Switzerland that have been randomly selected for interviews
so as to discuss the strategies of their rms vis-à-vis the foreign rivals.
You may receive within the next days a phone call from Mrs Lamia
Ben Hamida asking you for an interview at a time that suits you both.
This interview lasts approximately 15 minutes and can be carried out
by phone, within your company, or in a place that you choose. Of
course, the information given is anonymous and condential; this
research does not have any commercial or administrative goal.
We hope sincerely that you agree to take part in this study.
Thank you for your precious collaboration and with best regards.
The researchers in charge for the study
Lamia Ben Hamida*
*Lamia Ben Hamida is a PhD student in economics at the University of Fribourg. Email:
lamia.benhamida@unifr.ch - www.unifr.ch. Phone 032 721 3725. Mobile 078 647 5433.
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Box 4. Model of the letter sent to foreign a¢ liates in Switzerland
Mr. University of Fribourg
Bd de Pérolles 90,
CH - 1700 Fribourg.
Neuchâtel, April 13, 2006.
Concern: Research project at the University of Fribourg on
rms in Switzerland.
Dear Sir,
The University of Fribourg is currently undertaking, in the context
of a PhD project, a study of inward foreign direct investment
in Switzerland.
The object of this study is to explore the Swiss contribution in
the economic development of our foreign multinationals established
within our country so as to gain more prots: why do our foreign
rms choose Switzerland, do they benet from their presence in our
regions, through which channels do these benete occur, does the
presence of Swiss rms nearby increases their benets, etc. For this
study, we invite 120 people from rms across Switzerland that
have been randomly selected for interviews so as to discuss the
strategies of their rms vis-à-vis the establishment in Switzerland.
You may receive within the next days a phone call from Mrs Lamia
Ben Hamida asking you for an interview at a time that suits you both.
This interview lasts approximately 15 minutes and can be carried out
by phone, within your company, or in a place that you choose. Of
course, the information given is anonymous and condential; this
research does not have any commercial or administrative goal.
We sincerely hope that you agree to take part in this study.
Thank you for your precious collaboration and with best regards.
The researchers in charge for the study
Lamia Ben Hamida*
*Lamia Ben Hamida is a PhD student in economics at the University of Fribourg. Email :
lamia.benhamida@unifr.ch - www.unifr.ch. Phone 032 721 3725. Mobile 078 647 5433.
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Appendix 7: The econometric model
The equation (1.1) is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function
with value-added Y a function of two inputs, capital and labor
Yi;j;t = Ai;j;tL
1
i;j;tK
2
i;j;t. (3.6)
The level of productivity is given by Ai;j;t, which is assumed to vary
across rms within each sector j and across time t.
After taking logarithms of the variables to get into a linear form equation
(3.6) and adding a stochastic disturbance term ui;j;t to account for variations
in the productive capabilities of the i-th rm, we can rewrite equation (3.6)
for t  3 =2001 and t =2004 as
LnYi;j;t = ai;j;t + 1LnLi;j;t + 2LnKi;j;t + ui;j;t, (ai;j;t = LnAi;j;t), (3.7)
LnYi;j;t 3 = ai;j;t 3 + 1LnLi;j;t 3 + 2LnKi;j;t 3 + ui;j;t 3,
(ai;j;t 3 = LnAi;j;t 3). (3.8)
Then, taking the di¤erence (3.7-3.8) yields the change in value-added
for domestic rms between 2004 and 2001.  denotes the variation between
2004 and 2001
LnYi;j = ai;j + 1LnLi;j + 2LnKi;j + "i;j;. (3.9)
We test the hypothesis that the productivity growth is a¤ected by the
share of foreign presence at the industry level, its interaction with the human
capital of the i-th rm, and the increase in the level of industry competition,
by modeling the change in a as
ai;j = 3FPj;t 3 + 4HCi;j;t + 5FPj;t 3 HCi;j;t + 6Compj
+7 Si zei;j;t + 8Agei;j;t + 9Industryi;j , (3.10)
where, the change in a is also assumed to vary across sectors, the human
capital of the domestic rm, and its size.
Finally, combining equations (3.9) and (3.10) yields equation (1.1) in
section 1 of chapter 9.
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Table 9.2. Estimation results for manufacturing: Spillovers
from FDI and existing level of technology gap between foreign
and domestic rms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Variables Full Full Small Mid Large Small Mid Large
GAP GAP GAP GAP GAP GAP
LnK -0.0004 -0.001 0.45*** -0.005 -0.006 0.43*** -0.006 0.19***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.04) (0.006) (0.005) (0.04) (0.004) (0.04)
LnL 0.77*** 0.86*** 0.38*** 0.71*** 0.79*** 0.38*** 0.9*** 0.66***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.1) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.008)
HC 0.42*** 0.47*** 0.23*** 0.57*** 0.66*** 0.44*** 0.54*** 0.77***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.1) (0.07) (0.1) (0.1) (0.12)
FP j 0.0002 0.0005 0.009*** 0.005***
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
FP j;r 0.001* 0.002* 0.003** 0.001*
(0.0006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FP j;R r 0.0003 0.00008 0.0019* 0.0008
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0005)
FP jHC 0.006 -0.00007 0.01* 0.011***
(0.004) 0.003 (0.006) (0.003)
FP j;rHC 0.006* 0.002 -0.002 0.009***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
FP j;R rHC -0.002** -0.004** -0.002 0.0008
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Comp 1.54*** 1.52*** -0.36* 1.76*** 1.43*** -0.289* 1.52*** 0.29
(0.14) (0.1) 0.19 (0.15) (0.1) (0.17) (0.1) 0.29
Size -0.001 -0.002 0.03*** 0.01 -0.007 0.01 -0.001 -0.01
(0.008) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.67 0.7 0.88 0.69 0.77 0.9 0.67 0.79
F   Chow 15.6 9.73
N 370 269 71 106 193 61 93 115
Note: All estimations include industry dummies. All standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected
for heteroskedasticiy.
Variables (HC and FP ) used for interactions are centered by subtracting the full sample means, so
that (1) multicollinearity between the variables and their product is reduced, (2) better estimates of
(HC and FP ) are ensured, and (3) more meaningful interpretations of those estimates
are granted (Aiken and West, 1991).
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9.3. Estimation results for manufacturing: Spillovers
from FDI and the domestic absorptive capacity with respect
to learning and investment
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables Full Full High Small High Small
INV EST INV EST INV EST INV EST
LnK -0.002 -0.006*** 0.002 -0.006 -0.002*** -0.01
(0.003) (0.0006) (0.005) (0.01) (0.0006) (0.009)
LnL 0.85*** 1.07*** 0.95*** 0.67*** 1.12*** 0.79***
(0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.1) (0.02) (0.1)
HC 0.41*** 0.50*** 0.41*** 0.37 0.51*** 0.14
(0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.2) (0.02) (0.1)
FP j 0.0007 0.004*** -0.002
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.006)
FP j;r 0.001*** 0.004*** -0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.001)
FP j;R r -0.0002*** 0.002*** -0.0006
(0.00006) (0.0003) (0.0004)
FP jHC 0.002 0.005* 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.02)
FP j;rHC 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.014
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.01)
FP j;R rHC -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001)
Comp 1.69*** 1.79*** 1.67*** 1.45*** 1.8*** 1.47***
(0.1) (0.02) (0.1) (0.2) (0.04) (0.1)
Size 0.0005 0.007*** 0.004 -0.02 0.001 0.001
(0.009) (0.002) (0.01) (0.03) (0.003) (0.01)
R2 0.73 0.79 0.79 0.6 0.79 0.78
F   Chow 8.16 6.29
N 240 182 179 61 120 62
Note: All estimations include industry dummies. All standard errors, in parentheses,
are corrected for heteroskedasticiy.
Variables (HC and FP ) used for interactions are centered by subtracting the full sample
means, so that (1) multicollinearity between the variables and their product is reduced,
(2) better estimates of (HC and FP ) are ensured, and (3) more meaningful
interpretations of those estimates are granted (Aiken and West, 1991).
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9.4. Estimation results for services/construction:
Spillovers from FDI and existing level of technology gap be-
tween foreign and domestic rms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Variables Full Full Small Mid Large Small Mid Large
GAP GAP GAP GAP GAP GAP
LnK 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.47*** 0.19*** 0.009*** 0.53*** 0.36*** 0.01***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.03) (0.01) (0.001) (0.05) (0.05) (0.002)
LnL 0.5*** 0.69*** 0.4*** 0.6*** 0.76*** 0.35*** 0.64*** 0.72***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
HC 0.09*** 0.38*** 0.03*** 0.35*** 0.57*** 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.42***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.1) (0.09) (0.05)
FP j -0.01*** -0.0004 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
FP j;r 0.001*** 0.0009 0.006*** 0.002**
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003)
FP j;R r -0.0005*** 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0002)
FP jHC 0.0006 0.003* 0.009*** -0.01***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
FP j;rHC 0.004*** 0.017* 0.004 0.0035**
(0.001) (0.009) (0.005) (0.001)
FP j;R rHC -0.001*** -0.002 0.004*** -0.0033***
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004)
Comp 0.99*** 1.06*** -0.35*** 0.15*** 1.22*** -0.4*** -0.46 0.86***
(0.1) (0.08) (0.1) (0.04) (0.09) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
Size 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.0008 0.01** 0.001 0.038** 0.008
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.001) (0.006) (0.02) (0.01) (0.005)
R2 0.49 0.59 0.91 0.88 0.56 0.96 0.96 0.45
F   Chow 5.85 8.41
N 287 226 66 94 127 28 64 134
Note: All estimations include industry dummies. All standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected
for heteroskedasticiy.
Variables (HC and FP ) used for interactions are centered by subtracting the full sample means, so
that (1) multicollinearity between the variables and their product is reduced, (2) better estimates of
(HC and FP ) are ensured, and (3) more meaningful interpretations of those estimates
are granted (Aiken and West, 1991).
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9.5. Estimation results for services/construction:
Spillovers from FDI and the domestic absorptive capacity
with respect to learning and investment
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables Full Full High Small High Small
INV EST INV EST INV EST INV EST
LnK 0.33*** 0.3*** 0.37*** 0.24** 0.36*** 0.47***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.1)
LnL 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.63*** 0.54*** 0.29**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
HC 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.33*** 0.28* 0.29*** 0.009
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.1) (0.07) (0.09)
FP j 0.001 0.005* -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
FP j;r 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
FP j;R r 0.0006 -0.0007 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
FP jHC 0.001 0.012*** -0.009
(0.003) (0.005) (0.01)
FP j;rHC 0.0019 0.006* -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
FP j;R rHC -0.0005 0.001 0.0006
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.001)
Comp -0.14 -0.16 -0.34 0.71 -0.24 -0.29
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.5) (0.2) (0.4)
Size -0.007 0.02* -0.007 -0.07 0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
R2 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.81 0.72 0.88
F   Chow 3.25 6.6
N 104 86 72 32 52 34
Note: All estimations include industry dummies. All standard errors, in parentheses,
are corrected for heteroskedasticiy.
Variables (HC and FP ) used for interactions are centered by subtracting the full sample
means, so that (1) multicollinearity between the variables and their product is reduced,
(2) better estimates of (HC and FP ) are ensured, and (3) more meaningful
interpretations of these estimates are granted (Aiken and West, 1991).
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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